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QUICKLY? ENVIRONMENTAL




East Asia is undergoing its own Industrial Revolution. Special
economic zones (SEZs) are playing a key role in its economic
transformation. However, industrialization has brought great
environmental concern. Over recent decades, China, the Philip-
pines, South Korea, and other newly industrializing economies
in East Asia have designated special areas for foreign invest-
ment and export production to which have been conceded fa-
vourable investment and trade conditions, and often exemption
from certain kinds of regulation. "Race to the bottom" and re-
lated theories of the effects of inter-jurisdictional competition
for investment predict that environmental regulation would be
compromised in SEZs. Contrary to such hypotheses, there is
some evidence that environmental regulation in East Asia's in-
dustrializing zones is stricter than in other parts of their econo-
mies, and that foreign investors are sometimes more strictly
regulated than local businesses. The experience of East Asia's
SEZs - particularly in China - suggests we need to re-think
how we conceptualise the relationships between environmental
law and foreign investment in the context of rapidly industrial-
izing developing countries. This experience also reveals persis-
tent weaknesses in the legal systems of East Asia and the
fragility of the rule of (environmental) law. To address this, fur-
ther reform to the environmental regulation of SEZs should be
grounded in more wide-ranging and basic improvements to ad-
ministrative regimes, policy instruments and access to justice.
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
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I. THE SETTING AND PROBLEM
Is East Asia industrializing too quickly? Its bullish economic
growth has engendered massive environmental change, making
the region one of the planet's most environmentally stressed.' A
maelstrom of economic modernization, epitomized by rapid ur-
banization and industrialization, has created extensive environ-
mental problems that require stronger legal and policy responses.
The apotheosis of this economic transformation is the special ec-
onomic zones (SEZs). In China, South Korea, Thailand and
other "Newly Industrializing Countries" (NICs), special areas
have been designated to lure foreign investment and export pro-
duction through favourable investment and trade conditions, and
often exemption from certain kinds of regulation. As sites of
hyper-industrialization, the SEZs are vulnerable to acute envi-
ronmental pressure. East Asia's fragile legal institutions and its
difficulties of implementing a rule of law mentality pose great
challenges to the development of effective environmental regula-
tions capable of keeping pace with the frenetic economic
changes.
The region's Industrial Revolution has made its members
known as Asian "tigers", "dragons" or "miracles".2 Though they
share a similar economic trajectory, there are pertinent differ-
ences in their economic structures, legal cultures and political
ideologies. Such differences, in turn, lend to variations in their
environmental laws and policies. 3 South Korea and Taiwan have
enjoyed the most consistent growth and relatively higher stan-
dards of living, followed by Malaysia and Thailand.4 In a third
tier are countries that have poorer, largely agricultural-based
economies at a nascent stage of industrialization, such as Viet-
nam and Indonesia. 5 China is a sui generis case, for its sheer size
masks considerable regional variations in its economic moderni-
1. See, by way of introduction, ASIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (Michael C.
Howard ed., 1993).
2. See generally ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE "THE REST": CHAL-
LENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (2001); World
Bank, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993).
3. AJIT S. BHALLA, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: A STUDY
OF CHINA AND INDIA 7 (1992).
4. See ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SoUTH KOREA AND LATE IN-
DUSTRIALIZATION 3 (1989); PETER C.Y. CHOW, TAIWAN IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
FROM AN AGRARIAN ECONOMY TO AN EXPORTER OF HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS XV
(2002). See generally HYUNG-Koo LEE, THE KOREAN ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1996).
5. For evidence of the acute environmental problems in Vietnam, see David
Drakakis-Smith & Chris Dixon, Sustainable Urbanization in Vietnam, 28 GEOFORUM
21, 21 (1997).
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zation.6 But all of these countries are market economies or mov-
ing in that direction, and all seek to modernize their economies
through industrialization, foreign investment and technology,
and through participation in the global economic and legal order.
While East Asia's spectacular economic growth has created
millions of jobs and lifted living standards for many, its environ-
mental costs have been steep. Poverty alleviation, reduced inci-
dents of illiteracy and infant mortality, and other social and
economic benefits must be viewed in the context of a broader
deterioration in environmental conditions. 7 A ubiquitous politi-
cal philosophy in East Asia has been to "grow first, clean up
later".8 The synergistic effects of high urbanization, rapid popula-
tion growth and intensification of land use have created some
horrendous environmental problems. Lester Brown of the World
Resources Institute has drawn comparisons between East Asia's
hyper-industrialization to the earlier industrialization period of
Western Europe and North America. 9 The latter regions con-
tained far fewer people and relatively more resources than East
Asia today. Never in human history have so many people
climbed the food chain so quickly. 10 East Asia's stupendous eco-
nomic expansion has been exceeded by even faster growth in
pollution.11
What do such conditions imply about the condition of envi-
ronmental regulation in the region? At first glance, most East
Asian states have amassed sizeable collections of environmental
laws and policies, often borrowing from Western precedents.
They have also ratified many international environmental trea-
ties. But appearances can be misleading. China, for example, has
a plethora of environmental laws, policies and an extensive ad-
ministrative apparatus, but its seeming successes in environmen-
tal policy formation have not been matched by policy
implementation. Persistent weaknesses in its underlying legal in-
6. See SHAOGUANG WANG & ANGANG Hu, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UN-
EVEN DEVELOPMENT (1999).
7. See Guatam Kaji, Challenges to the East Asian Environment, 7 PAC. REV.
210 (1994); RICHARD L. EDMONDS, PATTERNS OF CHINA'S LOST HARMONY: A SUR-
VEY OF THE COUNTRY'S ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND PROTECTION (1994).
8. See ASIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (Michael C. Howard ed., 1993).
9. Lester Brown, Can we Raise Grain Yields Fast Enough?, 10 WORLD WATCH
8, 9 (1997).
10. Id. Of course, economic growth cannot be simplistically equated with high
pollution, for historically Eastern Europe had low growth and high pollution while,
conversely, Japan enjoyed high growth and lowered pollution. But economic growth
and ecological stress regrettably often coincide; see generally DONELLA H. MEAD-
OWS ET AL., BEYOND THE LIMITS: CONFRONTING GLOBAL COLLAPSE: ENVISIONING
A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1992).
11. Carter Brandon, Reversing Pollution Trends in Asia, 31 FIN. & DEV. 21, 21
(1994).
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stitutions have hampered environmental reforms. These
problems can be traced to various cultural and political condi-
tions that undermine the rule of public law. We need to ask
whether these general dilemmas of environmental regulation are
applicable to the SEZs, which have often been lavished with in-
stitutional support and financial resources unavailable in other
economic sectors. What variables have shaped environmental
regulation in the SEZs? "Race to the bottom" theories of inter-
jurisdictional competition for investment would predict that the
economic policies of East Asia would undermine environmental
regulation in the SEZs. Therefore, through an analysis of the
SEZs experience, what theoretical conclusions about environ-
mental governance in the context of rapid industrializing econo-
mies can by drawn? And what viable institutional and legal
reforms could help reduce the environmental impact of the
SEZs?
These are the primary concerns of this Article. The broad
argument advanced here is that while SEZs can be hot-spots for
environmental mismanagement, these industrializing precincts
have also pioneered some improvements to public regulation and
policy implementation. Their environmental regulation is some-
times stricter than in other areas that have been shielded from
the full brunt of industrial transformation. In many cases, the
presence of substantial foreign investment has contributed to im-
provements in environmental management. Indeed, solutions to
East Asian environmental regulatory weaknesses may well reside
in the areas most open to the market. SEZs can offer an arena
for experimentation of environmental law and for the testing of
new regulatory techniques. Also, certain environmental advan-
tages may ensue from engagement with the international market,
which can offer environmental technologies, management tech-
niques, and financial resources not readily available domestically.
However, until generic weaknesses in the legal institutions of
some East Asian nations are addressed, the scope for environ-
mental law reform in some jurisdictions appears to be limited.
In the next Part, this article traces the economic transforma-
tion of East Asia and its environmental legacy. It details the role
of the SEZs in this process. Part III of the Article examines the
state of environmental law in the region and analyzes the drivers
and obstacles to environmental law reform in East Asia. It ex-
plains the obstacles to establishing the rule of law that must be
overcome if the region's environmental reforms are to institu-
tionally survive. From this general perspective, Part IV considers
environmental regulation in the SEZs, focusing on pollution con-
trol. It highlights differences between the environmental regula-
tion of foreign investors and domestic enterprises. Part V
[Vol. 22:150
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canvasses the role that ecological modernization reforms play in
strengthening environmental regulations in the SEZs. Through
its comparative and interdisciplinary approach, this Article will
illuminate the state of environmental regulation in East Asia's
NICs, and thereby help advance theoretical debates regarding
how environmental law functions in the face of severe economic
change. While developments in all industrializing nations of East
Asia are considered, China is the focus of the Article because it
has had the most substantial experience with the SEZ model.
II. EAST ASIA'S INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION
AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
A. THE DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE OF EAST ASIAN STATES
East Asia-stretching from Korea to Indonesia-contains
many newly industrializing countries. 12 They include, principally,
China, Taiwan and South Korea, as well as Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. They have similar eco-
nomic ambitions, but differ considerably in their history, geogra-
phy, demography, ethnicity, political ideology and level of
economic progression. Despite their diversity, the state has
played a pivotal role in the economic transformation of all the
countries. Economic policies have emphasized industrialization
and quick economic growth.' 3 East Asian governments have ac-
cepted primary stewardship of growth and given it higher priority
than their Western counterparts. It has been estimated that while
it took the West some 400 hundred years to achieve a tenfold
increase in per capita income, South Korea and Taiwan bolted to
the same gain in merely 50 years. 14
While virtually all East Asian governments have adopted in-
dustrial policies to accelerate and direct economic development,
the "tiger" economies of Northeast Asia (e.g., South Korea and
Taiwan) have followed the state-driven industrial policy more
rigorously and with greater success. 15 Their growth rates were
12. "East Asia" as a region has no authoritatively-accepted boundaries. Its core
certainly includes China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea and Japan. It is also
commonly understood to include the ASEAN group (Association of South East
Asian Nations) and thus the sub regions of Indochina (e.g., Vietnam) and Southeast
Asia (e.g., Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines). See further PHILIPPE
RGNIER, REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA (2003).
13. Fred Robins, Industry Policy in Asia, 1 ASIAN Bus. & MGMT. 291 (2002).
14. Malcolm Dowling, Industrialization in Asia: A Tale of Two Regions, 8 J.
ASIAN ECON. 295, 295 (1997).
15. Id.
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about 7.5 percent annually through the heady 1970s and 1980s. 16
The resource-poorer countries of South Korea and Taiwan
adopted an economic strategy to overcome their impoverished
natural resources endowment by investing first in labour-inten-
sive industries (e.g., textiles) and, later, using earnings to expand
into capital-intensive high-technology industries.17 By contrast,
the resource-rich countries of mainly Southeast Asia (e.g., Ma-
laysia and Indonesia) focused their economic policies on ex-
ploitation of their forests, minerals and other abundant natural
resources.
18
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade
have been seminal elements in both types of economic strategies.
FDI to developing countries grew from an average of $46B per
year in the 1988-93 period to over $240B annually by 2000.19
South Korea's annual growth of trade increased from an average
of 1.4 percent during the years of 1950-60, to 37 percent in the
period of 1970-80.20 In Taiwan, trade over the same period
jumped from 6.5 to 28.6 percent.21 East Asia is now a magnet for
huge quantities of FDI, attracting more foreign investment than
any other developing country region. A wide variety of projects
have been targeted for FDI, especially chemicals, metallurgy, car
manufacturing, electronics and textile manufacturing.22 By 2002,
China had become the world's largest recipient of FDI, with a
US$53 billion annual inflow. 23 Most of this investment went to
China's SEZs and open economic cities.24 Between 1980 and
2000, Shenzhen's SEZ sucked in US$20 billion of FDI,2 5 and re-
corded the fastest growth of any part of China.26 Although much
of this investment into China, and some other parts of East Asia,
16. Shinichi Ichimura & James W. Morley, Introduction: The Varieties of Asia-
Pacific Experience, in DRIVEN BY GROWTH: POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE ASIA-PA-
CIFIC REGION 3, 5 (James W. Morley ed., 1993).
17. Dowling, supra note 14, at 297.
18. Id. at 298; Ichimura & Morley, supra note 16, at 7.
19. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT [hereinafter




22. See, e.g., Funds Pour into Economic Zone, CHINA DAILY, June 29, 2004, at
10, available at http://wwwl.cei.gov.cn/ce/doc/cen3/200406294021.htm.
23. ORGANIZATION FOR COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [here-
inafter OECD], RECENT TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3, 33 (2000).
24. M. Ogutcu & M.ehmet OgUtqU & Markus Taube, Getting China's Regions
Moving, 231 OECD OBSERVER 13, 13 (2002).
25. The Rise and Rise of an SEZ, HONG KONG MAIL, Jan. 23, 2002.
26. But It's Unlikely to Check Shenzen's Growth, AUSTRALASIAN Bus. INTELLI-
GENCE, Jan. 14, 2003, at 1008014; see also WEIPING Wu, PIONEERING ECONOMIC
REFORM IN CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES-THE PROMOTION OF FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN SHENZHEN (1999).
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is from North American and European companies, increasingly it
is also from other East Asian companies, especially Japanese
firms.
27
Underpinning the economic transformation of East Asia is
state-steered development.2 8 East Asia's economic "miracle" has
not been a serendipitous consequence of a conflation of various
market forces, but a result of specific economic policies and ac-
tive intervention by governments. Unlike the earlier 19th century
laissez-faire traditions of the West, state involvement in East
Asia began not in the liberal mould of detached market regula-
tion, but as a deep involvement in capital allocation and the re-
structuring of markets.29 After their independence, most
postcolonial administrations in the region nationalized foreign
companies, set up numerous state enterprises, and launched am-
bitious national development plans. Governments in Malaysia,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand all saw state inter-
vention in the market as crucial to support economic growth.
30
Their industrialization took the shape of command capitalism,
wherein economic development was centrally planned, markets
were highly regulated, and physical infrastructure such as trans-
port and communication facilities was subsidised by the state.
31
In Taiwan, the state legislated to help transform agricultural
lands into high intensity industrial zones.32 The Thai govern-
ment's economic blueprint was to shift from import-substitution
to export-oriented investment.33 South Korea's former President
Park Chung-Hee built an authoritarian political regime from
which he imposed policies to stimulate the rapid modernization
of the economy through periodic five-year economic plans in
27. OECD, supra note 23, at 33. One quarter of Malaysia's FDI has come from
Singapore in recent years and Hong Kong provides about 60 percent of China's FDI.
Id. at 34.
28. KJELD ERIK BR0DSGAARD & SUSAN YOUNG, Introduction: State Capacity in
East Asia, in STATE CAPACITY IN EAST ASIA: JAPAN, TAIWAN, CHINA, AND VIET-
NAM 1, 1 (2001).
29. See DRAGONS IN DISTRESS: ASIA'S MIRACLE ECONOMIES IN CRISIS (Walden
Bello & Stephanie Resenfeld eds., 1991).
30. See Richard Grabowski, Developmental States and Developmental En-
trepreneurial Groups: Asian Experiences, 13 J. ASIAN BUS. 25 (1997); FREDERIC
DEYO, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM (1987); MAN-
UFACTURING MIRACLES: PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND
EAST ASIA (Gary Gereffi & Don Wyman eds., 1990).
31. Introduction: The Rise and Crisis of the Dragon Economies, in DRAGONS IN
DISTRESS: ASIA'S MIRACLE ECONOMIES IN CRISIS, supra note 29, at 1, 7.
32. Martha F. Bishai, The Development of Industrial Land in Taiwan: A Legal
Framework for State Control, 26 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 53 (1991).
33. Pasuk Phongpaichit, Technocrats, Businessmen and Generals: Democracy
and Economic Policy-making in Thailand, in THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC POLICY
REFORM IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC 10 (Andrew J. MacIntyre
& Kanishka Jayasuriya eds., 1992).
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partnership with the chaebo134 industrial conglomerates such as
Hyundai and Samsung.35 Under such economic conditions, law
became an instrument of state power rather than a means of con-
straining the state. 36
Since the early 1980s, in line with global trends, East Asian
economies have been increasingly deregulated. 37 There has been
a concerted effort to dilute central economic planning and state
economic monopolies through a market-driven model based on
neo-liberal assumptions such as rational individual choice, mini-
mal state control, market competition and efficiency, and free
trade.38 Traditionally state-controlled sectors such as telecommu-
nications, electricity, railways, and airlines have been opened to
foreign investment. 39 The socialist countries of the region -
China and Vietnam - have also embraced these reforms. Since
the late 1980s the Vietnamese economy has surged in the wake of
the doi moi reforms to open the economy to international capital
and to reduce central government interference. 40 There has also
been a trend in much of East Asia away from heavy industry to
investment in the high technology and service sectors, heralding
what some commentators describe as Asia's "New Economy". 41
The role of policy-makers in the region has thus moved, but not
entirely, from interventionist, nation-building activities, to being
a facilitator of market forces in which the private sector plays the
hegemonic role.42
These economic policy changes towards government down-
sizing and market liberalization have been influenced by the
growing regional presence of international economic institutions,
notably the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
34. The term Chaebol refers to corporate groups, often large in scale, which are
run by families.
35. See JAE-YONG CHUNG & RICHARD J. KIRBY, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT IN KOREA (2002)..
36. KANISHKA JAYASURIYA, LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE
ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1999).
37. See M. Shamsul Haque, New Directions in Bureaucratic Change in Southeast
Asia: Selected Experiences, 26 J. POL. & MIL. Soc. 96 (1998); Mitchell Bernard,
States, Social Forces, and Regions in Historical Time: Toward a Critical Political
Economy of Eastern Asia, 17 THIRD WORLD Q. 649 (1996).
38. See DESMOND S. KING, THE NEW RIGHT: POLITICS, MARKETS AND CITIZEN-
SHIP (1987).
39. See B.N. GHOSH, PRIVATISATION: THE ASEAN CONNECTION (2000).
40. Drakakis-Smith & Dixon, supra note 5, at 21.
41. Beth Ahlering, The Political (New) Economy of Sustainable Development in
Asia, 32 GREENER MGMT. INT'L 103 (2000).
42. See, e.g., Muhammad Rais Abdul Karim, Public-Private Sector Cooperation
for Development in Malaysia, 8 ASIAN REV. PUBLIC ADMIN. 13 (1996); Robins,
supra note 13.
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and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 43 The World Bank,
IMF and affiliated organizations have traditionally used their fi-
nancial leverage to impose free-market, capitalist policies includ-
ing liberalization of international trade and investment,
privatization of government assets and services, and the elimina-
tion of market-impairing regulation.44 Governments in Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand and other nations have adopted policies
and restructured their economies in response to the pressures of
the global market and the prescriptions of international financial
agencies. 45 The Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 led to interna-
tional financiers such as the IMF assuming more influence in do-
mestic economic policy-making and, therefore, more influence
over environmental policy. A new skepticism emerged about the
nature of business-government relations and East Asian govern-
ance institutions, highlighting problems of crony capitalism and
speculative investment.46 Consequently, the IMF became more
assertive in championing market liberalization policies. For ex-
ample, the response to Indonesia's financial crisis after 1998 was
an agreement with the IMF for a financial bailout that included a
controversial provision to reduce legal restrictions on foreign
ownership of land and forests.47 One aspect of economic policy
that survived virtually unscathed from this period were the SEZs.
B. EMERGENCE OF THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
The SEZ concept
A central component of the economic governance of East Asia is
the special economic zone (SEZ).48 Taiwan and South Korea es-
43. See Mark Beeson, Indonesia, the East Asian Crisis and the Commodification
of the Nation-State, 3 NEW POL. ECON. 357, 361 (1998).
44. See, e.g., TERESA HAYTER, AID: RHETORIC AND REALITY (1985); SUSAN
GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT (1990).
45. See Haque, supra note 37, at 103.
46. See Walden Bello, The End of a "Miracle": Speculation, Foreign Capital De-
pendence and the Collapse of the Southeast Asian Economies, 19 MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR 9 (1998); CHARLES HARVIE, Economic Reforms and Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, in CONTEMP. DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES IN CHINA'S
ECONOMIC TRANSITION 3, 13-15 (2000).
47. Suparb Pasong & Louis Lebel, Political Transformation and the Environ-
ment in Southeast Asia, 42 ENV'T 8, 12 (2000).
48. Among the extensive literature on the history and economics of East Asia's
SEZs, see United Nations Industrial Development Organization [hereinafter
UNIDO], EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN TRANSITION, THE CASE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (1988); FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE
OPEN DOOR POLICY (John Thoburn ed., 1990); John A. Mathews, High Technology
Industrialization in East Asia, 3 J. INDUSTRY STUD. 1 (1996); Dennis A. Rondinelli,
Export Processing Zones and Economic Development in Asia: A Review and Reas-
sessment of a Means of Promoting Growth and Jobs, 46 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 89
(1987). For a descriptive discussion of the zones more generally, see David Wall,
Export-Processing Zones, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 478 (1976); Leslie Sklair, Free
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tablished Asia's first SEZs, oriented towards export processing,
in the mid-1960s.49 Their precedents were soon emulated by In-
dia and the Philippines.50 Special economic zones are geographi-
cally or juridically bounded areas designated by governments for
foreign investment and export-oriented industrialization, to
which are conceded favourable investment and trade conditions,
and reduced red-tape. They have been established as windows
for foreign investment and technology, to thereby act as catalysts
for the modernization and growth of domestic economies.5 1 By
locating them in underdeveloped areas, SEZs have also been
used by governments to alleviate poverty.52 The zones are a cari-
cature of the rapid globalization of markets, and they have been
established in numerous countries. 53 While a study undertaken
by the International Labour Organization in 1987 identified
about 175 SEZs in 53 countries, 54 this list had grown to some 850
such zones worldwide by the end of the 1990s. 55 According to a
1996 survey by the International Development Research Council
there were also over 12,000 smaller industrial estates in 90 coun-
tries.56 Special economic zones and its variants have ancient
roots. The concept of free economic towns arose in Europe dur-
ing the Middle Ages, and the British Empire established many
duty free ports (e.g., Singapore, Gibraltar, Hong Kong) in a con-
tinuation of this tradition. 57
Zones, Development and the New International Division of Labour, 22 J. DEV. STUD.
753 (1986).
49. MICHAEL W. OSBORNE, CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 75 (1986).
50. Kwan-Yiu Wong & David K.Y. Chu, Export Processing Zones and Special
Economic Zones as Generators of Economic Development: The Asian Experience,
66B GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER 1, 2 (1984).
51. See Philip Swinden, Asia's Science and Industrial Parks, July/Aug. CORP. Lo-
CATION EUR. 37 (1997); Kai-Veikko Vuoristo, The Special Economic Zones and Re-
gions in Southeast Asia, 106 TERRA 96 (1994); Tsuchiya Takeo, Free Trade Zones in
Southeast Asia, 29 MONTHLY REV. 29 (1978).
52. Dowling, supra note 14, at 309.
53. See generally Helena Johansson & Lars Nilsson, Export Processing Zones as
Catalysts, 12 WORLD DEV. 387 (1997); DORSATI MADANI, A REVIEW OF THE ROLE
AND IMPACT OF EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (1999).
54. Andrew Schrank, Export Processing Zones: Free Market Islands or Bridges
to Structural Transformation?, 19 DEV. POLICY REV. 223, 223 (2001) (citing ILO and
OECD statistics).
55. See WORLD ECONOMIC PROCESSING ZONES ASSOCIATION,
WEPZA INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES AND FREE
TRADE ZONES (1997), available at http://www.wepza.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2005);
Marhoz & Szymanski, infra note 184. See generally WEI GE, THE DYNAMICS OF
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (1999).
56. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME [hereinafter UNEP], INDUS-
TRIAL ESTATES: FACTS AND FIGURES, available at http://www.unepie.org/pc/ind-es-
tates/ind-estates/facts.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
57. See NANCY F. KOEHN, THE POWER OF COMMERCE: ECONOMY AND Gov-
ERNANCE IN THE FIRST BRITISH EMPIRE (1994).
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There is a diversity of SEZs, which reflect different philoso-
phies, objectives, and means of achieving them. This is evident by
their nomenclature, which includes such various descriptions as
free trade zones, export processing zones and technology devel-
opment zones. A 1992 report of the World Bank defined an SEZ
as "an industrial estate, usually a fenced in area of 10-300 hect-
ares, that specializes in manufacturing for export".5 8 Today's
zones have evolved from this limited concept, and range from the
small, enclave export-processing centres, such as at airports and
seaports, to entire cities serving as integrated development
nodes.59 Indeed, Hong Kong and Singapore are, in effect, entire
SEZs. There is also variation in the governance of SEZs; some
are privately owned while public SEZs are managed by local, re-
gional or national authorities. 60 The uniqueness of a SEZ de-
pends on the particular model adopted, and its mix of subsidized
physical infrastructure, favourable investment and trade condi-
tions such as lower taxes and duty-free import of manufacturing
equipment, and exemptions from regulation such as controls on
project development. Special economic production zones are in-
tended to encourage companies to locate there to take advantage
of the promised lower costs of production. 61 In turn, the SEZs
can benefit host countries through employment growth, poverty
reduction, introduction of advanced technologies and foreign ex-
change earnings.62 In practice, of course, the economic achieve-
ments of SEZs have varied immensely, although East Asia's
SEZs have been among the most economically successful in the
world.63
Special economic zones in China
In the 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took an
active interest in SEZs, and decided to establish SEZs as discrete
"laboratories for innovative domestic economic reforms", 64 un-
dertaken on an experimental basis in order to minimize potential
wider social unrest and political conflict. 65 China's SEZs became
58. DORSATI MADANI, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 1 (1998), available at http://
www.worldbank.org/prem/PREMnotes/premnotel .pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
59. Id.
60. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE FREE ZONES (Richard L. Bolin ed., 1993).
61. See PETER J. LLOYD, The Problem of Optimal Environmental Policy Choice,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE OPENING AND THE FORMATION OF THE GLOBAL ECON-
OMY 411, 469 (1999).
62. John Mutti, Economic Processing Zones: Removing Trade and Tax Obstacles
to Growth, 28 J. FLAGSTAFF INST. 23, 24-25 (2004).
63. MADANI, supra note 58.
64. GEORGE T. CRANE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECO-
NOMIC ZONES 3 (1990); see also CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: POLICIES,
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 87-88 (Y.C. Jao & C.K. Leung eds., 1986).
65. Id. at 20.
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the most comprehensive in East Asia, functioning as integrated
development centres for both foreign and Chinese enterprises.
Foreign investment was enticed with preferential measures and
incentives, consisting of special tax status for foreign investors,
lower tariffs, better infrastructure, long-term land leases, and ex-
pedited government approval procedures. 66 The SEZs also bene-
fited from special legal and institutional arrangements, including
an upgraded administrative ranking and more decision-making
power than usually available to municipal-level governments. 67
Though, at first glance, the SEZs might appear to be an
arena for unabashed market deregulation, they are as much a
product of government regulation and policy as any other sector
of the economy. But the state's management of the economy has
taken on a different guise. This transformation of the role of the
state has been most pronounced in China. After several decades
of largely ineffectual, central bureaucratic control, a bold new ec-
onomic policy was outlined at the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP
in December 1978.68 Then Chairman, Deng Xiao Ping, intro-
duced China to a new market ethic, proclaiming, "to get rich is
glorious". 69 The SEZ reforms were married to other economic
reforms, including rational commodity pricing, marketable land
use rights in urban centres, new capital allocation and taxation
measures, enterprise management reform to improve productiv-
ity, and the decentralization of some economic decision-making
to local governments. 70 The period of economic reforms thus
marked a shift in governmental focus from both Confucian and
Maoist ideologies, where a new market ethic of profit was viewed
as the primary goal and material rewards were introduced to im-
prove individual motivation and enterprise performance.
Presently, China has the most extensive array of SEZs in
East Asia - indeed, in the whole world. In the early 1980s, the
CCP designated four SEZs, at Shenzhen, Shantou Zhuhai, and
Xiamen. 71 In 1984, Hainan Island was opened as the fifth SEZ.
These flagship zones would eventually become the catalysts of
66. See, e.g., Bin X. San, Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone in China? An
Analysis of the Special Regulations and Policy for Shanghai's Pudong New Area, 14
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130, 132 (1993).
67. George 0. White, Enter the Dragon: Foreign Direct Investment Laws and
Policies in the PRC, 29 N.C.J. Ir'L L. & COM. REG. 35, 54 (2003).
68. OSBORNE, supra note 49, at 82.
69. Paul G. Harris, Getting Rich Is Glorious: Environmental Values in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 13 ENVTL. VALUES 145 (2004).
70. See HARVIE, supra note 46, at 3.
71. See Jao & Leung, supra note 64. Zhuhai is in Guandong Province and
Xiamen is in Fujian Province.
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modernization of the Chinese economy.72 Since the mid-1980s,
Chinese authorities extended SEZ privileges to many other areas
of the country.73 In 1984, this process began when "open door"
economic privileges were offered to fourteen coastal cities. 74 In
1985, the concept of open cities was expanded to "open regions",
and a number of open coastal areas were proclaimed, mainly
along the Yangtze River delta and the Pearl River delta. 75 Also,
within these SEZ cities and areas, various special sub-zones were
designed. For example, "Economic and Technical Development
Zones" were set up to cater to technology-intensive industries,
such as the Pudong New Zone in Shanghai.76 During the 1990s,
the State Council opened to the market some border cities, as
well all the capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous re-
gions.77 Today, the range of development zones in China is quite
staggering.78 By 2003, it was estimated that there were an aston-
ishing 3,837 development zones in all.79 Interestingly, less than
one third of these zones were approved by the State Council or
provincial governments; local authorities, impatient to get a slice
of the burgeoning foreign investment business, set up the remain-
ing zones.80
The preferential tax treatment and some other benefits of-
fered to investors in SEZs are gradually being whittled away to
allow more uniform market conditions throughout China. 81
China's entry into the WTO in December 200182 has provoked a
major review of the taxation system and a new unified corporate
72. YUE-MAN YEUNG & Xu-WEi Hu, China's Coastal Cities as Development
and Modernization Agents: An Overview, in CHINA' COASTAL CITIES: CATALYSTS
FOR MODERNIZATION 1, 11 (1992).
73. For an overview of the various investment zones, see China's Investment
Zones, 25 STEEL TIMES INT'L 42 (2001).
74. CRANE, supra note 64, at 76, 97.
75. Id.
76. San, supra note 66.
77. Zhaodong Jiang, China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, Cul-
ture and Modern Concepts, 18 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 549, 567-85 (1998); see also DALI L.
YANG, BEYOND BEIJING: LIBERALIZATION AND THE REGIONS IN CHINA (1997).
78. They are: (i) the flagship SEZs (Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, Xiamen and
Hainan Island); (ii) technological development zones; (iii) free-trade zones for inter-
national trade and export processing; (iv) high-technology, industrial development
zones; (v) border and economic cooperation zones; (vi) export-processing zones in
special enclosed areas; and (vii) Taiwan investment zones. See Julie Walton, Zoning,
in 30 CHINA BUS. REV. 24 (2003).
79. D. Yan, Development Zones Surge, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 31, 2004, at 9.
80.. Id. Only 1,215 of China's SEZ's were formally approved.
81. Goodbye to SEZ Tax Preferences, 20 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 4
(1998).
82. Accession of the People's Republic of China: Decision of 10 November 2001,
WTO Doc. No. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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tax law is planned for introduction by the end of 2006.83 Authori-
ties are looking to replace the tax distinction between foreign
and domestic enterprises by a policy favouring particular indus-
tries, regardless of their ownership or location. 84 Nonetheless, re-
flecting the often-decentralized nature of economic policy-
making in China, some SEZ authorities are continuing to intro-
duce their own new tax breaks to attract more investment, 85 and
new zones continue to be opened without central government
imprimatur. 86 The SEZs will likely continue to be viable and en-
joy comparative advantages over other areas because of their ge-
ographic location, better infrastructure and services, and better
planed urban development.
87
Special economic zones in other East Asian nations
Special economic zones and concomitant market stimulants have
been introduced by other industrializing East Asian nations. Vir-
tually all countries have pursued market deregulation policies in
relation to trade, investment, capital flow, and exchange rate.
88
Special economic zones were pioneered in the region by Taiwan
and South Korea. Taiwan's first export-processing zone was set-
up in 1965 in Chien-Jiang, Kaohsiung City, followed by the open-
ing of more zones in Nantze and Taichung in 1969.89 All of these
export-processing zones are managed by Taiwan's Export
Processing Zones Administration. These zones were very suc-
cessful in their early years, with an average annual growth in ex-
ports of about 61 percent from 1967 to 1979.90 However, by the
early 1980s, new investment had largely dried up - reflecting
their increasing redundancy as infrastructure and duty-free ar-
rangements improved elsewhere in Taiwan. 91 The Taiwanese gov-
83. China Plans to Increase Foreign Corporate Income Tax, 15 INT'L TAX REV. 1
(2004).
84. James Kynge, China Ready to Scrap Tax Breaks for Foreign Companies, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at 15 (stating that the WTO tenet of "national treatment"
requires creation of a level playing field for domestic and foreign companies).
85. Tax Breaks for Foreign Investors at Jiangsu Xishan Economic Development
Zone, BERNAMA (Malay.), May 21, 2004, at 1
86. See, e.g., Phil T. Bangsberg, China Province Eyes Closer Taiwan Ties, J.
COM., June 10, 2004, at 1.
87. MICHAEL WEBBER ET. AL., Reconfiguring the Microgeography of China:
Special Economic Zones, in CHINA'S TRANSITIONS TO A GLOBAL ECONOMY 143, 161
(2002).
88. For a compendium of foreign investment legislation in some East Asian
countries, see ASEAN's list at http://www.aseansec.org/6530.htm.
89. UNIDO, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002/2003 122
(2002).
90. Jing Dong Yuan & Lorraine Eden, Export Processing Zones in Asia: A
Comparative Survey, 32 ASIAN SURVEY 1026, 1032 (1992).
91. UNIDO, supra note 89, at 122.
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ernment, however, has recently renewed its interest in SEZs, and
has established several high-technology science parks to fulfill its
goal of being a world leader in selected capstone industries.92
Like Taiwan, South Korea organized special industrial parks
and export processing zones in the 1960s and 1970s to promote
the advancement of under-developed regions and thereby
achieve a more decentralized pattern of development in areas
away from Seoul, which had the lion's share of investment.93 The
first industrial parks for export production were set up in Ulsan
in 1962 and Kuro in 1965. 94 In the early 1970s, two major export-
promotion zones were designated in Masan and Iri.95 A variety
of regulations were enacted to create an enduring policy basis for
these industrial parks and zones. 96 Its SEZs were initially ex-
pected to spearhead the development of capital-intensive heavy
industries such as iron, steel and petrochemicals. 97 In the 1980s,
the SEZs shifted focus to high-technology industries as the gov-
ernment's economic policy favoured investment in computers,
semiconductors, telecommunications and biotechnologies. 98
Over time, South Korea's SEZs have waned in importance: by
1985, manufactured good exports from its SEZs amounted to
only 2.9 percent of the country's total manufacturing exports.99
But they have not become irrelevant, as evidenced by South Ko-
rea's recent Act on Designation and Operation of Free Eco-
nomic Zones 2002,100 which evinces a commitment to continue to
use SEZs as a vehicle for the country's on-going economic
modernization.
A late industrializing economy, Vietnam has begun to au-
thorize some SEZs in coastal and border areas to stimulate in-
vestment and economic growth, along with other policy reforms
92. See Analysis: Taiwan's Ambitious 6-Year Plan, NEWSMAX WiREs, May 10,
2002, available at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/5/10/60304.shtml
(last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
93. Kwang Sik Kim & Nick Gallent, Industrial Park Development and Planning
in South Korea, 31 REGIONAL STUD. 424 (1997); see also Young Back Choi, Indus-
trial Policy as the Engine of Economic Growth in South Korea: Myth and Reality, in
THE COLLAPSE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING (Peter Boettke ed., 1994).
94. Kim & Gallent, supra note 93, at 424.
95. Schrank, supra note 54, at 226.
96. See, e.g., Free Export Processing Zone Law 1970, Export Industrial Estates
Development Promotion Law, Industrial Estates Management Law, Income Sources
Promotion Law 1983, and Capital Region Rearrangement Planning Law 1994.
97. Kim & Gallent, supra note 93, at 424.
98. Id.
99. Johansson & Nilsson, supra note 53, at 2121-22.
100. Act on Designation and Operation of Free Economic Zones, available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN011500.
pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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to lure foreign investment. 10 1 In choosing sites for SEZs, the
Vietnamese authorities have laid down a number of conditions,
including a requirement that appropriate environmental protec-
tion measures would be secured for each zone.10 2 Vietnam ini-
tially designated three SEZs in the late 1990's: Hai Phong city,
the Chu Lai area of Quang Nam Province, and the Can Gio area
of Ho Chi Minh city.10 3 Some of these zones are subdivided into
specific economic functions, such as Chu Lai SEZ's free trade,
industrial park and export processing subzones. 10 4 In 2004, au-
thorities designated another SEZ on Vietnam's northern border,
known as the Mong Cai border-gate economic zone. Vietnam's
SEZs typically offer investors land-holding rights for terms of up
to 70 years, land rent holidays, reduced income, trade and con-
sumption taxes, expedited development project approvals, and
the provision of an enhanced physical infrastructure. 10 5 Each
SEZ is supervised by an Economic Zone Management Authority,
which fall under the auspices of the Ministry of Planning and
Investment. 106
Thailand is also using the SEZ model, and has designated
several SEZs along its borders with Laos and Cambodia.10 7 Thai-
land's Investment Promotion Act 1977 provides various tax and
non-tax incentives for both local and foreign investors in areas
promoted by the government. In 1993 the Thai Board of Invest-
ment (B01) designated three new "Investment Promotion
Zones",10 8 which effectively cover the entire country, providing
various levels of tax concessions and an exemption of import
101. See Vietnam: Investment in IZs and EPZs, VIETNAM ECON. NEWS, Sept. 14,
1998, at 1; UNCTAD, TAX INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT A
GLOBAL SURVEY 113-15, U.N. Doc. CTAD/ITE/IPC/Misc.3, U.N. Sales No.
E.01.II.D.5 (2000).
102. Le Xuan Trinh, Chu Lai Open Economic Zone: Objective and Policy for
Development (2000), available at http://www.undp.org.vn/ndm-partnership/reports/
chulaiobjective.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
103. Id.
104. Quang Nam Opens "Liberal" Business Zone, VIETNAMESE NEWS SERVICE,
July 1, 2003, available at http://www.vneconomy.com.vn/eng/index.php?param=arti-
cle&catid=17&id=030701100121 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
105. See Circular No. 11/2004/='-BTC dated Feb. 25, 2004 of the Ministry of
Finance, available at http://concetti-vn.com/news/vietnamlegalsystemltaxandfinancial
(providing guidelines for the financial regime applied to Chu Lai open economic
zone); Quang Minh: Investment Potential and Prospect, at http://www.vnn.vn/prov-
ince/quangninh/projjimple.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
106. See The website of Vietnam Ministry of Planning and Investment, at http://
www.mpi.gov.vnldefault.aspx?Lang=2 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
107. See Thailand Plans to Open Special Economic Zones Along Border, http://
english.people.com.cn/english/200102/26/eng20010226_63397.html.
108. THAI BOARD OF INVESTMENT, Board of Investment Privileges by Location,
available at http://www. boi.go.th/englishaboutboi-privileges-by-location.asp (last
visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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duty on machinery pursuant to the Investment Promotion Act.10 9
In addition to the BOI's policies, the Industrial Estate Authority
of Thailand (IEAT) provides further incentives with respect to
projects located in its special industrial estates. In 1972, the IEAT
was established under the auspices of the Thai Ministry of Indus-
try and administers the Industrial Estates Authority of Thailand
Act 1979.110 A total of 30 industrial estates have provided the
foundations for the transformation of the Thai economy. 1 ' A va-
riety of financial incentives and market privileges are offered to
companies accepted for investment in the industrial estates. 112
The IEA has planning and land use management functions in the
estates, and assists with infrastructure provision including water
and energy supply.
Malaysia established its first SEZ in 1971 pursuant to the
Free Trade Zone Act 1970 passed to entice export-oriented
FDI."13 By 1982, its several SEZs accounted for 52 percent of its
total manufactured goods exports. 1 4 Presently, Malaysia's SEZs
are regulated through the Free Zones Act 1990, which provides
companies operating in the zones with reduced import and ex-
port procedural controls and customs concessions.1 5 The legisla-
tion designates the zones as either free commercial zones or free
industrial zones. Companies located in free industrial zones may
import capital goods, raw materials and components for the pur-
pose of manufacturing products for export, without payment of
import duties, sales tax or excise duties. 116 Commercial, retail ac-
tivities are restricted to zones specifically designated as free com-
mercial zones. Additional financial incentives for foreign
investment are provided by the Promotion of Investments Act
1986."17 Reflecting a maturation in the role of its SEZs, the Ma-
laysian government has recently concentrated on the establish-
109. Investment Promotion Act 1977, http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:xo
pxNdUEy5P4J:www.ieat.go.th/menuO6/images/InfoMenu6.2.3 eng.doc+%22Invest-
ment+Promotion+Act+1977%22&hl=en&client=firefox-a.
110. See http://www.ieat.go.th/main.php3; Industrial Estates Authority of Thai-
land Act B.E. 2522, 1979.
111. UNEP, Laem Chabang Industrial Estate, Thailand, available at http://www.
unepie.org/pc/ind-estates/casestudies/LaemChabang.htm. The latest number of es-
tates is detailed in Roles, Responsibilities and Historical Background, at http://www.
ieat.go.th/main.php3 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
112. See http://www.boi.go.th/english/tid/data/IEATincentives-privileges.htm;
See further UNCTAD, supra note 101, at 108-09.
113. Peter G. Warr, Malaysia's Industrial Enclaves: Benefits and Costs, 25 DEVEL-
OPING ECON. 30, 31-32 (1987).
114. Johansson & Nilsson, supra note 53, at 2123.
115. Act No. 438 of 1990, http://www.lawsofmalaysia.com/shop/store/view-n.asp?
ISBN=9832477395 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
116. Id.
117. Act No. 327 of 1986, http://www.lawsofmalaysia.com/shop/store/view-n.asp?
ISBN=9832476186 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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ment of science and high technology parks to woo foreign
investors. 118
Many other countries in the region have incorporated SEZs
into their economic policy matrix, ranging from the Philippines,
Laos to North Korea. The Philippine Special Economic Zone Act
1995119 provides for the creation of economic zones, offering tax
holidays and other fiscal incentives, and superior transport and
related service infrastructure, with the mission of accelerating
employment generation and new investment. 120 The Philippines
has established some 75 ecozones to date.121 It set up the Philip-
pines Economic Zone Authority in 1995 to coordinate the inflow
of new FDI into the zones, with separate authorities for the Subic
Bay and Clark free trade zones established on the sites on the
former United States military bases.122 In 2001, Laos introduced
legislation to provide for the establishment of SEZs to attract
foreign investment and know-how.1 23 Indonesia also has policies
for the establishment of special industrial estates and free trade
zones.124 Even the reclusive and anti-capitalist North Korea state
has coveted the SEZ model.125 It has established four SEZs
since 1991, although they have yet to attract international inves-
tors.126 The Russian government is also planning to create some
118. Greg B. Felker, Southeast Asian Industrialism and the Changing Global Pro-
duction System, in ASIAN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: CRISIS AND CHANGE 82, 90
(Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 2004).
119. Special Economic Zone Act 1995, http://www.chanrobles.com/specialeco-
nomiczoneact.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
120. On their economic effects, see Investments in Philippine Special Economic
Zones Up 20%, ASIAPULSE NEWS, July 16, 2001, at 229.
121. Van V. Mejia, The Modern Foreign Investment Laws of the Philippines, 17
TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467, 488 (2003); see Philippine Economic Zone Author-
ity, List of Special Economic Zones by Region, http://www.peza.gov.ph/ecolistregion.
htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
122. Felker, supra note 118, at 91.
123. Achara Pongvutitham, Laos Encourages Foreign Investors, NATION, June
18, 2001, available at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/archive-laonews/message/2623
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005); see also the website of the Laos Department of Domestic
and Foreign Investment, at http://invest.laopdr.org/business%20guide.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2005).
124. UNCTAD, supra note 101, at 86.
125. Joongi Kim, The Challenges of Attracting Foreign Investment into North Ko-
rea: The Legal Regimes of Sinuiju and Gaeseong, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1306
(2004); Eric Y.J. Lee, The Special Economic Zones and North Korean Economic
Reformation with a Viewpoint of International Law, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1343
(2004) (describing North Korea's four SEZs in Rajin-Seonbong, Sinuiju, Gaeseong
and Geumgang).
126. N. Korea's Special Economic Zone Remains in Doldrums, ASIAN POL.
NEWS, July 2, 2001, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOWDQ/
is_2001_July_2/ai_76443875 (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
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SEZs to revitalize the economically depressed areas of its Far
East region. 127
Overall, the economic achievements of East Asia's SEZs
have been mixed. The Chinese SEZs have been among the most
economically successful, led by Shenzhen SEZ.128 Between 1980
and 2000, China's GDP surged on average by 9.7 percent per
year, and its per capita income quadrupled. 129 But, more aston-
ishing, has been the economic growth found within China's
SEZs. 130 One study assessed that areas benefiting from SEZ sta-
tus enjoyed annual economic growth rate of 5.5 percent above
the national average.13' Millions of jobs have been created in the
ballooning industrial and service sectors, and rising wealth has
contributed to improved living standards and rising life expec-
tancy for many SEZ denizens. 132 The SEZs established in Taiwan
and South Korea were very important to their countries' eco-
nomic transformations in the 1960s and 1970s, but have played a
less prominent role since then. Taiwan's three main SEZs that
initially were key drivers of national economic modernization in
the 1960s and 1970s had, by 1981, declined to where they "ac-
counted for no less than 7 per cent of the overall export volume
of the entire inland."'1 33 A similar fate befell Korea's main SEZ
at Masan. 34 Thus, concludes Professor Xie Wei, "their impor-
tance gradually faded with time as the economy as a whole
started to acquire the capabilities and resources that were for-
merly concentrated in the SEZs". 135 Even Shenzhen has suffered
lately owing to its rising costs of land and labour relative to other
parts of China, which is causing some local businesses to relocate
elsewhere in China.136 Nonetheless, SEZs remain a key feature
of many East Asian economies, and new zones continue to be
127. See Valentin A. Povarchuk, Russian Draft Law on Special Economic
Zones-A Step Forward, But Not Far Enough, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 351
(2004).
128. Xie Wei, Acquisition of Technology Capability through Special Economic
Zones: The Case of Shenzhen SEZ, 7 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 199, 200 (2000).
129. HARVIE, supra note 46, at 14.
130. Wei Ge, Special Economic Zones and the Opening of the Chinese Economy:
Some Lessons for Economic Liberalization, 27 WORLD DEV. 1267, 1272 (1999).
131. Derek C. Jones et al., Growth and Regional Inequality in China during the
Reform Era, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 186, 188 (2003).
132. Choo-sin Tseng & Simon K. M. Mak, Strategy and Motivation for PRC Out-
ward Direct Investments with Particular Reference to Enterprises from the Pearl River
Delta, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH CHINA 140, 152-53
(Stewart MacPherson & Joseph Y.S. Cheng eds., 1996).
133. Wei, supra note 128, at 201.
134. Peter G. Warr, Korea's Masan Free Trade Zone: Benefits and Costs, 22 DE-
VELOPING ECON. 169, 170 (1984).
135. Wei, supra note 128, at 201.
136. Id. at 212.
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established in many parts of the region, particularly in the Philip-
pines, Malaysia and Vietnam.
C. THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
East Asia's orgy of economic growth and industrialization
has wrought extensive social and environmental changes. 137 It is
a misnomer to see environmental issues as somehow "outside"
the economy. They impose direct public health and productivity
costs. Occasionally, these costs are obvious, such as during a ma-
jor environmental crisis like the 1997 forest fires of Southeast
Asia, which affected some 300 million people.138 But the most
serious environmental problems are usually more pervasive, in-
cremental and long-term, such as the proliferation of consumer
waste and the dispersion of industrial toxic chemicals, which cu-
mulatively degrade ecological systems and limit their capacity to
sustain human development. 139
Studies sponsored by the World Bank, United Nations and
other organisations offer some insights into the extent and sever-
ity of environmental problems in East Asia. 140 For instance, the
incidence of insecticide and lead poisoning has risen noticeably
in the region. 41 The capacity of rivers and lakes to assimilate
pollutants is diminishing because of increased water extrac-
tion.142 A World Bank study found that in Thailand there had
been a ten-fold rise in pollution intensity from 1975 to 1988.143
Air pollution plagues many cities, in particular suspended par-
ticulates, sulphur dioxide (SO 2) and nitrogen dioxide emis-
sions.144 Heavy metal pollution, such as lead, mercury and zinc,
has been found in Malaysian rivers as a result of mining and in-
dustrial discharges.145 Huge mountains of solid waste from
137. See David O'Connor, Managing the Environment with Rapid Industrialisa-
tion: Lessons from the East Asian Experiences, 36, FUEL & ENERGY ABSTRACTS 463
(1995).
138. Rafia Afroz, Mohd N. Hassan & Noor A. Ibrahim, Review of Air Pollution
and Health Impacts in Malaysia, 92 ENVTL. RES. 71, 76 (2003).
139. Ying Wang, Environmental Degradation and Environmental Threats in
China, 90 ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 161 (2004).
140. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC [hereinafter ESCAP], STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN ASIA AND THE PA-
CIFIC 172 (2000).
141. CARTER BRANDON & RAMESH RAMANKUTTY, TOWARD AN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL STRATEGY FOR ASIA 65 (1993).
142. Id. at 69
143. Id. at 66-67.; see also Nart Tuntawiroon, The Environmental Impact of In-
dustrialisation in Thailand, 15(4) THE ECOLOGIST 161 (1985).
144. ESCAP, supra note 140, at 124-25.
145. Id. at 85.
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China's cities are not being properly disposed of or recycled.
146
By no means have environmental problems been confined to or
concentrated in the industrial and urban sectors. Environmental
degradation has also arisen from "industrial" farming: Asia's
Green Revolution was propelled by chemicals, mechanization
and mono-crop agriculture which has both diminished the ge-
netic diversity of food crops and thereby indirectly compromised
broader biological diversity. 147
The environmental transformation of East Asia's cities is
also associated with urbanization and the emergence of mass
consumption.148 Its most populous cities have reached staggering
proportions - e.g., Shanghai's 17 million and Jakarta's 13.7 mil-
lion.149 Urban growth has ranged from some 2.5 to 3.5 percent
annually.15 0 East Asia's mega-cities are massive consumers of re-
sources and emitters of waste. For example, five of the ten most
polluted cities in the world are in China, 151 and Asia as a whole is
home to 13 out of the 15 most polluted cities in the world. 152 The
World Bank estimates that air and water pollution has cost China
about 8 percent of its GDP, or US$32 billion annually in prema-
ture deaths, restricted mobility, chronic bronchitis and other
health effects1 53
Of all the mutations in East Asia's mega-cities, the growing
number of automobiles is having the most profound impact. As
in Western societies, growing urban affluence is contributing to
the growing popularity of private motor vehicles over Asia's
traditional means of transport - the humble bicycle. 154 In South
Korea, the number of automobiles rose from a paltry 40,000 in
146. China's Environment: A Great Wall of Waste, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2004, at
55.
147. See GORDON R. CONWAY & JULES N. PRETTY, UNWELCOME HARVEST: AG-
RICULTURE AND POLLUTION (1991).
148. Bryan Bachner, Ecology and Economic Reform: Towards an Effective Envi-
ronmental Law in Southern China, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTH CHINA, supra note 135, at 266, 267.
149. See Managing Asia's Cities, 26 ErvrL. PoL'Y & L. 23, 23 (1996).
150. ESCAP, supra note 140, at 150.
151. Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Officially Lifts Filter on Staggering Pollution
Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at 18.
152. Call to Reverse "Dismal" Policies, CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY, Oct. 6, 1997, at
750 (quoting an Asian Development Bank study).
153. TODD M. JOHNSON ET AL., CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES: CHINA'S ENVIRON-
MENT IN THE NEW CENTURY 23 (1997); see also W. Scott Railton, The Rhetoric and
Reality of Water Quality Protection in China, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 859, 860
(1998); Chaoyang Peng et al., Urban Air Quality and Health in China, 39 URBAN
STUD. 2283, 2283 (2002).
154. Jane Pek, China Tailpipe Tally: The World's Biggest Nation "Modernizes"
with More Cars, 12 CURRENTS 16 (2002).
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1965 to 10 million by 1997.155 Each year, some 300,000 motor
vehicles are added to China's still relatively modest car popula-
tion, amounting to an increase of some 12 to 14 percent annually
since the 1970s.156
During their early phase of industrialization, the bread and
butter of the Asian dragon economies such as Taiwan were in-
dustries producing batteries, petrochemicals, leather goods, pes-
ticides and electroplating. 157 Later, these economies moved to
relatively cleaner, high technology ventures and relocated some
of their most polluting and labour intensive industries to poorer
countries. 158 Differences in economic structures are thus paral-
leled by differences in environmental conditions. At one end, the
wealthier economies of Singapore and Taiwan have achieved
levels of ambient air and water quality similar to Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) stan-
dards, and South Korea and Malaysia are not far behind.159
South Korean cities enjoy decreased concentrations of S02 and
total suspended particulate matter. 160 Environmental conditions
in Thailand and the Philippines are less satisfactory. 161 But all
countries are increasing their emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHG). 162 In the mid-1990s, Asia overtook North America and
Europe as the world's largest source of carbon dioxide (C02)
155. Meehye Lee & Zafar Adeel, Managing Air Pollution Problems in Korea, in
EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 133, 139 (Zafar
Adeel ed., 2003).
156. Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region, 32 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1503, 1541 (1999).
157. Beth E. Kinne, Regulatory Diversification and the Monitoring State: The Di-
rection of Environmental Regulation in Taiwan, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 91, 99
(2004); See also Deborah C. Chan, The Environmental Dilemma in Taiwan, 12 J.
NORTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 35 (1993); Walden Bello & Stephanie Rosenfeld, High-
Speed Industrialisation and Environmental Devastation in Taiwan, 20 ECOLOGIST
125, 127 (1990).
158. Teresa Edwards, The Relocation of Production and Effects on the Global
Community, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 183, 186 (2002). Although many
Asian SEZs increasingly favour high technology ventures rather than heavy indus-
try, the high technology facilities producing computers and electronics can also often
be accompanied by serious pollution. Ahlering, supra note 41, at 110 (citing for
example production of silicon chips). [WJ: Again, this is a new cite and our library
doesn't have the journal. We'll have to ask the author for the source since inter-
library loan won't enable us to get it in time.]
159. Rafia Afroz et al., Review of Air Pollution and Health Impacts in Malaysia,
92 ENVTL. RES. 71, 73 (2003).
160. Lee & Adeel, supra note 158, at 134, 141.
161. See Chris Dixon, Origins, Sustainability and Lessons from Thailand's Eco-
nomic Growth, 17 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 38 (1995).
162. See PAUL G. HARRIS, Climate Change Priorities for East Asia: Socio-eco-
nomic Impacts and International Justice, in GLOBAL WARMING AND EAST ASIA:
THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 19 (2003).
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emissions, 163 producing about 35 percent of the world's C02 in
1996, compared to 28.3 percent from Europe and 28.1 percent in
North America.
Within East Asia's SEZs, environmental conditions have at-
tracted harsh criticism from media commentators. To illustrate,
Suzanne McElligott has lambasted: "in the Special Economic
Zones located in southern China, ecology takes a back seat to
profit in a country struggling to develop an industry with few fi-
nancial resources".164 Similarly, Tester depicts China's SEZs as
an ecological disaster the likes of which the planet has never
seen; the result of firing this modern industrial revolution with
soft coal, of filling in thousands of hectares of rice paddies to
make way for roads, homes and factories, of moving whole
mountains in the process, of creating air, water and soil pollu-
tion problems that, by all reports, are the worst on the
planet.165
An article in The Ecologist blasts, "China [is] creating hundreds
of so-called 'free-trade zones' in which lax environmental en-
forcement is the norm. In the process, whole regions are being
ecologically decimated". 166 Elsewhere, Vietnam's SEZs have
been described as in a state of "environmental crisis", owing
principally to extensive water and air pollution from their indus-
trial enterprises.1 67 Similarly, serious water pollution problems
have also been documented in China's Xiamen SEZ.
168
However, other research suggests that environmental condi-
tions in the SEZs are no worse than in other areas, and indeed
may be superior owing to the greater availability of pollution
control technologies from foreign investors, as well as the more
systematic land use planning in the zones. 169 For instance, Sival-
ingam found favourable environmental conditions in Malaysia's
export processing zones because they were soundly planned and
163. ESCAP, supra note 140, at 134.
164. Suzanne McElligott, China Lags in Environment, CHEMICAL WK., Feb. 21,
1996, at 24.
165. Frank Tester, Existential Landscape: China and the Modern Superstore, 16
NEW CIrY MAG. 41, 42 (1995).
166. Simon Retallack, Why are We Failing the Planet, SANCTUARY ASIA ONLINE,
available at http://www.sanctuaryasia.com/features/detailfeaturescategory.php?id=
239&catid=44 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
167. Environmental Crisis Overtakes Vietnam's Economic Zones, ASIA TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2000, available at http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/BB24AeOl.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2005).
168. Reinhold Castensson, Further Growth of Xiamen Economic Free Zone
Hampered by Freshwater Pollution, http://nias.ku.dk/nytt/2003-2/Growth.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005).
169. WORLD BANK, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (1992). However, the
intensive scale of development in the SEZs has tended to entail higher energy and
resource demands than usual. UNIDO, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE (1999).
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built in conformance to zoning and building regulations. 170 Mul-
tinational businesses operating in these zones were portrayed as
better environmental managers than small, local businesses oper-
ating outside the SEZs.171 Likewise, the Asian Development
Bank's environmental survey reported that "careful spatial plan-
ning and management of industrial activity" in SEZs in the Phil-
ippines had helped minimize potential environmental effects.17 2
Of additional concern are the inhumane working conditions
in some SEZ factories. Asia's economic reforms have increased
income inequality, widening the differences between the haves
and have-nots. Industries located in these zones tend to be la-
bour intensive. Foreign companies have been attracted by the
prospect of cheap but disciplined workers. Workers uncommonly
toil away in conditions resembling concentration camps to pro-
duce garments, shoes and electronic goods for Western consum-
ers under the cheapest possible working conditions.1 73 Young,
unemployed women from rural areas are commonly recruited to
sweatshops to work for minimal wages and excruciatingly long
hours. 174 Health and safety standards are often ignored. 175 Nu-
merous fires and deaths have been recorded in Chinese factories
as a consequence of lax enforcement of occupational safety regu-
lations.176 Among these statistics, for example, 87 workers were
killed in a fire in a Hong Kong company's toy factory in the
Shenzhen zone in November 1993.177 With the exception of
South Korea, trade unions are generally weak in industrializing
East Asian nations, and most employees can do little to chal-
lenge their working conditions. 178 However, these problems in
the treatment of workers are not at all unique to Asia's capitalist
SEZs, and likely occur in other parts of East Asia's economies.
Moreover, labour conditions in the SEZs might even be better
than in the non-SEZ sectors given that the high public profile of
170. G. SIVALINGAM, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF EXPORT PROCESS-
ING ZONES: THE CASE OF MALAYSIA 35 (1994).
171. Id.
172. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 2001, 31
(2001).
173. Laurence Van de Walle, SEZs-Specially Exploitative Zones, http://www.
corporatewatch.org.uk/magazine/issuel 1/cwllf2.html.
174. Hilary K. Josephs, Labor Law in a Socialist Market Economy: The Case of
China, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 559, 568 (1995); Wong & Chu, supra note 52, at
11.
175. Edwards, supra note 158, at 197.
176. Jean-Paul Marhoz & Marcela Szymanski, Behind the Wire: Anti-union Re-
pression in the Export Processing Zone, available at http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/actrav-
english/telearn/global/ilo/frame/epzicftu.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
177. Id.
178. See generally Laura Watson, Labor Relations and the Law in South Korea, 7
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 229 (1998).
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foreign investment in developing countries has perhaps caused
authorities and international businesses to be more sensitive than
domestic enterprises to working conditions.
179
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN EAST ASIA - THE
PATH TO LEGAL MODERNIZATION
A. LEGAL INSTITUTIONs FOR ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
Foundations for the rule of law in East Asia
A plethora of environmental laws, administrative institu-
tions and policies governing East Asia's SEZs and other eco-
nomic sectors mask a variety of structural weaknesses in the
capacity of their legal systems to promote sustainable develop-
ment. While nearly all Asian states have produced a substantial
volume of environmental legislation, they have differed "in their
ability to build more effective public sector environmental agen-
cies that ha[ve] the legal authority and the tools to effectively
monitor and enforce emission and ambient standards. '180 Profes-
sor Jaro Mayda observes that new environmental legislation is
not so valuable unless "accompanied by a substantial increase in
each nation's capability for policy development, institutional
structures, administrative competence, and ability to train man-
agement, monitoring and enforcement personnel." 181 Unfortu-
nately, these elements are not always present. According to the
Asian Development Bank's Asian Environment Outlook report,
"the root cause of the poor state of the environment in the region
was a failure of policy and of institutions.'18 2 Weak policies and
institutions usually reflect deeper structural problems of
governance.
Environmental law regimes are unlikely to succeed unless
anchored to wider reforms to promote good governance and rule
of law.183 Law acquires its meaning and performs its social func-
tions through processes of implementation and enforcement,
without which it has little life in any given society. Heavy reliance
on centralized, bureaucratic decision-making that excludes civil
179. See Matthias Busse, Do Transnational Corporations Care about Labor Stan-
dards?, 36 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 39 (2003) (arguing that higher labour standards
are positively correlated with FDI inflows).
180. Michael T. Rock, Pathways to Industrial Environmental Improvement in the
East Asian Newly Industrializing Economies, 11 Bus. STRATEGY & ENV'T 90, 96
(2002).
181. Jaro Mayda, Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries: Some Pa-
rameters and Constraints, 12 ECOLOGY L. Q. 997, 998 (1985).
182. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 172, at xv.
183. See Ben Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: The
Roles of National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy into
Action, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 307 (1995).
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society, incompetent and corrupt administrative officials and
judges, and limitations on access to justice, all undermine, to va-
rious degrees, the ability of East Asian governments to imple-
ment environmental policies and laws to address the effects of
rapid industrialization. While some countries have made substan-
tial progress in addressing these encumbrances, there has been a
tendency for some states to naively import foreign precedents in-
compatible with local institutional and social conditions. 184
The laws and institutions extant in East Asia have eclectic roots,
encompassing colonial, indigenous and international sources. The
majority of legal systems (e.g., China and South Korea) derive
from European civil law regimes.185 While some countries es-
caped direct colonial rule, most-such as the Philippines, Malay-
sia and Vietnam-did not.
Whatever the consequences of colonialism and later abuses
of state power, some measure of rule of law would seem to be a
necessary precondition to effective environmental law. The no-
tion of rule of law is a contested concept with various definitions
and visions. Professor Joseph Raz believed that at a minimum
law must be able to guide behaviour.186 Professor Randall Peer-
enboom has suggested "law [must be] able to impose meaningful
restraints on the state. .. 187 Concepts of the rule of law have
been criticised as narrowly reflecting a Western, liberal demo-
cratic tradition that is not necessarily germane to the circum-
stances of East Asia or other developing country regions.188
Critical legal scholars, critical race theorists, and feminists have
shown that the seeming neutrality of the rule of law can reinforce
existing power relations at the expense of vulnerable groups in
society.189 Critical legal scholars have also demonstrated the in-
determinacy of law, associated with the rise of the regulatory
state and the enhanced reliance on discretionary administrative
184. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J.
EUROPEAN COMP. L. 111, 119 (1997).
185. See generally POH-LING TAN, ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (1997); ALBERT H.Y.
CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (1994).
186. JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
210 (1979); see also Robert Summers, A Formal Theory of Rule of Law, 6 RATIO
JURIS 127 (1993).
187. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF
RULE OF LAW 1, 2 (2004).
188. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, Recrafting the Rule of Law, in RECRAFTING THE
RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 1 (2000).
189. See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARDS A
CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (1999); CATHERINE MACKINNON,
TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
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powers to implement broad legislative policies. 190 The failure of
the "law and development" movement of the 1960s and 1970s -
a program for legal technical assistance and reform, as part of
Western development aid programs - shattered the naive belief
that if laws are reformed and legal institutions strengthened,
nothing can restrain the "rule of law's" triumph.191 The law and
development movement has re-emerged in a new guise in recent
decades, through the "New Public Management" and "Good
Governance" prescriptions recited by the international develop-
ment assistance community. a92 Rule of law reforms can wrongly
presuppose that certain societies do not have a "rule of law" and
are characterized by anarchy and disorder and must therefore be
restructured. But a society whose members are guided by, and
comply with, traditional norms of behaviour rather than a state-
supported edifice of codes and rules is clearly not one devoid of
law. Successful law reform in transitional countries at a minimum
requires establishing appropriate incentives and organizations af-
ter taking account of the local culture and the past constraints
that shaped the existing legal system.193
The pressures for legal reform in East Asia are growing as
its members open their economies to global market forces and
address the environmental problems of industrialization. Tradi-
tional rules, norms, and standards alone may not be conducive to
addressing the policy challenges. Legal institutions languished
somewhat during the earlier period of the developmental state.
Administrative discretion was at the core of the developmental
state model, where pursuant to broad delegations of authority
from the legislature, ruling elites were able to maintain policy
flexibility and achieve their economic goals with minimal legal
formalities. 194 The development of modern economies has
ushered in the need to replace closed political and bureaucratic
dealings with "rational" legal instruments. This entails improved
legislative drafting, coordination and dissemination, restraints on
the discretionary powers of bureaucrats, more independent and
competent judiciary, and effective enforcement mechanisms. To
be sustainable, however, legal reforms have to find sustenance in
the markets and civil societies that they purport to govern. Pro-
190. See Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1276, 1279 (1984).
191. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development, 1062 Wis. L. REV. (1974).
192. See GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL NEOLIBERALISM (Jolle
Demmers et al. eds., 2004).
193. Paul H. Brietzke, The Politics of Legal Reform, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REV. 1, 25 (2004).
194. Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the "Developmental State"? Administrative Pro-
cedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 586 (2001).
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fessor Yan Wang warns that "law becomes effective by social
forces and pressures interested in and working for its implemen-
tation. Without a properly institutional setting, the law will re-
main a fig-leaf, pretending action without changing social
reality."1 95
It is possible to conceive of rule of law reforms without nec-
essarily sacrificing local culture and institutions. Professor Ran-
dall Peerenboom argues that by differentiating between a "thin"
and "thick" conception of the rule of law, the core, universally
valid elements of an effective legal system can be isolated with-
out necessarily importing certain discourses about political mo-
rality.196 A thin conception of rule of law that embodies the
minimal characteristics necessary for the functioning of a viable
legal system includes the existence of courts to interpret laws,
laws made public, laws generally applicable, laws that are clear,
consistent and stable, and laws that are enforced and accepted by
most people. 197 Any legal system that is effective must have these
elements. These minimal requirements of rule of law are surely
compatible with a variety of institutions, rules and practices in
any given society. A thick conception of rule of law adds further
elements of political morality, such as particular economic ar-
rangements (free-market capitalism, administrative planning),
forms of governance (liberal democratic, socialist) or conceptions
of human rights (collectivist, libertarian). Through this distinc-
tion, each country's culture, traditions and economic aspirations
can be accommodated while respecting the need for certain core
elements of any legal system. Thus, law reform guided by "Asian
values" or other discourses can be conceived without importing
inappropriate political and legal philosophies. 198
In conclusion, while East Asia's legal systems will undoubt-
edly continue to exert their own distinctive characteristics and
goals, they almost certainly must meet some universal standards
if they are to play the role intended by environmental policy in
the context of an internationally open economy. One does not
have to accept the assumptions of liberal legalism to agree that a
legal system must provide a modicum of transparency, predict-
ability and fairness. Ultimately, if law is to guide behaviour, its
195. YAN WANG, CHINESE LEGAL REFORM: THE CASE OF FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT LAW 28 (2002).
196. Peerenboom, supra note 187, at 3-6.
197. Id.
198. KANISHKA JAYASURIYA, Introduction: A Framework for the Analysis of Le-
gal Institutions in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA 1 (1999);
Clyde D. Stoltenberg, Globalization, "Asian Values" and Economic Reform: The Im-
pact of Tradition and Change on Ethical Values in Chinese Business, 33 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 711 (2000).
[Vol. 22:150
2004] IS EAST ASIA INDUSTRIALIZING TOO QUICKLY? 179
rules must be reasonably clear and stable, prospective and imple-
mented. 199 Laws should limit arbitrary acts of government and
provide meaningful constraints on the governing elite. This im-
plies normative limits on administrators and others who interpret
and apply the law. Without these fundamental characteristics,
East Asia's environmental law will likely be ineffective and not
institutionally sustainable.
Implementing Legal Reform in East Asia
Obstacles to legal modernization are particularly acute in China,
which is undergoing profound social and economic upheaval as it
moves away from a socialist economic doctrine. 200 The impor-
tance of social networks (guanxi), a history of privileging sub-
stantive over procedural justice, and a preference for avoiding
formal law in favour of informal dispute resolution, have posed
barriers to the implementation of a law-based order more suited
to an open market economy. Historically and culturally, the Chi-
nese have tended to guide social behavior though moral stan-
dards and local custom rather than formal legislation.201 In the
post-war era, the addition of socialist legal theory has presented
law as a management tool to preserve the state's interest.
Whereas Western legal systems stress the virtues of generality,
equality and impartiality, Chinese cultural traditions, whether
Confucian or Maoist, "have rejected rule ethics and universal
principles in favour of a context-specific, pragmatic, situational
ethics. ' 20 2 Consequently, their legal system often cedes wide dis-
cretionary power to administrators to implement the law and to
make it workable in specific situations. This does not mean that
the law is simply shunted aside, but that legal rules are adapted
to meet specific needs and situations.
Since the early 1980s, rule of law has re-entered public dis-
course in China, with an emphasis on legislation and institution
building.20 3 The PRC leaders have accepted the need for legal
reform as a means to enable China's economic transformation.
199. See supra note 186, at 210.
200. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARDS RULE OF
LAW (2002).
201. Holly Sims, One-fifth of the Sky: China's Environmental Stewardship, 27
WORLD DEV. 1227, 1235 (1999). However, since ancient times there has been a tra-
dition of Chinese rulers governing through extensive bureaucratic apparatus. Zhip-
ing Liang, Explicating "Law": A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western
Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55 (1989).
202. Randall Peerenboom, Ruling the Country in Accordance with Law: Reflec-
tions on the Rule and Role of Law in Contemporary China, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS
315, 324 (1999).
203. Randall Peerenboom, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China, in
ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 187, at 113, 115-17.
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The rise of a complex urban-industrial society and the current
market reforms has spawned new demands for legal reform. An
economy increasingly open to foreign investors and international
trade has required a more open, transparent and stable legal sys-
tem. Authorities' initial attempts to restrict reform to the com-
mercial law context did not prevent the momentum of legal
reform from spilling into other policy fields including environ-
mental regulation.20 4 As a result there has been an enormous
outpouring of legislation in the economic and environmental
fields, especially in relation to the management of the SEZs.
205
An enduring problem is that PRC leaders-have tended to
take a mechanistic view of law, assuming they can "utilize the
language and forms of law initially crafted in a liberal democratic
context" absent from China.20 6 Their failure to establish a legal
system that is both sensitive to indigenous institutions yet suffi-
ciently autonomous to engineer social change has posed a range
of problems for environmental governance (and other areas of
public policy). These problems include: inconsistencies between
lower and higher level legislation; conflicts of interest in public
administration; bureaucratic inefficiencies and policy distortions
from the proliferation of extralegal powers and vague discretion-
ary authority; and the limiting of outlets for citizen participation
in decision-making and enforcement. Unwritten variables in the
implementation of Chinese environmental law - such as the im-
pact of guanxi connections - can make it hard for foreign com-
panies in the SEZs to understand what regulators actually expect
of them.207
Ultimately, the key to the realization of rule of law in China
is power. How is power to be controlled and allocated in a single-
party socialist state and in a culture with a habitual "reliance on
the instructions of authority figures over the texts of laws"? 20 8
Meixian Li sees "the biggest challenge China faces in developing
an independent and effective legal system as the ambiguous rela-
tionship between China's constitutional supremacy and the Com-
204. Peerenboom, supra note 187, at 39-40.
205. See Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do With It? Legal Institutions and
Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1991).
206. William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall? China's Post-Cultural Revolution
Project of Legal Construction, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 193, 202 (1999).
207. Felicity Thomas & Clare Donnelly, Chinese Labyrinth, 6 INFRASTRUCTURE
FIN. 41, 42 (1997).
208. Richard J. Ferris, Jr., Reaching Out to the Rule of Law: China's Continuing
Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 569, 585 (2003).
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munist Party's authority. ' 209 It is now acknowledged that the
Party and the State must act within the limits of the law. Re-
forms are being introduced to address corruption and incompe-
tence in the government and to improve citizens' access to
justice. But efforts to separate the functions of Party and State
have not adequately addressed the CCP's indirect intervention in
the economy through its control of state-owned enterprises and
through continued Party appointment of key personnel in all
government organs.210 Law-making, of course, is not simply a
rubber-stamp of Party leadership edicts. The CCP is often split
over policy issues, and the legislative system can "serve as a sig-
nificant adjunct arena for leadership political debate. '211 The ma-
chinery of government also has its own interests and agenda, and
policy-making can involve extensive bargaining among bureau-
cratic entities and CCP officials. 212 Consequently, the Chinese
legal system can represent a system of "fragmented authoritari-
anism" in which "authority below the very peak of the Chinese
political system is fragmented and disjointed. ' 213 In this regime,
law can serve to indicate a general policy direction and provide
symbolic significance to political initiatives. Ultimately, a
strengthening of the rule of law in China seems inevitable given
that the CCP's legitimacy increasingly rests on economic growth
rather than political ideology, and that growth is doubtful with-
out legal reform.
While cultural traditions and political ideologies have made
it difficult to establish a law-based order in China, such factors
have also existed in South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan for in-
stance, all of which have managed to establish fairly robust legal
regimes. And once institutions of reform are established, they
can develop a momentum of their own, "if for no other reason
than path-dependent institutional self-interest. '214 During the
1990s, Taiwan and Korea embraced a Western-style liberal-dem-
209. Meixian Li, China's Compliance with WTO Requirements will Improve the
Efficiency and Effective Implementation of Environmental Laws in China, 18 TEM-
PLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 155, 168 (2004).
210. Randall Peerenboom, A Government of Laws: Democracy, Rule of Law and
Administrative Law Reform in the PRC, 12 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 45, 46-47 (2003).
211. Murray S. Tanner, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: IN-
STITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS 19 (1999).
212. David M. Lampton, A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureau-
cratic Politics in China, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING IN
POST-MAO CHINA 33, 34 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992).
213. Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism"
Model and Its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING IN
POST-MAO CHINA, id. at 1, 8-9.
214. Peerenboom, supra note 210, at 62 (discussing how Taiwan's Council of
Grand Justices assumed a much greater role in curbing administrative discretion,
thereby contributing to further legal reforms).
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ocratic version of rule of law, including constitutional and parlia-
mentary reforms and the promotion of more effective
administrative and judicial structures. 215 The process began in
Taiwan after the lifting of martial law in 1987.216 In South Korea,
the Constitutional Court has emerged as a key force for the as-
cendancy of rule of law.217 However, South Korean business reg-
ulation is still hampered by the chaebol-based economy.2t 8 South
Korea was particularly hurt by the region's financial crisis of
1997-98 owing to insufficient state supervision of market actors
who had enjoyed greater autonomy in the wake of the market
liberalization reforms.219 By contrast, Singapore was virtually
alone in emerging relatively unscathed from the East Asian fi-
nancial turmoil because it had a reliable, robust legal system that
provided better checks and balances against such market
abuses.220
South Korea and Taiwan's democratisation reforms have fu-
eled various environmental activist movements, which in turn
have contributed to the strengthening of environmental laws.
22 1
As a result of environmental degradation from South Korea's
"poisoned prosperity," some people began reassessing their lead-
ers' "faster and faster" motto. 222 South Korean environmental
groups, taking advantage of a more liberalized mass media and
freedoms to organize political activities, managed to thwart or
delay several major development behemoths, such as the
Youngwol Dam and the Wichon Industrial complex. 2 2 3 Environ-
mentalists have also campaigned against the nuclear power in-
215. Sean Cooney, The Effects of Rule of Law Principles in Taiwan, in ASIAN
DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 199, at 417; Ginsburg, supra note 194.
216. See Hung-mao Tien & Yun-han Chu, Building Democracy in Taiwan, 148
CHINA Q. 1141 (1996).
217. Chan Jin Kim, Korean Attitudes Towards Law, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1,
38-40 (2000).
218. Hisahiro Kondoh, Policy Networks in South Korea and Taiwan during the
Democratic Era, 15 PAC. REV. 225,230 (2002); Martin Hart-Landsberg & Paul Bur-
kett, Economic Crisis and Restructuring in South Korea: Beyond the Free Market-
Statist Debate, 33 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 403, 404 (2001) (arguing for worker/com-
munity-led socialization of the chaebol).
219. Yeon-ho Lee, The Failure of the Weak State in Economic Liberalization:
Liberalization, Democratization and the Financial Crisis in South Korea, 13 PAC.
REV. 115, 117 (2000).
220. Andrew Harding, The Economic Crisis and Law Reform in South East Asia,
8 ASIA PAC. Bus. REV. 49, 50-51 (2001).
221. See especially ASIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS: COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECrIvE (Yok-shiu Lee & Alvin So eds., 1999).
222. See generally NORMAN EDER, POISONED PROSPERITY: DEVELOPMENT,
MODERNIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH KOREA (1996); Sunhyuk Kim,
Democratization and Environmentalism: South Korea and Taiwan in Comparative
Perspective, 35 J. ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 287 (2000).
223. Joon Hyoung Lim & Shui-Yan Tang, Democratization and Environmental
Policy-Making in Korea, 15 GOVERNANCE 561, 568-73 (2002).
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dustry.2 24 By the early 1990s the Korean government accepted
the need for concessions, and began promulgating tougher pollu-
tion control laws.22 5 Taiwan has also experienced popular pro-
tests against pollution, particularly nuclear energy
technologies.22 6 Numerous environmental protectionist reforms
that have occurred since the mid-1990s in Taiwan can be corre-
lated with the growing pluralization of Taiwanese political cul-
ture.227 The political clout of the environmental and consumer
movements peaked in 2000 when newly elected president, Chen
Shui-bian, announced the goal of creating a "green silicon
island."2 28
By contrast, Malaysia and Indonesia are soft-authoritarian
regimes where opposition parties and the media have been muz-
zled through security laws and other mechanisms that reinforce a
non-liberal conception of democracy. 229 Notwithstanding this
fact, Malaysia enjoys a relatively well-developed legal system,
which remains a product of British colonialism. Political inde-
pendence led to attempts to inculcate the legal system with local
values, and former Prime Minister Mahathir sought to distance
Malaysia from the liberal model by infusing so-called Asian val-
ues into the legal system. 230 Law is used in Malaysia to
strengthen the state, to ensure stability and to facilitate economic
growth. In Indonesia, although authoritarianism and military in-
terference in government have been enduring problems, and
have engendered destructive crony capitalism,231 law reform ef-
forts have continued over many decades, most recently through
the Reformasi movement. 232 Environmental governance in these
two Southeast nations remains weak as there are few formal legal
224. See Sungroe Lee & Michael R. Fitzgerald, Openness in Public Administra-
tion and the Politics of Environmentalism: In the Case of Nuclear Facility Siting in
South Korea, 63 INT'L REV. ADMIN. Sci. 67 (1997).
225. Hong Sik Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, 29 ENVTL. L.
501, 505 (1999).
226. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Nuclear Dump Disrupts a Peaceful Taiwan Island,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, at 3; Lim & Tang, supra note 223.
227. Jorgen Domes, State Capacity in an Asian democracy: The Example of Tai-
wan, in STATE CAPACITY IN EAST ASIA: JAPAN, TAIWAN, CHINA, AND VIETNAM,
supra note 28, at 114, 118-25.
228. See President Chen Unveils Strategies For Economic Development, CENT.
NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 24, 2003, at 1.
229. Graham Field, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN ASIA 105-
08 (1995).
230. H.P. Lee, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in Malaysia, in ASIAN
DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 199, at 225.
231. See Jared Levinson, "Living Dangerously": Indonesia and the Reality of the
Global Economic System, 7 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 425 (1998).
232. David K. Linnan, Indonesian Law Reform, or Once More unto the Breach:
A Brief Institutional History, 1 AuSTL. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1999).
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mechanisms by which government-developer alliances can be
challenged by citizens.
Thailand has also been confronting fundamental constitu-
tional issues such as the relationship of democracy to rule of law,
balance of power issues between the different arms of the state,
and protection of human rights. But it has been less successful in
addressing basic rule of law problems, and economic and envi-
ronmental reform is undermined by elementary legal problems
including access to justice, inefficient courts and administrative
corruption. Vitat Muntarbhorn summarises that the Thai legal
system is plagued by the five Cs: corruption, collusion, cronyism,
clientism and crime.2 33 Thai governments have been unstable ow-
ing to shifting parliamentary coalitions and excessive "money
politics," as well as interference from the military.234 In this mi-
lieu, environmental issues have been promoted in Thailand
mainly through a corporatist movement geared towards corpo-
rate social responsibility and the promotion of new markets for
environmental goods and technologies, rather than through
broader social movements as in Taiwan and Korea.235 Clearly
then, a lack of democracy imposes some limits to the extent to
which rule of law will be realised. Public participation in policy-
making, greater transparency of decision-making, and access to
justice can improve the quality of governance and enhance its
legitimacy.236 Democracy can provide a procedural mechanism
for regulating societal conflicts, allow for more open debate, thus
leading to a more informed decision-making process, and pro-
vide a more accurate feedback mechanism to policy-makers. The
corporatism and clientelism that have marked state-society rela-
tions in East Asia during the post-war period are increasingly be-
ing challenged by democratic and civil societal movements.
2 37
Democratisation has engendered new institutional arrangements:
competitive electoral systems, local autonomy, liberalization of
the mass media, and freedom of civic association. These institu-
233. Vitat Muntarbhorn, Rule of Law and Aspects of Human Rights in Thailand:
From Conceptualization to Implementation?, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF
LAW, supra note 187, at 346, 360.
234. See Chai-Anan Samudavanija & Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Thailand: Liber-
alization Without Democracy, in DRIVEN BY GROWTH: POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, supra note 16, at 119; Douglas L. Tookey, Southeast Asian
Environmentalism at its Crossroads: Learning Lessons from Thailand's Eclectic Ap-
proach to Environmental Law and Policy, 11 GEO. INT'L L. REV. 307, 330-32 (1999).
235. See Tookey, supra note 234.
236. See generally DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James Bohman & William Rehg
eds., 1997); Scott Kuhn, Expanding Public Participation is Essential to Environmen-
tal Justice and the Democratic Decisionmaking Process, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 647
(1999); Jenny Steele, Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Explor-
ing a Problem-solving Approach, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 415 (2001).
237. BR0DSGAARD & YOUNG, supra note 28, at 6.
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tions have empowered civil society, helped to facilitate the artic-
ulation of a more diffuse set of social interests in environmental
policy-making, and created the room for greater criticism of
unidimensional policies of uncompromising industrialization.
Democratic change is interwoven with changes in a society's liv-
ing standards. Kuznets' theory predicts a correlation between a
society's rising concern for the environment and its standard of
living.238 This is because pollution damage receives a higher pri-
ority after rising wealth has financed basic investments in health
and education, and because wealthier societies have more re-
sources to devote to environmental protection.239 Democracy is
arguably a necessary parallel development, because it allows for
the articulation of public concerns and social pressures for policy
reform. New societal pressure as a result of democratisation is
gradually compelling some governments in East Asia to respond
to environmental problems, and thereby establishing a rule of en-
vironmental law.240
Even in countries where democracy is not yet politically via-
ble, such as the one-party states of China and Vietnam, a mean-
ingful rule of law can be achieved. It may seem futile to imagine
rule of law when the ruling party has been above the law, but
Professor Randall Peerenboom points out that CCP leaders have
increasingly appreciated the advantages of rule of law for eco-
nomic development, national stability and Party legitimacy.
24
'
For example, popular discontent over judicial corruption, bias,
and incompetence is deterring investors, undermining the effec-
tiveness of the legal system, and ultimately hurting the political
legitimacy of the Party.242 Even without competitive elections,
administrative law reforms have empowered society by giving cit-
izens the right to challenge state actors through litigation, media-
tion and other channels. Government environmental agencies
periodically issue public bulletins regarding their affairs, and give
citizens the right to file accusations against anyone alleged to
238. Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON.
REV. 1 (1955).
239. Id. However, democratisation alone appears to be insufficient to produce
major shifts in environmental policy, as the situation of the Philippines shows - a
country with lower income per capita than Korea and Taiwan. Rock, supra note 180,
at 95. Conversely, high living standards can produce strong environmental laws even
in the absence of vibrant civil society, as Singapore's soft-authoritarian democracy
illustrates. See Lye Lin Heng, Singapore's New Environmental Law: The Environ-
mental Pollution Control Act, 1999, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
240. See ASIA's ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPEcTIVE
(Yok-shiu Lee & Alvin So eds., 1999).
241. Peerenboom, supra note 210, at 60-61.
242. Id.
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have breached environmental laws. 243 More reforms are needed
of course, as China's court system generally remains poorly
equipped to dispense environmental justice. Its judges are mainly
unqualified to evaluate the complex technical information on
which pollution cases typically hinge, and they are reluctant to
sanction enterprises favoured by local authorities, given their de-
pendence on their local municipality for largesse. 244
In summary, reforms to transform East Asian legal systems
from institutions based on bureaucratic discretion to those sub-
scribing to universal legislative norms remain vulnerable to indig-
enous cultural preferences for non-legal methods of dispute
resolution, lack of familiarity with regulations that are based on
external norms, and political systems that place the governing
elites or party above legal norms. These problems are particu-
larly pronounced in China and Vietnam, but are becoming less
evident in South Korea and Taiwan, which have established more
democratic systems of governance. Law reformers need to under-
stand the interaction between imported legal norms and local in-
stitutional precepts and organizational processes. To some
extent, East Asian legal systems are giving rise to a bifurcated
legal system, whereby legal reforms are almost solely relegated
to special economic zones and areas with foreign investment ac-
tivity, so that the spread of potentially destabilizing reforms is
curbed.
B. TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN
EAST ASIA
Environmental Legislative Developments
Throughout East Asia, environmental law and policy has ostensi-
bly begun to reach maturity, manifested by extensive legislative
initiatives, the founding of environmental management agencies,
judicial activism and the environmental jurisprudence created
thereon. 245 Governments are modernizing their environmental
management regimes to give effect to principles of sustainable
development. 246 East Asian environmental policy-makers faced
243. Wang Xi & Robert F. Blomquist, The Developing Environmental Law and
Policy of the People's Republic of China: An Introduction and Appraisal, 5 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. &. POL'Y REv. 25 (1992). For other works on democracy in China,
see GROUPS AND POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (David S.G. Good-
man ed., 1984); POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA
(Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 1992).
244. Peerenboom, supra note 210, at 58.
245. Boer, supra note 156, at 1503.
246. Surya 0. Subedi, Incorporation of the Principle of Sustainable Development
into the Development Policies of the Asian Countries, 32 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 85
(2002).
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with the daunting task of devising and implementing effective
regulatory regimes for their industrializing economies, "have at
least one advantage over their historical counterparts in the West
- they have several decades of environmental regulatory history
to learn from. '247 So far, the most advanced reforms have been
pioneered in Singapore and Taiwan, while Thailand, Indonesia
and Vietnam have among the least developed environmental law
regimes. Between these poles are China, Malaysia, and South
Korea.
Virtually all of East Asia has looked to the developed world
for ideas and precedents. Yet, many of the foreign environmental
law innovations such as economic instruments and integrated
pollution control systems, have hardly been touched. Because of
their institutional and legal weaknesses, many states have envi-
sioned an overly-simple solution of centralizing environmental
administration, so as to bring coherence and coordination to pol-
icy-making.2 48 Legislation often takes the form of command-and-
control regulation with wide discretionary powers to state admin-
istrators.249 The danger of this approach is that it can create inap-
propriate scales for effecting environmental management and an
institutional vacuum at local levels of governance, particularly in
the SEZs. This institutional centripetalism is reflected in govern-
ments' preferences for national environmental strategies, na-
tional environmental agencies and other policy centralizing
mechanisms.
The mainstay of environmental law in East Asia is the um-
brella national environmental statute, with complementary stat-
utes addressing specific environmental media such as water, air,
soil and biodiversity. Examples include: China's Environmental
Protection Law of 1979,250 Malaysia's Environmental Quality
Act of 1974,251 Thailand's Enhancement and Conservation of
National Environmental Quality Act of 1992,252 Indonesia's Law
247. Allen Blackman & Winston Harrington, The Use of Economic Incentives in
Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air
Pollution, 9 J. ENV'T & DEV. 5, 5 (2000).
248. Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Law in Postcolonial Societies:
Straddling the Local-Global Institutional Spectrum, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 1, 21-26 (2000).
249. See generally CLIVE Y. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE
IN PERIPHERAL SOCIETIES (1984); Su HOON LEE, STATE-BUILDING IN THE CONTEM-
PORARY THIRD WORLD (1988).
250. http://www.novexcn.com/environmental_protec_law.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
251. Act No. 127 of 1974, http://www.lawsoftnalaysia.com/shop/store/viewn. .asp?
ISBN=9832314208 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
252. http://www.ostc.thaiembdc.org/environment/enhance.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
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Concerning Environmental Management of 1997,253 Taiwan's
Basic Environmental Act of 2002,254 and Vietnam's Law on Pro-
tection of the Environment of 1993.255 In addition, some states
are adding environmental protection clauses to their national
constitutions as an expression of their commitment. To illustrate,
the Indonesian constitution was amended in the early 1970s to
introduce a provision on care for the environment. 256 The consti-
tution of South Korea was amended in 1980 to provide its citi-
zens with the right to live in a healthy and clean environment. 257
China's constitution was modified in 1978 to incorporate an envi-
ronmental protection clause. 258 Nonetheless, constitutional pro-
visions often lack the legal significance found in Western
examples. For example, the Supreme Court of Korea has con-
strued the environmental protection provision of its constitution
as not self-executing. 259
Taiwan's environmental laws arose during the early 1970s,260
and it now has an estimated 300 environmental laws and regula-
tions. 261 Taiwan's regulatory approach has evolved in a pattern
common to Western nations - beginning with the direct regula-
tion of end-of-pipe pollution, and gradually moving towards
more complex regulation strategies characterized by an increas-
ing dependence on cooperative relationships among industry,
253. Law No. 23, 1997, available at http://sunsite.nus.edu.sg/apcel/dbase/indonesia/
primary/inaem. htmL
254. Http://law.epa.gov.tw/en/laws/81178521.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
255. Http://www.mekonglawcenter.org/download/O/vietnam.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
256. INDON. CONST. art. 33, http://menic.utexas.edu/asnic/countries/indonesia/
Constlndonesia.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005). Art. 33 states, in part, that: "[T]he
land, the waters and the natural resources therein are basic assets for the people's
prosperity and should, therefore, be controlled by the state and exploited to the
greatest benefit of the people."
257. S. KOREA CONST. art. 35, http://www.oefre.unibe.chlaw/icl/ksOOOOO_.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2005). It states: (i) All citizens have the right to a healthy and
pleasant environment. The State and all citizens shall endeavour to protect the envi-
ronment; (ii) The substance of the environmental right is determined by law; (iii)
The State endeavours to ensure comfortable housing for all citizens through housing
development policies and the like.
258. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the People's Repub-
lic of China] art. 9 (1982), http.'//english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.
html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
259. See, e.g., Dae-bup-won [DBW] [Supreme Court] 94 ma 2218 (May 23, 1995)(S. Korea); DBW 95 da 23378 (Sept. 15, 1995) (S. Korea); DBW 96 da 56153 (July
22, 1997) (S. Korea).
260. The first versions of the Water Pollution Control Act (May 23, 1975,
amended May 16, 1991) and the Air Pollution Control Act (May 23, 1075, amended
Jan. 20, 1999) were passed in the 1970s. See respectively http://law.epa.gov.tw/en/laws/
water/water.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005); http://law.epa.gov.tw/en/laws/atmosphI
air.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
261. See Cleaning Up China, 29 Bus. ASIA 5, 6 (1997).
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government, and third parties.2 62 The Taiwanese parliament en-
acted the Fundamental Environmental Protection Act in 2002,263
which builds on other capstone environmental laws including the
Water Pollution Control Law of 1991 and Air Pollution Control
Act of 1992 (both revisions of earlier pollution control statutes
dating from the 1970s),264 and the Environmental Impact Assess-
ment Act of 1994.265 In principle, the latter law gives the Na-
tional Environmental Protection Agency (established in 1987)
authority to veto major projects, an authority the Agency has at-
tempted to exercise against industrial complexes proposed for lo-
cation in environmentally sensitive areas.
266
South Korea has a reasonably well-developed system of en-
vironmental law. Though its legal system draws on the civil law
traditions of Germany, most of its environmental statutes are
modelled on Anglo-American precedents. 267 The Basic Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1990 is patterned after the United States'
National Environmental Policy Act. South Korea's first genera-
tion pollution laws in the mid-1960s were ineffectual in stemming
the massive pollution that accompanied the country's heavy in-
dustrialization over the ensuing decades. 268 In the late 1970s, a
new generation of environmental laws arrived, including the
seminal Environmental Conservation Act of 1977, which intro-
duced an environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure.
269
A number of specialist pollution control laws were introduced,
notably the Air Environment Preservation Act,270 Water Envi-
ronment Preservation Act,271 and the Waste Management Act.
272
Substantial efforts were made to improve pollution control in Se-
oul in preparation for its hosting of the Olympics in 1988.273 Dur-
ing the 1990s the specialization of environmental laws continued,
such as the new Environmental Impact Assessment Act.274 To-
day, South Korea possesses a basket of environmental laws com-
262. Kinne, supra note 157, at 100.
263. http://www.epa.gov.tw/english (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
264. Shu-Hwei Fang & Hsiung-Wen Chen, Air Quality and Pollution Control in
Taiwan, 30 ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T 735 (1996).
265. http://law.epa.gov.tw/en/laws/8117085 2 1.html.
266. Id.
267. Cho, supra note 225, at 506.
268. See OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: KOREA (1997).
269. Lee & Adeel, supra note 155, at 144.
270. Law No. 4262 of Feb. 1, 1991.
271. Law No. 4260 of Feb. 1, 1991.
272. Law No. 4363 of Mar. 8, 1991.
273. Yearn Hon Choi, Environmental Management in South Korea: Origin, Pol-
icy, Program Questions, 30 KOREA OBSERVER 269 (1999).
274. Law No. 4567 of June 11, 1993.
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parable to many Western nations,275 and it is beginning to tackle
more complex challenges such as greenhouse gas emissions. 276
Environmental law reform in China has not matched efforts in
South Korea or Taiwan, but has nonetheless been quite exten-
sive. Ostensibly, the PRC boasts a laudable array of environmen-
tal laws and institutions - comparable to that in many Western
countries.277 The legal transformation has been quite remarka-
ble.278 By contrast, Mao Tse-tung's reign was described as a "war
against nature. ' 279 Mao's grandiose aspirations led to ecologi-
cally destructive behemoths such as the Sanmenxia dam on the
Yellow River,280 as well as environmentally detrimental develop-
ment practices during the chaotic Great Leap Forward and the
Cultural Revolution.281 While the gigantic Three Gorges dam
reveals that the "Think Big" mentality persists among the con-
temporary PRC leadership, 282 in other contexts, environmental
policies are being acknowledged as central, rather than ancillary,
concerns. A raft of new environmental laws have been promul-
gated or revised, notably the Environmental Impact Assessment
Law of 2002 and the amendments to the Air Pollution Prevention
and Control Law of 2000.283 For example, environmental stan-
dards have been incorporated into the national constitution, 284
and there are at least 20 major national environmental laws, com-
plemented by hundreds, if not thousands, of provincial and mu-
275. See the list of environmental laws at the Ministry of Environment's website,
at http://eng.me.go.kr/user (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
276. Seung-Hoon Yoo & Chang-Young Yang, Evaluating the Greenhouse Gas
Emission Reduction Policy in Korea, 33 KOREA OBSERVER 469 (2002).
277. Hongjun Zhang & Richard J. Ferris, Jr., Shaping an Environmental Protec-
tion Regime for the New Century: Environmental Law and Policy in the People's
Republic of China, 6 ASIAN J. ENVTL. MGMT. 35 (1998).
278. See L. Ross, The Next Wave of Environmental Legislation, 21(4) CHINA Bus.
REV. 4 (1994).
279. Judith Shapiro, MAO'S WAR AGAINST NATURE: POLITICS AND ENVIRON-
MENT IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA (2001).
280. Id. at 23; VACLAV SMIL, CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 114 (1993).
281. See DALI L. YANG, CALAMITY AND REFORM IN CHINA: STATE, RURAL SO-
CIETY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE SINCE THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD (1996).
282. Richard L. Edmonds, Recent Developments and Prospects for the Sanxia
(Three Gorges) Dam, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE IMPACT ON REGIONS,
MIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 161, 165 (Terry Cannon ed., 2000).
283. See Lori Frater, A Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law
in the People's Republic of China, 7 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 89 (2002); Yan Wang,
Richard K. Morgan & Mat Cashmore, Environmental Impact Assessment of Projects
in the People's Republic of China: New Law, Old Problems, 23 ENVTL. IMPACT As.
SESSMENT REV. 543 (2003).
284. BEN BOER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE ASIA PA-
CIFIC 219 (1998).
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nicipal level environmental regulations. 285 China's peak law, the
Environmental Protection Law of 1989 (replacing the interim
Environmental Protection Law of 1979), provides a general tem-
plate for pollution control, environmental impact assessment and
other core regulatory functions.
286
A national environmental agency was first set up in 1975,
and is presently known as the State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA). It shares peak authority with environ-
mental units in the State Council and the National People's Con-
gress (NPC). Under the Chinese legal system, central
government environmental laws are implemented by local agen-
cies, principally the environmental protection bureaux (EPBs) 2
87
that function as part of the national administrative system. Local
agencies have some discretion to adapt national laws to local
conditions, although their environmental standards cannot be
less stringent than national ones. Administrative cooperation is
frequently hampered by byzantine administrative arrangements
involving multiple, overlapping agency responsibilities. A specific
environmental issue may be regulated by several entities - for
example, eight different ministries and commissions at the na-
tional level are involved in implementing China's obligations
under the Montreal Protocol. 288
Environmental laws in the nations of Southeast Asia vary in
extent, type, and quality. Though the Philippines lack a national
environmental law framework, it has achieved some ad hoc suc-
cesses, such as the new Clean Air Act of 1999, Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act of 2000, and the Clean Water Act of
2004.289 Thailand's primary environmental law is the Enhance-
ment and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act
of 1992 (NEQ Act),290 which is overseen by the Pollution Control
Department of the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Envi-
ronment. 291 The NEQ Act provides for a National Environment
Board to undertake strategic policy-making, with responsibilities
285. See e.g., Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law 1987 (revised in 1995
and 2000), Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law 1984 (revised in 1996). See
further Ferris, supra note 221, at 580.
286. Barbara J. Sinkule & Leonard Ortolano, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY IN CHINA 5 (1995).
287. Id. at 6-8.
288. William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, The Limits of the Law in Addressing
China's Environmental Dilemma, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRoN-
MENTAL PROTECrION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 405,414 (Michael R. McElroy et al.
eds., 1998).
289. See Philippine Primary Legislation, available at http://sunsite.nus.edu.sg/
apcelldbase/filipino/ primary.html.
290. B.E. 2535 §§ 12-21 (1992) (Thail.), available at http://www.pcd.go.th/info-
serv/enreg-envi_12.html.
291. Id. at § 21. See further Tookey, supra note 234.
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for the preparation of environmental policies and plans, the issu-
ance of environmental quality standards, and supervision of
EIAs.292 Similar legislative and administrative patterns exist in
Indonesia and Malaysia under their peak environmental stat-
utes.293 Vietnam is at a different stage of legal reform; it has a
parsimonious collection of environmental laws and, prior to 1980,
had virtually none. 294
This extensive body of environmental law in East Asia is
somewhat deceiving, for much of it is of poor quality. Legislation
is often poorly drafted, framed in very general and exhortational
terms, with undefined terminology, legislative gaps, and inconsis-
tent provisions.295 Sometimes environmental legislation seems
more akin to policy statements than law. For example, China's
Environmental Protection Law 1989 vaguely proclaims that local
governments are "responsible for the quality of the environment
within their own administrative regions. ' 296 Vague provisions can
pose problems in the context of legislative sanctions. For exam-
ple, the 1990 Measures on Administration of the Waigaoqiao
Free Trade Zone of Shanghai dictate that "any projects which
may cause environmental pollution shall be prohibited to be car-
ried out in the Free Trade Zone. '297 The absence of a definition
of "environmental pollution", and the potentially all-encompass-
ing scope of this provision, make this regulation rather problem-
atic. Similar drafting problems affect Vietnam's Law on
Environmental Protection, which the government has attempted
to overcome by enacting a supplementary measure, entitled the
Decree on Providing Guidance for the Implementation of the
Law on Environmental Protection.298 Similarly, Thailand's envi-
ronmental laws have been criticised for their brevity, indicating
only generic principles that leave enormous discretionary power
to administrative officials. 299 These legislative characteristics can
severely weaken the rule of environmental law.
292. Id. at §§ 13(1)-(14), 32-34.
293. Supra notes 251, 253.
294. Tannetje Bryant & Keith Akers, International Environmental Sympo-
sium: Environmental Controls in Vietnam, 29 ENVTL. L. 133, 136 (1999).
295. Peter Crone, China's Legal Structure, in A GUIDE To THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THE PRC 1, 1 (Chris Hunter et al. eds., (1997).
296. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohufa [Environmental Protec-
tion Law of the People's Republic of China], art. 16 (1989), available at http://www.
zhb.gov.cn/english/chanel-3/detail-3.php3?chanel=3&column=l&id=3 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2005).
297. Id. at art. 11.
298. Decree on Providing Guidance for the Implementation of the Law on Envi-
ronmental Protection, Vietnam Government Decree No. 175-CP (1994), available at
http.//law.nus.edu.sg/apceldbase/vietnam/regs/videnv.html#Top (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).
299. Tookey, supra note 234, at 331.
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Administrative and Policy Reforms
New or better environmental laws are not enough to protect East
Asia's environment. Governments must also have an administra-
tive system with the capacity and the motivation to implement
and enforce such laws. 3°° Legal reform must extend to an effec-
tive administrative process, incorporating public participation,
access to information, and judicial review. Unfortunately, there
has been a tendency of governments to "relegate the considera-
tion of legal and institutional arrangements to artificially isolated
chambers, destined for sequential consideration once the neces-
sary policy document has been developed. '301 Not uncommonly,
environmental legislation has been a dead letter due to too few
skilled personnel, insufficient administrative and technical sup-
port, and a paucity of financial resources. 30 2 There is also a ten-
dency to ignore the potential contributions of the non-
government organizations (NGOs), local community groups or
business associations as a means of environmental governance.
Most East Asian states have national environmental man-
agement agencies, which operate in conjunction with line minis-
tries dealing with water, minerals, and other natural resources. 30 3
Often there are also regional or provincial level environmental
administrations, and environmental units within municipal gov-
ernments. Little progress has been achieved in promoting cross-
sectoral administrative cooperation between environmental au-
thorities and other arms of government such as economic and
financial ministries. For example, Indonesia's State Ministry of
Population and Environment (SMPE), has been embroiled in a
number of disputes with other ministries over development pro-
posals.30 4 Some central government ministries have resisted the
demands of SMPE for their approval of a required EIA report
before undertaking a major development project. 30 5
Certainly, since the 1970s, virtually all countries in the re-
gion have established central environmental administrations,
often at the ministerial level with a seat in cabinet. South Korea
established its Environmental Administration in 1979, which was
300. William L. Andreen, Environmental Law and International Assistance: The
Challenge of Strengthening Environmental Law in the Developing World, 25 COLUM.
J. ENvTL. L 17, 26 (2000).
301. Id. at 28.
302. China's Environmental Problems - Needs - Spending - Enforcement, 21
EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 16 (1999).
303. Richardson, supra note 248, at 23.
304. See also Lim & Tang, supra note 223, at 568 (discussing conflicts between
the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Construction and Transportation
over the proposed Youngwol Dam project).
305. See also id.
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upgraded to a Ministry of Environment in 1990.306 Taiwan set up
a central Environmental Protection Administration in 1987,
which was later raised to a full Ministry.307 At the regional level,
the Ministry oversees the Taipei and Kaohsiung departments of
environmental protection. The Philippines has a Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. 308 In Vietnam, the Law on
Protection of the Environment is administered by the Ministry of
Science, Technology, and the Environment. The Ministry's func-
tions include: preparing all environmental protection legislation
plans and policies; monitoring of national environmental condi-
tions; appraising EIAs of project proposals; formulating environ-
mental standards; and pollution licensing. 30 9
Enforcement is the weakest link in East Asia's environmen-
tal law regimes. In 1994, Lester Ross wryly commented, "for
many years, China's environmental authorities have been like a
muzzled dog: plenty of bark but little bite. '310 The same could be
said for many of China's neighbours. China's criminal law is not
short of offences that harm public health and the environment.
31 1
But efforts to achieve a semblance of rule of law have yet to fully
overcome corruption and reliance on personal connections and
backdoor negotiations. 312 Occasionally, major administrative en-
forcement crackdowns are launched with considerable fanfare. 3
13
But sustained enforcement seems unlikely given the guanxi rela-
tionships that flourish between regulators and industry.
314
Professors Peter Hills and C.S. Man suggest that because of "a
cultural predisposition to harmony and consensus-building,
heavy-handed imposition of environmental regulations is typi-
cally avoided, unless an edict is delivered from the upper eche-
306. Cho, supra note 225, at 506; Yeon-Chang Koo, Legal Aspects of Environ-
mental Protection in Korea, 7 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 1, 6 (1979) (noting that the gov-
ernment is going to establish a centralized Environment Agency to effectuate the
Environment Preservation Act of 1977).
307. The website of Environmental Protection Administration, http://cemnt.epa.
gov.tw/eng (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
308. The website of Environmental Management Bureau under the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, http://www.emb.gov.ph (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).
309. Bryant & Akers, supra note 294, at 141.
310. Lester Ross, The Next Wave of Environmental Legislation, 21 CHINA Bus.
REV. 30, 30 (1994).
311. Benjamin Van Rooij, Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through
Enforcement, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
149, 155 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002).
312. SHAPIRO, supra note 279, at 206.
313. See, e.g., China Punishes 12,000 Firms for Environmental Offences, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 21, 2003; Sims, supra note 214, at 1235.
314. Peter Hills & C.S. Man, Environmental Regulation and the Industrial Sector
in China: The Role of Informal Relationships in Policy Implementation, 7 Bus. STRA-
TRATEGY & ENV'T 53 (1998).
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Ions of the Government. '315 The same patterns can be seen in
Thailand: Professor Douglas Tookey reports that "to avoid creat-
ing problems with each other, neighbours do not report environ-
mental violations" and corrupt officials prefer to be "nice to
family and friends" rather than generate animosity.316
So far, the courts in East Asia have been used mostly as a
last resort; policies and regulations serve as guidance, and dis-
putes are settled largely through negotiation and bargaining
outside the court system.317 A few significant public interest envi-
ronmental cases have been litigated in recent years in the region,
notably in Malaysia and the Philippines. 31 8 In Taiwan, there have
been some government-initiated lawsuits against polluters, but
citizen suits are uncommon.319 Others states such as Vietnam and
Indonesia lack an effective and independent judiciary willing and
able to entertain such cases.320 China's Administrative Litigation
Law of 1990 provides that any environment-related administra-
tive body that fails to carry out its duties (e.g., by failing to im-
pose a fine for pollution) can be challenged in the People's
Courts.321 However, a People's Court has no authority to review
a general decision made by the State Council, its ministries, or
any local government body which does not immediately bear on
a specific enterprise or individual (e.g., a decision to build a nu-
clear power station).322 While there is some evidence that formal
dispute resolution mechanisms are being used more frequently in
China to deal with environmental problems and complaints, 323
mediation remains favoured by most parties for addressing local
pollution problems. 324
Besides legislation and administrative support, an effective
system of environmental governance requires policies for sus-
315. Id. at 61.
316. Tookey, supra note 234, at 328.
317. Sinkule & Ortolano, supra note 286, at 27; see also RONALD C. BROWN,
UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS (1997).
318. See Meenakshi Raman, The Malaysian High Court Decision Concerning the
Bakun Hydro-Electric Dam Project, 2 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 93 (1997); Denter B.
Gatmaytan, The Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa v. Factoran as Pyrrhic
Victory, 15 GEO. INT'L ENV'T L. REV. 457 (2003).
319. See D. Te-chung Tang, The Environmental Laws and Policies of Taiwan, 26
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 534, 545 (1993).
320. CAROL WARREN & KYLIE ELSTON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN IN-
DONESIA 12 (1994).
321. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa [Administrative Litiga-
tion Law of the People's Republic of China], art. 11(5) (1990).
322. H. Mei, Legal Gateways for Environmental Protection in China, 4 REV.
EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 22, 29 (1995).
323. See Yuhong Zhao, Environmental Dispute Resolution in China, 16 J. ENVTL.
L. 157 (2004).
324. Id.
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tainable development. Policies can provide strategic directions
for regulators and help ensure discretionary legislative authority
is put to appropriate ends. All industrializing East Asian nations
have adopted national environmental policies and plans, though
their regulatory impact has been highly variable. Many were pre-
pared with assistance from international donors and advisors
such as the World Bank and the World Conservation Union
(IUCN). 32 5 However, most of these policy statements seem to be
of little regulatory significance. At best, they serve to indicate
long-term political commitment and, at worst, are mere public
relations exercises.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES
A. INFLUX OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ITS
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
At the heart of the economic transformation of East Asia's SEZs
is foreign investment. One might expect the interaction of mar-
ket deregulation, rapid industrialization and foreign investment
in the SEZs to be an incendiary combination from an environ-
mental perspective. Many transnational companies (TNCs) have
set up production facilities and entered into joint ventures with
local firms in East Asia. They have brought capital, as well as
new technologies, business systems and values, and management
behaviour to East Asia.326 Private finance now dominates the de-
velopment ledger in East Asia, and it has helped to compensate
for declines in bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental
aid. 327 As a result of economic globalization, "almost every gov-
ernment in the world, including communist regimes. . . attempts
to entice foreign capital. '328 In the 1990s, four of the five top
recipients for FDI in the world were in East Asia - namely,
China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand.329 Private capital is
moving not solely from the West to developing countries, but is
also increasingly circulating between emerging economies. South
325. Bryant & Akers, supra note 294, at 136 (discussing the IUCN's assistance to
the Vietnamese government to prepare a National Conservation Strategy in 1985).
326. Kylie Redfern & John Crawford, An Empirical Investigation of the Influence
of Modernisation on the Moral Judgements of Managers in the People's Republic of
China, 11 CRoss CULTURAL MGMT. 48 (2004).
327. Hilary F. French, When Foreign Investors Pay for Development, 10 WORLD
WATCH 8, 9 (1997).
328. Robert 0. Keohane & Van Doom Ooms, The Multinational Firm and Inter-
national Regulation, 29 INT'L ORG. 169, 170 (1975).
329. French, supra note 327, at 15.
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Korea and Taiwanese firms are among the most active investors
in China's SEZs. 330
The presence of foreign investors poses special challenges to
environmental regulators. This challenge is amplified when TNCs
acquire and manage major domestic enterprises in strategic sec-
tors of the economy. The privatization of public assets (often at
discount prices) has enhanced foreign ownership, especially in
highly indebted countries such as Thailand and the Philip-
pines.331 As a consequence of the infamous Bhopal tragedy in
1984 when a leak from a Union Carbide subsidiary's plant in In-
dia caused the deaths of thousands of workers and local inhabi-
tants, TNCs became more scrutinized by regulators and public
interest groups.332 Environmental issues have become increas-
ingly included in the TNC agenda, through technological solu-
tions, subscription to relevant corporate environmental systems,
and codes of conduct. 333 The Business Council of Sustainable
Development and the International Chamber of Commerce are
working to promote more environmentally responsible TNC con-
duct.334 Some TNCs see advantages from taking the environment
more seriously, including access to green consumer markets, ma-
terial savings from greater energy efficiencies, as well as helping
to pre-empt unwanted external environmental regulation. 335 But
many foreign investors no doubt do not see beyond financial im-
peratives and callously disregard their environmental impacts. 336
The environmental effects of FDI activity can be divided
into mainly scale effects (expansion of economic output), struc-
tural effects (reallocation of production and consumption), and
technological effects (technological innovation and diffusion). 337
In general, the former two effects tend to be negative, while the
technological and structural effects are anticipated to be posi-
330. Id. at 11.
331. See Richard Higgott, The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of
Resentment, 3 New POLITICAL ECONOMY 333 (1998).
332. See Jay L. Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Pros-
pects for an International Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J 321 (1985).
333. See HALINA S. BROWN, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY: SOCIETAL VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1993);
Bradford Gentry, Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment: Bone or Bane?, in
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 21 (OECD Proceedings,
1999) [hereinafter FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT].
334. See CHARLIES 0. HOLLIDAY, JR. ET AL., WALKING THE TALK: THE Busi-
NESS CASE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2002).
335. Id.
336. This is poignantly illustrated in the film THE CORPORATION (2004).
337. Tom Jones, TRADE AND INVESTMENT: SELECTED LINKS TO DOMESTIC ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY 6 (2003); available at http://www.tilburguniversity.n/globus/ac-
tivities/conference/papers/jones.pdf.
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tive. 338 The entry of foreign capital has raised living standards for
some host communities, but FDI is "often an accomplice to envi-
ronmental degradation on a massive scale, '339 and is associated
with "dangerous working conditions, child labour and the violent
repression of dissent."340 Increased FDI is viewed by some com-
mentators as exacerbating the inadequacies of local environmen-
tal regulation by increasing the scale of production and
consumption.341 Even if increased FDI leads to local environ-
mental improvements through the infusion of cleaner technolo-
gies, these benefits may be neutralized on an international scale
if production of pollution-intensive products is simply shifted to
other countries. Thus, the environmental impacts are displaced
rather than resolved.342 Furthermore, while international trade in
environmental technologies and products may ultimately benefit
the environment, trade liberalization can also make some envi-
ronmentally-harmful goods more accessible to new markets. The
WTO obligations may even compel countries to allow the import
of previously banned environmentally dangerous products.
Other sanguine perspectives defend TNC investment and in-
ternational trade for their supposed promotion of global prosper-
ity. This prosperity involves improved living standards and
economic growth in developing countries, and the facilitation of
democracy and greater respect for human rights through the re-
duction of poverty and political unrest.343 Professors Shinichi
Ichimura and James Morley argue that countries in East Asia
that have experienced the strongest economic growth have been
more successful in establishing parliamentary democratic systems
(e.g., South Korea and Taiwan), while countries that have exper-
ienced lower economic growth have tended to suffer from a more
autocratic type of governance (e.g., Indonesia and Thailand). 344
Western enterprises are also applauded for having brought a
range of corporate social responsibility norms to East Asia. A
broad spectrum of ethical issues has recently begun to take hold,
which include fighting corruption, poverty alleviation, workers'
338. Id.
339. French, supra note 327, at 12.
340. Id. at 10.
341. See Anil Markandya, Overview and Lessons Learnt, in RECONCILING
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS FROM CASE STUDIES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1 (Veena Jha et al. eds., 1999).
342. Jones, supra note 337.
343. See John Norberg, in DEFENSE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2003); Larry J.
Obhof, Why Globalization? A Look at Global Capitalism and its Effects, 15 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 91 (2003) (arguing that economic globalisation has reduced in-
come inequalities in developing countries).
344. Ichimura & Morley, supra note 16, at 31.
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rights and safety, public health, and environmental protection.345
A flourishing corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement
has already arisen among some companies predominantly in de-
veloped nations.346 The CSR practices have been articulated
through the drafting of corporate environmental management
systems, such as the International Standard Organization (ISO)
14000 series347 and the European Union's Eco-Management and
Audit Scheme 348 and Eco-Label Regulation.349 These mecha-
nisms for promoting CSR can be influential for businesses wish-
ing to trade in OECD markets where there is a growing green
consumer movement. 350 Corporate social responsibility practices
can be reinforced through "green supply chain" requirements
that multinational companies dictate to their Asian suppliers.351
East Asian governments are reinforcing these market-based CSR
pressures by linking them to their traditional environmental reg-
ulation. China's then National Environmental Protection Agency
(NEPA) in 1996 founded an environmental auditing and certifi-
cation centre to facilitate ISO 14000 certification among local en-
terprises.352 The ISO certification of Chinese enterprises has
arisen mostly in the context of joint ventures with Western com-
panies operating in the SEZs.353 The ISO certification has also
been awarded to some SEZ administrative authorities for their
environmental management achievements. 354
Compared to local enterprises, TNCs' environmental per-
formance is often said to be superior. In China, the state-owned
enterprises appear to shoulder responsibility for most of the
345. See TERENCE TSAI, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM IN CHINA AND TAI-
WAN (2002).
346. PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (David Crowther
& Lez Rayman-Bacchus eds., 2004).
347. See iso 14001: CASE STUDIES AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE (Ruth Hillary
ed., 2000).
348. European Economic Community Regulation No. 761/2001 (Mar. 19, 2001)
(allowing voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-management
and audit scheme); 2001 O.J. (L 114).
349. European Community Regulation No. 1980/2000 (July 17, 2000) (on a re-
vised Community eco-label award scheme); 2000 O.J. (L 237/1).
350. Rock, supra note 180, at 93.
351. WORLD BANK, GREENING INDUSTRY: NEW ROLES FOR COMMUNITIES,
MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENTS 60-63 (2000); DAVID P. ANGEL & MICHAEL T.
ROCK, ASIA'S CLEAN REVOLUTION: INDUSTRY, GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2000).
352. Mary L. Calkins, Make Friends First, Certify Later: China and ISO 14000, 9
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 609, 628 (1997).
353. Id. at 615, 636.
354. See Lisheng Zhan, Funds Pour into Economic Zone, CHINA DAILY, June 29,
2004, at 10 (discussing the case of the Guangzhou Economic and Technological De-
velopment Zone).
PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL
country's industrial pollution. 355 In Taiwan, the small business
sector has been identified as a source of pervasive, hard to regu-
late, pollution.356 In Singapore, foreign enterprises appear to be
generally much more aware and active than local businesses in
promoting corporate environmentally responsible practices. 357 A
study of green supply chains in East Asia found that they were
mainly sponsored by leading international companies rather than
local enterprises. 358 Foreign investment can thus help overcome
unsustainable development, which is seen as a result of underly-
ing inadequacies in environmental controls on economic activi-
ties. 359 It is also theorized that once a country begins to
industrialize, economic liberalization and foreign investment
help to eventually render its economic structure less pollution-
intensive than those countries whose economies remain
closed. 360
B. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY COMPETITION
FOR INVESTMENT
Crucial to understanding the environmental impact of TNCs is
the effect of inter-jurisdictional competition for economic invest-
ment. Some theories predict that competition between countries
for economic investment leads to a "race to the bottom," "regu-
latory chill," or a "pollution haven." Investment competition is
assumed to affect regulatory behavior (both standards and en-
forcement) in such areas as environmental and labour policy.361
The gist of the argument is that stringent environmental stan-
dards in industrial countries push businesses to relocate opera-
tions to developing countries, where standards are relatively
weaker, which results in monetary savings. Concomitantly, gov-
355. Sims, supra note 201, at 1238.
356. See Christian Aspalter, The Taiwanese Economic Miracle: From Sugarcane
to High-Technology, in UNDERSTANDING MODERN TAIWAN 1, 13 (Christian As-
palter ed., 2001).
357. Martin Perry & Sanjeev Singh, Corporate Greening of Foreign Transnation-
als in Singapore, 22 SING. J. TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY 52, 58-59 (2001).
358. Purnba Rao, Greening the Supply Chain: A New Initiative in South East
Asia, 22(6) INT'L J. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION MGMT. 632 (2002).
359. See Jennifer Clapp, Foreign Direct Investment in Hazardous Industries in
Developing Countries: Rethinking the Debate, 7 ENVTL. POL'Y 92 (1998); SUSMITA
DASGUPTA ET AL., WHAT IMPROVES ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE?: EVIDENCE
FROM MEXICAN INDUSTRY (1998).
360. OECD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF FOREIGN AND DIRECT INVEST-
MENT: A LITERATURE REVIEW (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/
40/9091451.pdf; OECD, OPEN MARKETS MATTER: THE BENEFITS OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LIBERALISATION (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/
51/1948792.pdf.
361. For an overview of these debates, see HAKAN NORDSTROM & SCOTT
VAUGHAN, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT (1999).
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ernments in developing countries intentionally undervalue envi-
ronmental damage, so as to attract more FDI - a process that
generates a "race to the bottom" as countries compete to lower
environmental regulation to attract FDI. Even if there is no race,
competitive concerns may still affect environmental decision-
making in host countries by causing a "regulatory chill. '362 This
position arises where states refrain from stricter environmental
controls for fear of alienating potential foreign investors.363 Con-
sequently, environmental regulations can get "stuck in the
mud."364
This race to the bottom is said by some commentators to be
particularly pronounced in the SEZs. Among the more passion-
ate rhetoric includes John Madeley, from People and Planet, who
charges, "under globalisation, the makers of manufactured goods
locate their factories in countries where wages are low; they com-
pete fiercely with each other in what has been called 'a race to
the bottom.' In so called 'free trade zones,' millions of people
work for long hours and low pay to make some of the world's
most expensive consumer products - such as clothing, toys, shoes,
and electronic equipment. Environmental standards in free trade
zones are often low and even non-existent. '365 Similarly, writing
for The Ecologist, Goldsmith claims, "wherever free-trade zones
have been established, there has been environmental devastation
on a literally horrific scale. '366
The environmental aspects of FDI have been examined in
some detail and various empirical studies have explored whether
there is any corroboration of the theoretical hypotheses.367 Cur-
rent research reveals a broad diversity in approaches used to ei-
ther support or refute the race to the bottom or pollution haven
hypotheses. Some studies look at aggregate patterns of FDI
flows, which indicate a rise in the flows of FDI in dirty industries
to developing countries,368 and others look at rates of exports for
362. Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Environmental Protection and Interna-
tional Competitiveness, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1998); H. Jeffrey Leonard, Con-
fronting Industrial Pollution in Rapidly Industrializing Countries: Myths, Pitfalls, and
Opportunities, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 779 (1985).
363. See NORDSTROM & VAUGHAN, supra note 361.
364. Id.
365. John Madeley, Trading off the Poor, PEOPLEANDPLANET.NET, Aug. 4, 2004,
available at: http://www.peopleandplanet.net/doc.php?id=1525&section=16.
366. Edward Goldsmith, Can the Environment Survive the Global Economy? 27
ECOLOGIST 242, 247 (1997).
367. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Private Sector Foreign Investment and the Environ-
ment, 4 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 99 (1995); ERIC NEUMAYER,
GREENING TRADE AND INVESTMENT (2001).
368. NORDSTROM & VAUGHAN, supra note 361, at 40.
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pollution intensive products. 369 Comparing environmental laws is
problematic due to the high number of variables involved. While
there are a variety of empirical studies and individual examples,
there is no conclusive data as to whether FDI is overall beneficial
or harmful to the environment.
The majority of studies suggest that the evidence of a race to
the bottom or pollution haven simply does not exist, 370 especially
in Western industrialized economies,371 where there exists
greater political obstacles to the lowering of environmental stan-
dards. But in the context of SEZs in developing countries, many
commentators cite Mexico's maquiladora border region as proof
of industrial flight and pollution haven.372 Low pollution abate-
ment costs due to lax environmental regulation appear to have
been a determinant for drawing FDI to the region. 373 Evidence
of business relocation was seen in the chemical industry where
investment in Mexico ballooned by over twenty-fold from 1982-
1990, following a tightening of environmental regulations in the
US. 3 74 Production of some hazardous chemical products banned
or strictly regulated in the US expanded in Mexico. However, it
has been argued that low labour costs acted as the primary mag-
net for FDI to this region.375 Leonard also sees the Mexican situ-
ation as more a product of regulatory chill rather than a race to
the bottom, as the environmental regime in the maquiladora re-
gion area has always been relatively light.376
The race to the bottom thesis has also been applied to inter-
national labour markets. It is postulated that FDI may cause jobs
369. Patrick Low & Alexander Yeats, Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?, in INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Patrick Low ed., 1992).
370. See, e.g., Gareth Porter, Trade Competition and Pollution Standards: "Race
to the Bottom" or "Stuck at the Bottom"?, 8 J. ENV'T & DEV. 133 (1999);
Muthukumara Mani & David Wheeler, In Search of Pollution Havens? Dirty Indus-
try in the World Economy, 1960-1995, 7 J. ENV'T & DEV. 215 (1998); Esty & Ger-
adin, supra note 362.
371. David Vogel, Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance
and Environmental Protection, 4 J. EUR. PuB. POL'Y 556 (1997).
372. See Edward J. Williams, The Maquiladora Industry and Environmental Deg-
radation in the United States-Mexico Borderlands, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765 (1996);
Daniel C. Esty & Bradford S. Gentry, Foreign Investment, Globalisation and the
Environment, in OECD, GLOBALISATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PRELIMINARY
PERSPECTIVES 141, 161 (1997).
373. David J. Molina, A Comment on Whether Maquiladoras are in Mexico for
Low Wages or to Avoid Pollution Abatement Costs, 2 J. ENV'T & DEV. 221 (1993).
374. Clapp, supra note 359, at 99.
375. Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North
American Free Trade Agreement, in THE U.S. - MEXICO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
13 ( Peter M. Garber ed., 1993). But labor conditions can also be environmental
issues, such as Mexican workers exposed to occupational hazards associated with
asbestos fibres. See H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE WORLD PRODUCT 144-45 (1988).
376. LEONARD, supra note 375.
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to relocate from high-income countries to labour-abundant econ-
omies in the developing world, forcing a competitive downward
decline in real wages and the quality of working conditions all
around. 377 There is some empirical evidence that FDI flows are
responsible for pushing wages downward in the global labour
market and generating factory sweatshops. 378 Labour conditions
in some of East Asia's SEZs appear to support the race to the
bottom hypothesis.379 Economic globalization is also said to be
associated with a rise in exploitation of child labour.380 However,
separate empirical research rejects the notion that FDI in newly
industrialized countries is associated with sweatshops and declin-
ing labour market conditions. 381 Other research also suggests
that global trade and associated foreign investment flows have
had only modest impacts - positive or negative on labour mar-
kets - suggesting that other aspects of globalization (e.g., tech-
nology transfer and volatile capital markets) have greater
impacts and risk for the welfare of workers.
382
Some scholarship on investment relocation focuses on the
nature of decision-making in TNCs. The main thesis is that inter-
national firms invest where they can exploit a comparative ad-
vantage. Increasing environmental management costs due to
tightening environmental laws can detract from this advan-
377. See Eddy Lee, Globalization and Employment: Is Anxiety Justified?, 135
INT'L LAB. REV. 485 (1996); William B. Gould, Labor Law for a Global Economy:
The Uneasy Case for International Labor Standards, 80 NEB. L. REV. 715 (2001);
Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization Incorporate Labor and Envi-
ronmental Standards? 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (2004).
378. See, e.g., Ogutcu Mehmet & Akbar Tavakoli, Does Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Cause a Race to the Bottom? Evidence from Four Asian Countries, 8 J. ASIA
PAC. ECON. 133 (2003) (providing empirical evidence from China, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand that support the race to the bottom argument); MIRIAM
CHING YOON LOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS TAKE
ON THE GLOBAL FACTORY (2001).
379. See especially Gus Edgren, Spearheads of Industrialization or Sweatshops in
the Sun? A Critical Appraisal of Labour Conditions in Asian Export Processing
Zones, in POVERTY AND POWER: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS AND THE MARKET IN
DEVELOPMENT 119 (John Cameron et al. eds., 1995); Dong-Sook S. Gills, Globaliza-
tion of Production and Women in Asia, 581 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 106
(May 2002).
380. See Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas
of Integrating Developing Countries, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 25 (2001) (ar-
guing for increased investments in the education of children to reduce exploitation
of child labour); Benjamin J. Stevenson, Pursuing an End to Foreign Child Labor
Through U.S. Trade Law: WTO Challenges and Doctrinal Solutions, 7 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129 (2002) (arguing for domestic and international legal mea-
sures to prevent trade in products made by children).
381. See Busse, supra note 179.
382. RICHARD B. FREEMAN, TRADE WARS: THE EXAGGERATED IMPACT OF
TRADE IN ECONOMIC DEBATE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10000, 2003).
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tage.383 But most research suggests that investors rarely factor
environmental costs into their decision-making on investment lo-
cations. The strictness or laxity of environmental regulation in
the host country is usually not determinative. 384 Environmental
compliance costs are more likely to be a factor in the location of
a new production facility rather than the relocation of an existing
facility. Of higher priority to corporations usually are considera-
tions of the availability of cheap labor, the natural resource en-
dowments of the host country, existing infrastructure, taxes,
transportation costs, availability of raw materials and market
size. 385
The literature also highlights a variety of extra-legal pres-
sures on TNCs to act environmentally responsible. The global
reach of TNCs is starting to be matched by the capacity of home
country environmental groups and consumers to monitor and act
against corporate behaviour overseas. 386 Companies' financial
sponsors such as banks and institutional investors may demand
environmental due diligence of international investment activi-
ties in order to avoid bad publicity or costly pollution liabili-
ties.387 Scrutiny from international consumer, labour and
environmental groups can also influence foreign investors to ad-
here to credible environmental standards. 388
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that Asian governments
have diluted their environmental regulations in order to entice
investment. Some Japanese companies relocated to their poorer
Southeast Asian neighbours apparently to take advantage of
lower environmental controls. 389 There is also evidence of the
migration of Japan's cement industry to China to take advantage
383. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS AND DE-
VELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM EMPIRICAL STUDIES (1995).
384. Lyuba Zarsky, Havens, Halos and Spaghetti: Untangling the Evidence about
FDI and the Environment, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 333, at 47.
385. Esty & Geradin, supra note 362.
386. See Tony C. Lempriere et al., Environmental NGOs, New Information Tech-
nologies and the Demand for Environmental Improvement in the Developing and
Industrializing Countries of the Asia Pacific Region, 1 J. ASIA PAC.ECON. 139 (1996).
387. Benjamin J. Richardson, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION THROUGH FINAN-
CIAL ORGANISATIONS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDUSTRIALISE COUN-
TRIES 280-83 (2002).
388. David Wheeler, Racing to the Bottom? Foreign Investment and Air Pollution
in Developing Countries, 10 J. ENV'T & DEV. 225, 236 (2001).
389. See Owen Cameron, Japan and Southeast Asia's Environment, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 67 (Michael J.G. Parnwell & Raymond L.
Bryant eds., 1996); Alejandrino J. Ferreria et al., Investments and TNCs in the Phil-
ippines: Towards Balanced Local and Regional Development, 14 REGIONAL DEV.
DIALOGUE 67, 78 (1997).
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of softer environmental regulations. 390 Esty and Gentry found
that foreign energy companies were under pressure to reduce en-
vironmental standards in order to satisfy the Chinese authorities'
desire for the cheapest generation of electricity.391 In 1993,
Taiwanese firms involved in recycling hazardous substances relo-
cated their operations to the eastern coastal areas of China, such
as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, after Taiwanese authorities banned
trading these substances. 392 Xia Youfou found that many foreign
investors in polluting industries entered into joint ventures with
China's township and village factories that are usually beyond
the reach of national environmental regulators. 393 An OECD en-
vironmental performance review of China noted, "foreign firms
promoted imports of outdated technologies and polluting or
toxic substances, taking advantage of the lower (or more flexible)
environmental standards in China. '394 In another reported inci-
dent, Hong Kong manufacturers of styrofoam and electrical cir-
cuit boards, constructed with ozone-depleting CFCs
(chlorofluorocarbons), relocated their activities to China's
SEZs. 395 As a developing country, China has enjoyed a longer
grace period to phase-out CFCs according to the terms of the
Montreal Protocol, a status not enjoyed by Hong Kong. None-
theless, this report also noted that "the move into China is part
of a wider phenomenon that is occurring mainly for reasons un-
related to the difficulties or cost of reducing consumption of
CFCs. Cheap, plentiful labour in Guangdong province is the
main factor luring hundreds of Hong Kong companies across the
border."396
Countering the pollution haven theory, there are some ex-
amples where FDI has stimulated improvements in the host
country's environmental regulations. The OECD has reported
that foreign investors in China have brought significant resources
for investment in environmental technology development as well
as corporate environmental management systems.397 Professor
David Wheeler examined air quality trends in the United States,
390. Thi Binh Minh Nguyen & A.T.M. Nurul Amin, The Role of Foreign Direct
Investment in Urban Environmental Management: Some Evidence from Hanoi, Viet-
nam, 4 ENV'T DEV. & SUSTAINABILIry 279, 287 (2002).
391. Esty & Gentry, supra note 372, at 156.
392. OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES FOR CHINA'S SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT 31 (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/54/29516017.pdf.
393. YOUFOU XIA, STUDY ON CHINA'S CONTROL MEASURES To THE TRANSFER
OF FOREIGN WASTES AND POLLUTION INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES THROUGH TRADE
AND INVESTMENT (1995).
394. OECD, supra note 394, at 28.
395. Carl Goldstein, Pollution Exporters: Hong Kong's CFC Users Shift to China,
155(19) FAR E. ECON. REV. 54 (1992).
396. Id.
397. OECD, supra note 394, at 31-32.
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China, Brazil and Mexico, the latter three representing the top
three shares of FDI for developing countries in the 1990s. 398 A
general improvement of air quality in the major cities of all four
countries was found. 399 Professor Michael Porter surmises that
stronger environmental regulations can improve a country's com-
petitiveness by fostering innovation and efficiency. 400 China is
cited as an example where government policy in the power indus-
try is to prefer investors that upgrade coal-fired power plants to
clean combustion technology. 4 Further, Professor David Vogel
argues that obtaining access to greener industrialized country
markets can motivate higher standards. 402 For instance, both
South Korea 40 3 and Japan 40 4 upgraded their emission control
standards for automobiles according to standards in the United
States and the EU. Similarly, Ruishu and others claim that large
state-owned factories in China have assumed higher production
costs to meet stronger environmental standards in industrialized
country markets. 405
Another driver for the "race to the top" is that TNCs some-
times seek to apply their home country's environmental stan-
dards regardless of where they do business.406 It can be more
efficient to apply one set of standards than to adapt them to each
country, 40 7 and using home country standards can help alleviate
harassment from home country consumers and environment
groups. For example, General Motors has made an effort to com-
ply with the United States' national environmental standards re-
gardless of where it is producing. 408 Investors' adoption of home
country standards can be particularly helpful in situations where
the host government lacks the capacity to effectively regulate en-
398. D Wheeler, supra note 388, at 227-31 (2001).
399. Id.
400. MICHEAL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990).
401. Gretta Goldenman, The Environmental Implications of Foreign Direct In-
vestment: Policy and Institutional Issues, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra
note 333, at 77-78.
402. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REG-
ULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995).
403. Sang Don Lee, The Effect of Environmental Regulations on Trade: Cases of
Korea's New Environmental Laws, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 651, 658-60 (1993).
404. David Vogel, Environmental Regulation and Economic Integration, 3 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 265, 270 (2000).
405. RuISHU Lu ET AL., A STUDY ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND FOR-
EIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (1993), available at http://rO.unctad.org/
tradeenv/docs/chinafdoc (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
406. See Edith B. Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Com-
ment, 102 YALE L.J. 2123 (1993); Vogel, supra note 371.
407. NORDSTROM & VAUGHAN, supra note 361, at 40-41.
408. Edwards, supra note 158, at 195.
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vironmental impacts.40 9 This phenomenon contributes to the
"pollution halo" theory, which posits that host country environ-
mental standards are improved as a result of FDI imports of ad-
vanced, cleaner technologies and corporate environmental
management systems. 410 It dovetails with the ecological moderni-
zation doctrine, which predicts that improved corporate environ-
mental performance can yield economic benefits as well. 411 Some
foreign companies may also see environmental technology mar-
ket opportunities in the SEZs.412 Bruce Tremayne and Penny de
Waal found a trend towards environmental ventures in China
with foreign investors, such as selling technologies for treatment
and recycling of wastes. 413 The ability of foreign companies to
import pollution control technologies into the SEZs and open
cities without customs duties also facilitates their compliance
with environmental regulations.414
C. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES
Environmental regulation in China's SEZs
The most informative evidence regarding SEZ environmental
regulation in East Asia comes from China's SEZs. Contrary to
the race to the bottom thesis, Chinese authorities have ostensibly
expanded and strengthened environmental controls in the SEZs
and open cities in recent years. The 1986 Provisional Regulations
on Environment Control for Economic Zones Open to Foreign-
ers is the main national instrument, and is complemented by reg-
ulations specific to each zone and each open city. Local
authorities rather than the central government have the responsi-
bility of developing most of the details of the environmental reg-
ulations specific to their jurisdiction.
409. Sitanon Jesdapipat, Trade, Investment and the Environment: Thailand, 6 J.
ENV'T & DEV. 350 (1997) (stating that in Thailand, even though environmental pro-
visions are included in its investment legislation, the government lacks sufficient per-
sonnel to monitor projects for compliance).
410. Z Zarsky, supra note 384.
411. See Peter Christoff, Ecological Modernization, Ecological Modernities, 5
ENVTL. POL. 476 (1996); See also ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION AROUND THE
WORLD: PERSECTIVES AND CRITICAL DEBATES (Arthur P.J. Mol & David A. Son-
nenfeld eds., 2002); ARTHUR P.J. MOL, GLOBALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
FORM: THE ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001).
412. See TERENCE TSAI, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM IN CHINA AND TAI-
WAN (2002); Gail Dutton, Chinese Environmental Laws a Plus for the West, 253
CHEMICAL MARKET REP. 7 (1998).
413. See Bruce Tremayne & Penny de Waal, Business Opportunities for Foreign
Firms Related to China's Environment, in Managing The Chinese Environment 292
(Richard Louis Edmonds ed., 1998).
414. Id. at 305-06.
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While many developments during the early years of China's
SEZ reforms proceeded with merely perfunctory considerations
of their environmental and social effects, authorities quickly be-
gan to take environmental regulation more seriously for several
reasons.415 First, PRC leaders felt that stronger environmental
regulation would help them regain political control over the
SEZs, which were gaining notoriety for "excesses" such as cor-
ruption and financial mismanagement. 416 Such problems con-
vinced authorities of the need for more supervision of activities
taking place in the zones. Second, tighter environmental regula-
tion was also an outcome of internal struggles within the CCP
between conservative and liberal factions over the direction of
the market reforms. The conservatives cited environmental
problems among the various reasons to oppose the SEZ model,
thus prompting the reformers to increase environmental regula-
tion in the SEZs to forestall further consternation. 417 Thirdly, the
strengthening of environmental laws in the SEZs would, believed
some CCP leaders, facilitate the reception of Western legal con-
cepts and technologies, which could assist China's moderniza-
tion.418 For example, the introduction of EIA procedures could
help improve the efficiency and productivity of Chinese industry
by reducing profligate resource consumption. Finally, interna-
tional development agencies financing projects in China have en-
couraged improvements to environmental regulation. The Asian
Development Bank claims "a market-based economy offers
more opportunities as it has proved easier for the government to
effectively regulate the conduct of the private sector than to reg-
ulate itself. '419 Thus, for example, "government officials in
charge of environmental protection do not feel the same respon-
sibility under a command economy to ensure the survival of a
state-managed enterprise." 420
But while environmental controls in China's SEZs have
been clearly fortified, their effectiveness is less apparent. A lin-
gering structural weakness of much of Chinese environmental
law is the assumption that the economy is a command, planned
one, where production is dominated by state-owned enterprises.
The SEZ environmental regulations have a command and sanc-
415. Joseph R. Profaizer, Economic Development and Environmental Law in
China's Special Economic Zones, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 319, 320-21 (1993).
416. Id. at 330.
417. L. Ross & M.A. Silk, Environmental Planning for Investment Projects in
China, in W.P. STRENG & A.D. WILCOX (EDS), DOING BUSINESS IN
CHINA 11, 26 (1990).
418. Profaizer, supra note 415.
419. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND
LEGISLATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 7 (2000).
420. Id.
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tion orientation, lack economic incentives for businesses to im-
prove environmental practice and provide little opportunity for
public input into decision-making. There is insufficient market-
based regulation, such as environmental taxes and negotiable
management agreements, that might offer a superior means of
promoting environmental performance among the increasing
numbers of private companies operating in these zones.
A complex web of municipal regulation and bureaucratic ad-
ministration has arisen from the decentralization of economic
and environmental responsibilities to local authorities in the
SEZs. Local authorities are incongruously expected to be both
advocates of business enterprise, and environmental regulators
of business.421 Local authorities also tend to lack the financial
resources and environmental expertise to be effective environ-
mental watchdogs. And in many municipalities, the local envi-
ronmental protection bureau holds a low administrative rank,
which further diminishes its limited influence. 422 Municipal au-
thorities, of course, do not have a completely free reign in the
SEZs and open cities, which are usually of provincial or national
strategic significance. Stories of severe pollution and environ-
mental degradation could bring unwelcome publicity to the
SEZs, and thus central government bodies have established some
minimum environmental standards for all SEZs.
In 1986, the central government issued the Provisional Reg-
ulations on Environment Control for Economic Zones Open to
Foreigners. 423 Applicable to domestic and foreign enterprises,
the regulations have the stated aim: "to prevent and control envi-
ronmental pollution and ecological damage, to ensure the health
of human beings, to protect and create a sound investment envi-
ronment and to promote economic and social development. '424
Among their specific provisions, the regulations require SEZ
managing authorities to include environmental protection mea-
sures in local development plans;425 to conduct environmental as-
sessment studies of new development proposals;426 and to
prohibit new projects that pose specified serious harms.427 Local
authorities are permitted to adopt supplementary pollution con-
421. Abigail R. Jahiel, The Contradictory Impact of Reform on Environmental
Protection in China, 149 CHINA Q. 81, 85 (1997).
422. Id. at 93.
423. State Counsel of the People's Republic of China, Provisional Regulations
on Environment Control for Economic Zones Open to Foreigners (1986), available
at http://www.ccpitcanada.ca/laws/f34.htm (last visited at Apr. 2, 2005).
424. Id. at art. 1.
425. Id. at art. 3.
426. Id. at art. 4.
427. Id. An example is manufacturing of electroplating: SINKULE & ORTOLANO,
supra note 286, at 41.
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trol standards, which may be stricter than baseline provincial
standards.428
To get an insight into their effectiveness, it is worth com-
menting on the Provisional Regulations' provisions for environ-
mental assessment of new investment projects. Such projects
must incorporate appropriate pollution control facilities, 429 and
each contract between the authorities and project proponent
must specify measures to control pollution in conformity with ap-
plicable legislation. 430 Project proponents must submit a report
on environmental protection measures to be adopted, for evalua-
tion by the local environmental protection department (EPD).431
From the standpoint of Western environmental law precedents,
there are various shortcomings in these procedures. Notably,
there is no reference to opportunities for public participation in
this process and, indeed, the responsible EPD is directed to keep
confidential the information provided by businesses under its su-
pervision.432 Moreover, there is no guidance in the regulations on
the methods for the preparation of the environmental protection
measures and on what basis they would be assessed. It can, how-
ever, be reasonably assumed that pollution per se would not bar
project approval, because Article 9 provides a mechanism for the
issuance of pollution discharge permits, even if national or local
environmental standards are exceeded, so long as the prescribed
fee is charged. Businesses that pollute without permission face
various enforcement measures, including financial compensation
orders for the cleanup of pollution and administrative fines.433
Besides this general template for environmental governance,
local authorities in the SEZs and open cities have enacted envi-
ronmental regulations tailored to their localities. Presently,
Shenzhen SEZ has the largest collection of environmental
rules.434 Since 1992, when the municipality was granted the right
to pass laws, it has enacted at least 50 regulations and decrees
428. Id. at art. 5.
429. Id. at art. 6..
430. Id. at art. 7.
431. Id. at art. 8.
432. Id. at art. 10.
433. Id. at art. 11.
434. Examples of the Shenzhen SEZ environmental regulations include: Regula-
tions on Environmental Protection of Shenzhen SEZ; Regulations on Prevention of
Noise Pollution of Shenzhen SEZ; Regulations of the Shenzhen SEZ on the Ap-
pearance of the City and Environmental Sanitation; Regulations on Water and Soil
Preservation in Shenzhen SEZ; Regulations on Prevention and Control of Pollution
of the Sea Areas of the Shenzhen SEZ; Ordinances on Management of Urban
Greening in Shenzhen SEZ: regulations listed in Qun Du & John Davis, Local En-
actment of Urban Environmental Management Law: The Case of Shenzhen City,
China, 6 ASIA PAC. J. ENvTL. L. 79 app. (2001).
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concerning environmental protection.435 Similarly, Xaimen and
Hainan SEZs have passed numerous local environmental protec-
tion regulations over the same period. 436 Among the open cities,
Shanghai has probably the most substantial library of environ-
mental regulations.437 In all these cases, the SEZ regulations en-
compass such matters as land use planning, provision of urban
amenities, pollution licensing and waste disposal. Poor legislative
drafting, reflected by vague or unworkable provisions, plagues
many regulations. For example, the Regulations of the Shenzhen
SEZ on the Appearance of the City and Environmental Sanita-
tion provide, "All units and individuals shall perform an obliga-
tion to preserve the appearance of the city and environmental
sanitation, and take good care of public facilities. '438 The regula-
tion offers no definition of "environmental sanitation," and
leaves it to the relevant municipal department to prepare a "plan
of environmental sanitation" where, presumably, the matter
would be defined.439 Similarly, the Measures on Administration
of the Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone of Shanghai dictate, "any
projects which may cause environmental pollution shall be pro-
hibited to be carried out in the Free Trade Zone. '440 Again, the
key phrase "environmental pollution" is left undefined, and the
potentially all-encompassing and draconian scope of this rule
does not assist regulators wishing to accommodate economically
promising new investments that may pose minor pollution
risks.441
435. Wenfang Li, Laws Protect Environment in Shenzhen, CHINA DAILY, Dec.
24, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 4555726.
436. Xiamen's Growth Still Leaves Room for Nature, CHINA DAILY, June 8, 1998.
at 3.
437. The Shanghai municipal government has issued a plethora of environmental
regulations, including: Regulation of Environmental Planning Management; Regula-
tion of Urban Environmental Management; Regulation of Environmental Protec-
tion of On-Going Construction Projects; Regulation of Comprehensive
Environmental Management; Regulation of Water Pollution Prevention and Con-
trol; Regulation of Air Pollution Prevention and Control; Regulation of Hazardous
Wastes Pollution Prevention and Control; Regulation of Radioactive Pollution Pre-
vention and Control; Measures for Pollution Prevention and Control of Hazardous
Wastes of Shanghai, available at http.//www.unescap.rg/drpad/publication/integra/
modalities/china/4chO2fhtm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
438. Administrative Regulations of the Shenzhen SEZ on the Appearance of the
City and Environmental Sanitation (1999), art. 7, available at http://fzj.sz.gov.cn/enl
40.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
439. Id. at art. 51.
440. Measures on Administration of the Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone of Shang-
hai (1997), art. 13, available at http://www.techcn.com/etechnew/Market/lawviewl.
asp?Id=435303.
441. See further David W. Massey et al., Economic Imperatives vs. Environmental
Quality in the Dragon's Head: The Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, Shanghai, 40(5) J.
ENVTFL. PLAN. & MGMT. 661 (1997).
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The SEZ environmental regulations are somewhat austere
and authoritarian, and provide few opportunities for formal citi-
zen participation in SEZ environmental decision-making. The
Regulations on Prevention and Control of Pollution of the Sea
Areas of the Shenzhen SEZ bark, "It shall be forbidden for a
ship with cargo in bulk to wash its polluted decks within a har-
bour, '442 for which stiff fines are to be imposed. 443 In China, the
public has traditionally been seen by authorities as a mass to be
mobilized and educated, through activities such as "Tree Planting
Day" or "Love the Birds Week. '444 Opportunities for public in-
volvement arise mainly in relation to enforcement actions. Thus,
the Regulations of the Shenzhen SEZ on the Appearance of the
City and Environmental Sanitation provide, "The responsible de-
partment may engage some urban residents as volunteer-watch-
ers to assist propagandistic education as well to help correct
illegal acts."' 445 More concretely, the Regulations on Prevention
and Control of Pollution of the Sea Areas of the Shenzhen SEZ
give pollution victims the right to claim damages: "Any unit and
individual falling a victim to the damages caused by environmen-
tal pollution in the sea areas shall have a right to claim compen-
sation for loss from the party responsible for pollution. '446
The extensive decentralisation of responsibilities to munici-
pal authorities in China has contributed to variable and inconsis-
tent implementation of environmental regulations in the SEZs.
An unprecedented nationwide probe of the country's develop-
ment zones, conducted by the Ministry of Land and Resources in
2003, found rampant land use and planning law abuses. 447 Aston-
ishingly, it is reported that the probe resulted in 2,426 develop-
ment zones being closed by authorities. 448 Of particular concern
was evidence uncovered about the loss of arable lands to make
way for the development zones and industrial parks. 449 Legisla-
tion delegating powers to SEZ municipal authorities is vulnera-
ble to being undermined by those authorities following local
economic aspirations that diverge from national environmental
442. Regulations on Prevention and Control of Pollution of the Sea Areas of the
Shenzhen SEZ (1999), art. 15, available at http://fzj.sz.gov.cn/en39.asp (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
443. Id. at arts. 42-44.
444. LESTER Ross & MITCHELL A. SILK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 207 (1987); see generally ALLEN P.L. LIu, MASS
POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA (1996).
445. Supra note 438, at art. 7.
446. Supra note 442, at art. 53.
447. Discussed in Dai Yan, Development Zones See Upsurge, CHINA DAILY, Mar.
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protection objectives. From the reforms, municipal governments
have become "fully fledged economic actors, not just administra-
tive-service providers. '450 It is said that the "diminution in the
central state's capacity to control local policy decisions through
the traditional mechanisms of patronage and Party discipline has
meant that to a very large extent Beijing rules the provinces in
name only. '451 The power of local authorities is increasingly
linked to local business interests, from whom they derive revenue
and political support. Municipal governments in the PRC are em-
bedded in various informal economic arrangements and institu-
tional norms, the constellation of which is seen as "heralding the
potential emergence of local corporatism. ' 452 Apart from their
antipathy to national policies that might hurt local economic
growth, municipal authorities struggle to manage environmental
problems that transcend their jurisdictional boundaries, and may
lack the resources and technical expertise to address even local
pollution hazards.
But when we look at China's flagship SEZs, subject to much
greater central oversight, environmental regulation appears to be
much more effective. Some of China's major cities with SEZs
have experienced significant declines in pollution. For example,
Wheeler found that from 1987 to 1995 particulate airborne mat-
ter concentration in the sampled cities declined from almost 500
g/m3 to about 300 g/m3.453 Further, China reduced its energy in-
tensity (i.e., the quantity of energy used per unit of output) by
about 50 percent since 1980.454 A 1999 survey suggested less than
half of China's industrial enterprises met national environmental
standards, with compliance highest in eastern China (48.8%) and
lowest in the west (23.5%).455 All of the cities in the major SEZs
were among those coming closest to meeting air quality stan-
dards.456 According to the State Environmental Protection Ad-
ministration, only 11 cities met or exceeded national air quality
standards in 2000, and these cities included all the SEZ munici-
palities in Fujian and Guangdong provinces. 457 The relatively few
450. Jean C. Oi, The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy, 144
CHINA Q. 1132, 1137 (1995).
451. Pitman B. Potter, Globalisation and Local Legal Culture: Dilemmas of
China's Use of Liberal Ideals of Private Property Rights, 2 AusmL. J. ASIAN L. 1, 19
(2000).
452. Id.
453. Wheeler, supra note 388, at 229.
454. J John Byrne et al., The Challenge of Sustainability: Balancing China's En-
ergy, Economic and Environmental Goals, 24 ENERGY POL'Y 455 (1996).
455. Supra note 302.
456. Id.
457. Rongrong Li, International Market Insight Trade Inquiries: China: SEPA
Environmental Projects, INT'L MARKET INSIGHT TRADE INQUIRIES 1 (April 11,
2000).
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State Owned Enterprises in the SEZ cities partly may explain
their success in achieving environmental standards. In particular,
pollution loads in Shenzhen are significantly lower than typical
Chinese cities.458 Shenzhen has complied with national air and
water quality standards, and has been described as "among the
top five environmental enforcers in China. '459 The Shenzhen city
authorities are reported to have vetoed 3,619 projects that have
failed to meet environmental requirements. ' 460 According to Qiu
Mei, former deputy director of the Shenzhen Environmental
Protection Bureau, by 1998 Shenzhen authorities had "dealt with
700 environmental cases in the past five years involving fines to-
talling 11.5 million yuan (US $1.4 million) [and had] shut down
dozens of small factories and rejected 240 projects of 4,000
projects because they were deemed potentially polluting." 461
These achievements have been acknowledged by various en-
vironmental awards and honours. In recent years, Chinese au-
thorities have begun to see the SEZs as places to showcase
environmental excellence. A decade ago, Profaizer showed per-
cipience to argue that China "should utilize the SEZs as an envi-
ronmental laboratory to study how economic growth can proceed
in cooperation with environmental protection. '462 Since 1997,
Chinese authorities have designated five places as "model" envi-
ronmental cities - all of them located in the major SEZs. The
city of Shenzhen (an area which includes the SEZ) has been
showered with several accolades, notably International Garden
City in 2000 (bestowed by the International Association of Gar-
dens and Recreational Facilities), 463 and the Global 500 Roll of
Honour of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in
2002.464 In bestowing the award, UNEP cited the city's array of
environmental laws, large investments in environmental protec-
tion and extensive parks. The Shenzhen City's Master Plan 1996-
2010 has provided the blueprint for an era of sustainable urban
living. According to a report on its UNEP award, "since being
458. K.C. Lam, Environmental Protection in the Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone: Achievements, Problems and Implications, in CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONES: POLICIES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 66, at 76, 78.
459. Li, supra note 435.
460. Tale of Two Cities Cited for Care of Nature, CHINA DAILY, May 17, 2002, at
3.
461. Li, supra note 435..
462. Profaizer, supra note 415, at 345-46.
463. China to Host 2002 World Environment Day Observance, EARTHVISION
ENvTL. NEWS, Mar. 20, 2002, at http://www.earthvision.net/ColdFusion/NewsPage
1.cfm?NewslD=19962 (last visited May 20, 2005).
464. UNEP Press Release, The City of Shenzhen, People's Republic of China,
One of Eight Individuals and Organizations, to Receive United Nations Environment
Award, (May 2002) - Bluebook, available at http://www.unep.org/documents/De-
fault.asp?DocumentlD=248&ArticlelD=3056 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
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established in 1980 as China's first special economic zone, the
municipal council has spent 3.8 billion yuan (US $463 million) on
the environment, passed 38 local environmental laws and in-
creased green coverage by 45 per cent. '465
Another Chinese open economic city to receive recognition
for its environmental performance is Dalian. It has received a
UNEP Global 500 award and the Dalian Economic and Techno-
logical Development Zone (ETDZ) Administration was certi-
fied to the ISO 14001 voluntary standard in 1999.466 The Dalian
ETDZ authorities sought ISO certification because existing gov-
ernmental environmental regulations and policies were consid-
ered inadequate to promote local sustainable. 467 For example,
the ETDZ's new environmental system includes a plan to reduce
the S02 emissions and dust pollution from coal burning by re-
placing coal with liquefied petroleum gas for domestic consump-
tion.468 The Dalian ETDZ Administration is also helping local
enterprises achieve their own ISO 14001 certification.469
The SEZs usually have the advantage of extra resources -
financial and technological from the infusion of foreign invest-
ment to address environmental problems.470 Some of the envi-
ronmental achievements of the SEZs appear to owe not so much
to diligent regulation but investment in environmental infrastruc-
ture and public works schemes, such as construction of sewage
treatment facilities, recreational parks and afforestation initia-
tives. Haikou city (on Hainan island SEZ) has invested heavily in
tree planting, and 39 percent of the city is described as
"green. '"471 Shenzhen's environmental improvements can be
credited in part to investments in hard infrastructure such as
modern sewage treatment works.472 In contrast to environmental
investments, pollution and land use regulations appear to have
played a less influential role. In November 2001, Xiamen SEZ
was chosen to host an international exposition of environmental
cities, as it had been listed among the "Top 40 Cities" for envi-
465. Id.
466. Geng Yong & Raymond C6t6, EMS as an Opportunity for Engaging China's
Economic Development Zones: The Case of Dalian, available at http://www.unepie.
org/pc/ind-estates/casestudies/Dalian.htm (last visted Mar. 22, 2005). The ISO 14001
standard provides a framework of standards and processes for corporations to adopt
to improve their internal use of materials and energy, and to provide a structure for




470. Lam, supra note 458, at 76.
471. Growing Haikou Stays Green, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 21, 1997, at 3.
472. Shenzhen to Build a Number of Key Environmental Protection Projects, Si-
NOCAST CHINA Bus. NEWS DAILY, Aug. 15, 2003, at 1.
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ronmental improvement investments. 473 Between 1991-1995,
Xiamen city spent 1.5 percent of its total GDP on environmental
protection (about double the national average of 0.7 percent),
and for the 1996-2000 period this rose to three percent of its
GDP.474 Thus, the superior wealth and high national profile of
the SEZs would appear to be factors that have enabled them to
achieve superior environmental conditions, rather than as a re-
sult of innovations in their environmental regulation per se. Such
wealth, however, would probably be unlikely in the absence of
foreign investment.
There is a miscellany of other factors that help explain why
certain SEZs have achieved superior environmental results. Such
"showcase" cities are, by definition, exceptions. Most Chinese
cities are very different - one United Nations study describing
them as "vociferous consumers of resources and relentless emit-
ters of pollutants. ' 475 Some SEZs enjoy superior environmental
conditions because they had a head-start over other Chinese cit-
ies; initially set-up in relatively undeveloped areas, SEZs were
given an advantage to engage in more systematic, careful plan-
ning from the outset. 476 Before the SEZ policies, Shenzhen "was
just a sleepy border town" in "agricultural backwater. '477 Simi-
larly, in Vietnam, authorities established new industrial zones in
the relatively undeveloped areas of Hanoi to avoid the pollution
and congestion that affected older industrial areas in the city.
478
Because much economic activity in the SEZs and open cities is
new, it is also caught by environmental regulations that otherwise
exempt existing industrial facilities.479 If they cannot comply,
SEZ authorities have sometimes simply ejected their most pollut-
473. Xiamen Special Economic Zone, China's Green City, AsIAINFo DAILY
CHINA NEWS, Nov. 12, 2001,. at 1, available at http://www.highbeam.com/library/
docO.asp?docid=lPl:48188450&refd=ink-tptd-np&skeyword=&teaser (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
474. China: Xiamen Works to Become One of World Cleaniest Cities, CHINA Bus.
INFO. NETWORK, Sept. 5, 1997, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=
131852461&sid=6&Fmt=3&clientld=5220&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
475. ESCAP, supra note 140, at 148 (describing trends in Chinese and other
Asian cities).
476. See Mee Kam Ng & Wing-Shing Tang, Theorising Urban Planning in a Tran-
sitional Economy: The Case of Shenzhen, People's Republic of China, 75 TowN
PLAN. REV. 173 (2004); Mee Kam Ng & Wing-Shing Tang, The Role of Planning in
the Development of Shenzhen, China: Rhetoric and Realities, 45 EURASIAN GEOGRA-
PHY & EcoN. 190, 191 (2004).
477. Mee Kam Ng, Shenzhen, 20 CITIES 429, 429-30 (2003).
478. Minh Nguyen & Nurul Amin, supra note 390, at 282.
479. See Jiming Hao et al, Control Strategy for Sulfur and Acid Rain Pollution in
China, 12 J. ENVTL. ScL. 385, 387 (2000).
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ing industries beyond city limits. 480 Around Shenzhen, for exam-
ple, is the highly polluted Pearl River Delta.481 Finally,
environmental model city status is probably partly due to the
presence in these areas of a relatively well-educated workforce.
A World Bank study of environmental policy in China noted that
where communities have higher levels of literacy and education,
they are more likely to complain about pollution.482 Various
studies show a correlation between rising income and rising soci-
etal demand for improved environmental amenities. 483 This is be-
cause pollution damage receives a high priority after rising
wealth has financed basic investments in health and education,
and because wealthier societies have more resources to devote to
environmental protection.4
84
Environmental regulation in other East Asian SEZs
There has been comparatively less effort to develop environmen-
tal regulations tailored to the SEZs in other parts of East Asia.
There is also some evidence that environmental standards may
be waived or diluted for SEZ investments. Looking at South Ko-
rea first, the recent Act on Designation and Operation of Free
Economic Zones,485 promulgated in 2002, provides that "the pos-
sibility of securing the environmentally sound and sustainable de-
velopment" is a matter to be taken into account by the
government's Free Economic Zone Committee when selecting
sites. 486 Further, the plan for each new free economic zone must
include a "program for environmental preservation. 4 87 Contro-
versially, Korean legislation also permits the authorities to re-
duce or waive any applicable pollution levies, environmental
improvement charges or water use fees, where they consider this
necessary "for smoothly carrying out the development project of
any free economic zone. '488 Further, approval from the Minister
of Finance and Economy of a zone's implementation plan is
deemed to supersede the need for any further administrative ap-
480. United States Embassy Beijing, Curbing Chinese Pollution: A Tale of Two
Cities, at http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/Liaoningweb.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2005).
481. See A.W.M. Wong & M.H. Wong, Recent Socio-economic Changes in Rela-
tion to Environmental Quality of the Pearl River Delta, 4 REGIONAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 28 (2004).
482. JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 61.
483. Wheeler, supra note 388, at 233.
484. Id.
485. Act on Designation and Operation of Free Economic Zones, Act. No. 6835
of Dec.30, 2002, available at http://www.investkorea.org/templet/type0/1/read.jsp.
486. Id. at art. 5.5.
487. Id. at art. 6.11.
488. Id. at art. 15.2.
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provals under separate environmental and planning laws (e.g.,
for clearance of forestry reserves, diversion of farmland to indus-
trial development or establishment of sewage facilities). 489 These
latter provisions dangerously displace environmental protection
regulations and standards, which may not be adequately incorpo-
rated into a zone's development plan. Environmental and labour
laws are known to have been previously waived in Masan SEZ,
for investors. 490 South Korea's foreign investment laws are simi-
larly vague or non-committal on environmental protection. The
only reference to the environment in the Foreign Investment
Promotion Law491 is a proscription against investment "where it
has harmful effects on public hygiene or the environmental pres-
ervation of the Republic of Korea. '492
Like Korea, Taiwan has not enacted any environmental stat-
utes specifically for its SEZs and has relied on miscellaneous pro-
visions for environmental management and planning scattered
among Taiwan's economic and environmental legislation. Thus,
the Air Pollution Control Act of 1975 mentions that "when de-
veloping special industrial parks air quality monitoring facilities
shall be planned and installed within the boundaries of the parks
or in appropriate zones. '493 Further, the Environmental Impact
Assessment Act of 1994 requires that environmental assessments
be undertaken into proposals to establish any industrial park. 494
Interestingly, as in China, Taiwanese authorities have begun to
see their SEZs as arenas for showcasing their best environmental
practices. Taiwan's Environmental Protection Administration has
recently announced plans to establish "eco-parks" in Hualien
and Kaohsiung counties, and in Taoyuan and Tainan counties, to
promote investment and development of environmentally
friendly industries.495 The "Environmental Science and Technol-
ogy Parks," as they are formally described, are expected to pio-
neer research and development into clean energies and waste
489. Id. at arts. 9, 11.
490. TRADE UNION ADVISORY COMMITrEE, LABOUR STANDARDS IN THE
GLOBAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT SYSTEM (1996), available at http://www.itcilo.it/
actrav/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/standard/tuacinv.htm.
491. Foreign Investment Promotion Act, Act No. 5559, effective from Sept. 16,
1998, available at http://www.investkorea.org/templet/type0/1/read.jsp.
492. Id. at art. 4(2).2. There is no indication as to the threshold of "harmful
effects."
493. Kongqi Wuran Fangzhifa [Air Pollution Control Act 1975], art. 15 (2002),
available at http://law.epa.gov.tw/en/laws/889404502.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
494. Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1994, art. 5.1 (2003), available at
http//law.epa.gov.tw/en/laws/379692190.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
495. Chiu Yu-Tzu, Eco-parks to Aid Taoyuan and Tainan, TAIPEI TIMES, Mar. 26,
2004, at 4, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwanarchives/204/O3/26/
2003107792 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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recycling, for example.496 Similarly, Singapore has established an
Eco-Recycling park for industries wishing to develop commercial
applications for recycled products.49
7
Vietnam has promulgated a miscellany of regulations and
guidelines that contain provisions on the environmental activities
of foreign investors in its special industrial zones.498 Management
plans for the establishment of industrial zones are to include
measures for environmental protection, although the relevant
regulation contains no guidance on what specific measures
should be incorporated into the plans.499 Among the taxonomy
of investments to be encouraged and which are enumerated in
the 1996 Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, are those for
"protecting the environment or investing in research and devel-
opment."500 It is also stated in a 1997 administrative circular that
industries prohibited from investing in the country's industrial
zones include those producing harmful chemicals, dyes and radi-
oactive materials. 501 Another circular on the EIA of investment
projects specifies requirements for investors to undertake envi-
ronmental assessments according to standards formulated by the
Ministry of Science. 502 Also relevant is the Regulation on the
Protection of the Environment in Industrial Parks, which posits
procedures for the construction of development infrastructure in
manufacturing areas, and procedures for inspections to evaluate
environmental conditions and the processing of industrial
496. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCI-
ENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PARK IN TAIWAN, available at http://cemnt.epa.gov.tw/eng/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
497. MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF SINGAPORE, THE SINGAPORE GREEN
PLAN 2012, iv (2002), available at http://www.mewr.gov.sg/SGP2012/default.htm.
498. Bryant & Akers, supra note 294, at 182.
499. Circular No. 04-BXD-KTQH, on Providing Guidelines for Implementation
of Decree 36-CP Dated 24 April 1997 of the Government with Respect to Prepara-
tion and Approval of Detailed Plans, Management of Construction in Accordance
with Plans and Evaluation of Technical Designs of Works of Investment Projects in
Industrial Zones, Export Processing Zones and High-Tech Zones (July 30, 1997), cl.
1.2, available at http://www.vietnamese-law-consultancy.comi/sources/s-EPZIPsl
planO71997.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
500. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam (1996), art. 3.1(c), available at http:/
/www.dpi.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/invest/html/law2.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
501. Circular No. 08/KHDT, on Providing Guidance on the implementation of
the List of Industries Which are Encouraged or Limited or Prohibited To Invest in
Industrial Zones and High-Technology Industrial Zones (July 29, 1997), cl. A.IV,
available at http://www.vietnamese-law-consultancy.com/sources/s_EPZIPs/gene_
circular_07_1997.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
502. Circular No. 1100/TT-MTg, on Guiding Preparation and Evaluation of Re-
port on Assessing Environmental Impact in Respect of Investment Project (Aug. 20,
1997), available at http://www.vietnamese-law-consultancy.com/sources/s-EPZ-IPs/
other_08_1997.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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waste. 50 3 Implementation of these measures appears wanting so
far. One study has reported that the National Law on Environ-
mental Protection and the National Environmental Agency "are
relatively weak compared to the pro-industry sections of govern-
ment and also to the various regional governments. The conse-
quence is that the Export Processing Zones, like those in Ho Chi
Minh City and Haiphong, experience minimal pressure to adhere
to proper procedure. 50 4
In Thailand, all designated industrial estates are overseen by
the Industrial Estate Authority (IEA). The IEA is a state enter-
prise attached to the Ministry of Industry with a legislative man-
date to promote industrial development in accordance with land
use planning and environmental protection measures.505 The
IEA is responsible for industrial pollution control and other en-
vironmental management within all of the industrial estates. It
has set up environmental monitoring systems and a central was-
tewater treatment plant in each estate, though it usually subcon-
tracts this work to private contractors. Companies in the
industrial estates pay to use these facilities, and thus have incen-
tives to reduce waste. Companies that generate wastewater con-
taining chemicals such as heavy metals are obliged to establish
their own in-house pre-treatment facilities. Although the IEA is
able to support waste and environmental management facilities
in the estates, because it is charged with the conflicting responsi-
bilities of both promoting development and regulating the envi-
ronmental effects of that development, it has been known to be
reluctant to enforce pollution controls that are unpopular with its
investors. 506
The Philippine's Special Economic Zone Act 1995 contains
just two brief clauses on environmental management. The Act
provides that the Philippine Economic Zone Authority "in coor-
dination with the appropriate agencies, shall take concrete and
appropriate steps and enact the proper measures for the protec-
503. Regulation on the Protection of the Environment in Industrial Parks, C6ng
Bdo No. 46, Sept. 20, 2002, 43-50 (enacted pursuant to the Environment Protection
Act, 1993), available at file:///C:/Documents%20and%2OSettings/MarialLo-
cal%2 0Settings/Temporary%20Internet%2OFiles/OLK82/Vietnam.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2005).
504. Drakakis-Smith & Dixon, supra note 5, at 34.
505. This discussion draws on UNEP, Laem Chabang Industrial Estate, Thailand,
available at http://www.unepie.org/pc/ind-estates/casestudies/LaemChabang.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005); see also Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand, availa-
ble at http://www.ieat.go.th/main.php3 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
506. For a more benign view of the IEA's environmental regulatory activities, see
Kasemsri Homchean, Thailand's Environmental Enforcement Program, Fourth In-
ternational Conference on Compliance and Enforcement (1996), available at http://
www.inece.org/4thvol2/homchean.pdf.
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tion of the local environment. ' 50 7 The legislation unfortunately
gives no hint as to what constitutes "concrete and appropriate
steps." Secondly, the Special Economic Zone Act also authorises
the government to compulsorily acquire lands within or adjacent
to an SEZ "for the protection of watershed areas and natural
assets valuable to the prosperity" of the zone. 50 8 More helpful
are the extensive environmental provisions in the SEZ laws en-
acted for specific zones. Thus, the Cagayan Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995509 gives the Cagayan Economic Zone Author-
ity (CEZA) the powers, inter alia, "to protect, preserve, maintain
and develop the virgin forests, beaches, coral and coral reefs
within the Zone. The virgin forest within the Zone will be pro-
claimed as a national park and will be covered by a permanent
total log ban. For this purpose, the rules and regulations of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be im-
plemented by the CEZA. '' 510 The Act also gives the Authority
power "to adopt, implement and enforce reasonable measures
and standards to control pollution within the Zone. '' 511 Similar
environmental provisions are contained in the Zamboanga City
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.512 The Philippine Foreign
Investments Act of 1991 also provides that: "all industrial enter-
prises regardless of nationality shall comply with existing rules
and regulations to protect and conserve the environment and
meet applicable environmental standards. ' 513 The Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act elaborates
by specifying that the applicable environmental standards are
those set by the Department of Environment and Natural Re-
sources, which shall provide the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission with a list of environmentally critical activities, projects
and areas. 514
507. Philippine Special Economic Zone Act 1995, § 33, available at http://www.
chanrobles.com/specialeconomiczoneact.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
508. Id. at § 29(c).
509. Cagayan Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, Republic Act No. 7922, avail-
able at http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno7922.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2005).
510. Id. at § 6(g).
511. Id. at § 6(h).
512. Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, Republic Act No.
7903, § 7(i), available at http://www.chanrobles.comlrepublicactno7903.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2005).
513. Act No. 7042, § 11, available at <www.chanrobles.com/default8fia9l.htm#
FOREIGN %20INVESTMENTS %20ACT% 200F%201991 >.
514. Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act 1991
(July 9, 1996), Rule XVII, available at http://www.chanrobles.com/defaultl.htm#
IMPLEMENTING %20RULES %200F% 20FOREIGN%20INVESTMENTS % 20
ACT (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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In passing, it is worth noting that the experience of other
nations outside of East Asia reveals a similar contradictory pat-
tern of strong and weak SEZ environmental regulation. In Costa
Rica, for instance, the Free Zone Law excluded a wide range of
regulations, including environmental ones, from application to its
free economic zones. 515 The Belize Environmental Impact As-
sessment Regulations also exempt development projects in its ex-
port processing zones from regular environmental review, but
only where a project has already been approved pursuant to an
alternative EIA review mechanism, and it does not pose serious
pollution problems. 516 At the other end of the spectrum some
states have developed specific environmental management re-
gimes for their SEZs. Zambia's Export Processing Zones Act of
2001 provides for special EIA provisions for foreign investment
projects in its zones. 517 Sri Lanka has a separate department in its
Board of Investment to monitor environmental conditions in its
SEZs, and each zone benefits from its own environmental moni-
toring facility, and investors are subject to specific pollution con-
trol standards and limits. 518
D. DIFFERENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES:
THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE
To properly understand the environmental consequences of
SEZs, we should assess how governing authorities have regulated
and managed the environmental activities of foreign investors.
Differences between the way foreign and domestic enterprises
are regulated could be expected in countries seeking to industri-
alize through FDI. One might expect regulators to treat foreign
investors - bringing coveted capital, technology and management
skills - more favourably than domestic enterprises. Theories of
inter-jurisdictional competition for economic investment predict
this exact situation. The question therefore is: do the privileges
and incentives offered by SEZs to foreign investors extend to
"special" arrangements concerning environmental regulation?
Certainly, there are some notorious instances where authorities
have waived environmental rules to avoid jeopardizing foreign
investment deals. This is alleged to have occurred in the approval
515. DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GATr: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
FUTURE (1994).
516. Belize Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations (1995), Statutory In-
strument No. 107, § 9(c); available at http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?ID=936
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
517. Export Processing Zones Act, 2001, § 19(d), available at http://www.hurid.
org.zm/legOl-7.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
518. See generally http://www.boi.lk/B0I2005/index.asp.
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of Sony Corporation's TV kinescope production facility in
China's Pudong New Area.5 19 A similar story of expedited ap-
proval and perfunctory compliance with environmental proce-
dures involved the Shell oil refinery project in Guandong.520
However, as the following analysis will show, in fact environmen-
tal regulators seem more likely to treat domestic enterprises
leniently.
In general, Chinese environmental law ostensibly applies
equally to all entities, whether a foreign company, a state-owned
enterprise (SOE), a township and village enterprise (TVE) or a
domestic private company. Within the corpus of its environmen-
tal law, there are few provisions that single out foreign investors.
Article 18 of the Constitution provides that all foreign investors
must comply with Chinese laws and regulations and meet the
host country's environmental standards.521 The procedures gov-
erning approval of foreign investments have included some envi-
ronmental measures.5 22 Beginning in 1983, the NPC promulgated
a circular which contained a provision making foreign polluters
liable for environmental harm.523 In 1990, the Rules for the Im-
plementation of the Law of the PRC on Foreign-Capital intro-
duced a provision: "application for the establishment of a
foreign-capital enterprise shall not be approved if the proposed
enterprise would involve possible creation of environmental pol-
lution. ' 52 4 The Rules also stipulated that an application to estab-
lish a foreign-capital enterprise must disclose the risks of
"environmental pollution and the measures for tackling
pollution. 525
China's main regulations concerning the allowable scope for
foreign investment are presently the Regulations for Guiding the
519. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Plato Kwong-To Yip, Environmental Impact As-
sessment Regulation in Hong Kong and Shanghai: A Cross-city Analysis, 42 J.
ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 355, 366 (1999).
520. Bruce Gilley, A Tangled Web, 159 FAR E. EcoN. REV. 27 (1996).
521. Constitution of PRC, supra note 258, art. 18.
522. See generally Yasheng Huang, One Country, Two Systems: Foreign-Invested
Enterprises and Domestic Firms in China, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 404 (2003); George
0. White III, Enter the Dragon: Foreign Direct Investment Laws and Policies in the
PRC, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 35 (2003).
523. The Circular stated: "[F]oreign contractors who take part in the joint ex-
ploitation of offshore oil will assume all risks themselves during the exploitation
period", quoted in Ross & SILK, supra note 444, at 342.
524. State Council, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waizi Qiyefa Shishi Xize
[Rules for the implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Foreign-capital Enterprises], art. 5 (approved on Oct. 28, 1990), available at http://
www.fdi-xiamen-cn.comlv4/html/en-invest-tzfg-05-01.php (last accessed on Mar. 24,
2005).
525. Id. at art. 14(10).
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Direction of Foreign Investment of 2002526 and its companion
Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry. 527 They
provide guidance to prospective investors on which foreign in-
vestment projects can be approved at a local government level,
the preferential treatment that such projects will receive, and
which investment projects are restricted or prohibited in China.
The Guiding Regulations and Catalogue were updated in 2002 to
bring China's foreign investment rules in line with the require-
ments of its WTO membership.5 28 These regulations divide in-
dustrial and commercial sectors into four categories for foreign
investment: encouraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited in-
vestments. The Foreign Investment Catalogue lists the sectors in
which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted or prohibited.
Foreign investment is deemed "permitted" in sectors that are not
listed, except where other laws, regulations or industrial policies
provide otherwise. Reflecting the growing opening of China's
economy since its WTO accession, the number of industries in
the "encouraged" category has increased from 186 to 262, while
the "restricted" category shrank from 112 to 75 items. One signif-
icant difference between the "encouraged" category and the
other categories is that customs duties for certain qualifying im-
ported equipment and import-level value-added tax may be
waived only for companies in the "encouraged" group. Applica-
tions for "permitted" projects involving an investment of more
than US$30 million must be handled by central or provincial gov-
ernment authorities, while smaller projects may be approved at
the local level.
Among the investment projects deemed "encouraged" by
these regulations are those that involve use of renewable re-
sources, new technology or equipment for preventing and con-
trolling environmental pollution. Also included, are projects that
use new or advanced technology to save energy, raw materials,
raise economic efficiency or alleviate shortages in the domestic
market. 529 Restricted categories of foreign investment include
projects with an adverse effect on the environment or energy
conservation; and projects involving the exploration for and/or
526. Discussed in Baker & McKenzie, Venture Capital Newsletter (April 2002);
listed in State Environmental Protection Administration, at http://www.zhb.gov.cn/
english/chanel-3/chanel-3-end-2.php3?chanel=3&column=2.
527. WANG, supra note 195, at 188-93; listed in State Environmental Protection
Administration, at http://www.zhb.gov.cn/english/chanel-3/chanel-3-end-2.php3?cha-
nel=3&column=2.
528. The previous regulations were: State Planning Commission, the Provisional
Regulations for Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment (June 27, 1995); and
State Council, the Catalog for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry (Dec. 29,
1997).
529. WANG, supra note 195.
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extraction of rare or precious mineral resources.530 Prohibited
foreign-investments, according to the Catalogue, include projects
that pollute the environment or endanger human health; and
projects that occupy large tracts of farmland. These provisions
are reinforced by rules in the Foreign Trade Law, which enable
authorities to prohibit the import or export of goods or technol-
ogy: (i) where necessary to protect the lives or health of citizens;
and (ii) where the ecological environment will be endangered.531
Not only do the above provisions suggest that foreign invest-
ments are subject to greater environmental scrutiny than projects
initiated by domestic enterprises, but in practice foreign invest-
ment projects "are almost always monitored at the national level
because of the widely acknowledged fact that local regulators
may be overly sensitive to the need to attract outside invest-
ment. ' '532 For instance, foreign projects are more likely than do-
mestic projects to be subject to EIA procedures. According to
the Management Procedures for Environmental Protection in
Construction Projects, 533 the State Environmental Protection
Agency (SEPA) is generally responsible for the review and ap-
proval of the EIA process for "mega projects" representing in-
vestments larger than RMB 200 million, which will usually be
foreign investment projects. Such projects must also be approved
by the State Planning Commission. 534 The Management Proce-
dures also stipulates that business contracts concerning the man-
agement of foreign-construction projects shall not contain clauses
that contravene Chinese national or local environmental laws. 535
The structures for the implementation and enforcement of
environmental regulation also allow for some distinctions to be
made between domestic and foreign enterprises. Professors
Zhang Hongiun and Richard Ferris argue that, "local enforce-
ment practices may vary the application of the law with respect
to domestic and foreign-owned operations, or even between for-
eign operations owned by different companies. ' 536 An important
consideration is that China's environmental regulations and poli-
cies have been institutionalised primarily within the State Owned
Enterprise (SOE) sector.537 For example, a study by Hua Wang
and others of China's pollution levy system found that levy pay-
530. Id.
531. Foreign Trade Law, arts. 17(3)-(4).
532. Zhang & Ferris, supra note 277, at 50.
533. National Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter NEPA], Manage-
ment Procedures for Environmental Protection in Construction Projects (1990).
534. Zhang & Ferris, supra note 277, at 50.
535. NEPA, supra note 533, at art. 4.
536. Zhang & Ferris, supra note 277, at 49.
537. Jahiel, supra note 421, at 102.
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ments are generally based on negotiations between factory man-
agers and local environmental protection offices; and that private
companies tend to have less bargaining clout than the SOEs over
the size of levy payments.5 38 The mechanisms for collection of
discharge fees, monitoring of environmental pollution and so on,
arose principally for the SOE sector. Thus, policies aimed at ex-
panding the market economy have resulted in the challenge of
implementing equal treatment by Chinese environmental author-
ities of SOE's and foreign enterprises.
A comparison of the environmental regulation of foreign
and domestic businesses in China is complicated by the fact that
foreign investment does not always involve direct investment
through a single company, but rather is undertaken in coopera-
tion with a local enterprise through a joint venture or other form
of association.539 Among the various business partnerships, con-
tractual or equity joint ventures are the most popular arrange-
ments.540  Under a contractual joint venture, the rights,
obligations and profit sharing between the partners are governed
by contract. An equity joint venture materializes as a limited lia-
bility corporation, in which the domestic and foreign partners
take equity shares, with profits distributed according to their re-
spective shares. Chinese authorities have used investment regula-
tions to encourage or mandate joint ventures.541 Nonetheless,
wholly foreign-owned ventures remain the most popular invest-
ment vehicle, recently amounting to about 65 percent of China's
total FDI.542
Some research suggests that foreign investment in China,
whether undertaken through a joint venture or WFO, is more
stringently regulated for its environmental effects than domestic
economic activity. In joint ventures, the domestic partner tends
to leave the environmental management concerns to the foreign
partner, and authorities usually target enforcement of environ-
mental laws against that foreign partner.543 Professors Julia Klee
and Felicity Thomas argue that, "because many Chinese officials
consider international companies to have more resources and
538. Hua Wang et al., Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargain-
ing Power of Chinese Factories, 24 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 245, 248, 258 (2003).
539. See JAMES E. SHAPIRO ET AL., DIRECT INVESTMENT AND JOINT VENTURES
IN CHINA (1991); ROGER BARAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN EAST
ASIA (1996).
540. WANG, supra note 195, at 185-87.
541. See, e.g., Provisional Regulations Governing Development and Operation of
Tracts of Land with Foreign Investment, art. 4 (1990).
542. China: Investment Regulations, 301 Eiu VIEWSWIRE CHINA, April 27, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 13974936.
543. Suzanne McElligott, China Lags in Environment, 158 CHEMICAL WK. S24
(1996).
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more experience in meeting pollution-control requirements, they
often expect them to be in full and immediate compliance with
the requirements. a5 4 4 Sims found that authorities are much more
likely to collect environmental fines from foreign companies
"that are believed to have deep pockets" than from SOEs, which
are often at the margins of solvency.5 45 The differential treatment
of foreign firms and the SOEs also owes to the pivotal role SOEs
play in providing housing, health and other social welfare ser-
vices to local communities.
Yasheng Huang suggests that the foreign investor enter-
prise-government relations are typically "more arm's length"
than equivalent relations between regulators and domestic enter-
prises.546 The foreign investment regulations, for example, do not
generally refer to the CCP and do not mandate establishment of
Party units within foreign companies. 547 Foreign enterprises are
also less likely to be immersed in local guanxi,548 which can im-
pede referral of cases to the courts. 549 The first environmental
law case in a Chinese SEZ was decided in 1985, Shenzhen Munic-
ipal Shekou District Environmental Monitoring Station v. Kaida
Enterprises Ltd.550 The case involved a Hong Kong based toy
company, which was successfully prosecuted and fined for pollu-
tion based on violations of China's Environmental Protection
Law, even though the company's business contract with the SEZ
authorities did not contain any environmental protection
measures.
Whereas the letter of the law is more likely to be applied to
foreign entities, a pragmatic and tolerant approach is often dis-
played towards local enterprises.551 Surveys of the environmental
regulation of Chinese firms reveal lax supervision and arbitrary
enforcement practices.55 2 This is particularly the case with the
SOE sector, despite the fact that the structures for the implemen-
tation of environmental regulation arose principally out of the
SOE sector. Enforcement action against SOEs is less likely than
544. Julia E. Klee & Felicity C. Thomas, An Evolving Environmental Framework,
24 CHINA Bus. REV. 34, 39 (1997).
545. Sims, supra note 201, at 1241.
546. Huang, supra 522, at 410.
547. Id.
548. However, the guanxi relations that can undermine adherence to the letter of
the law can also arise with foreign companies, because a significant number of for-
eign investors are overseas Chinese domiciled in Malaysia and Taiwan.
549. Huang, supra note 522, at 490.
550. The case is translated in Ross & SILK, supra note 444, at 258-71.
551. Case examples of tougher regulation of foreign companies are discussed in
POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE PRC: AN INVESTORS' GUIDE (S. Clarke & F. Thomas
eds., 1997).
552. ULRICH STEGER ET AL., GREENING CHINESE BUSINESS 25 (2003).
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against foreign or other domestic enterprises because SOEs func-
tion as more than mere factories. Because they provide impor-
tant local social services to workers and their families, such as
housing and health care,55 3 many SOEs are allowed to continue
operations despite pollution emissions.5 54 While recent reforms
to the SOE sector have given the enterprise managers more au-
tonomy and scope to make independent business decisions,
555
these reforms have hardly touched the environmental policy
dimensions of the SOE system. These polluting SOEs, argue
Professors Julia Klee and Felicity Thomas, "frequently lack the
capital to invest in clean technologies to meet the requirements
of environmental regulation and, thus, receive deferential appli-
cation, if any, of environmental requirements. ' 556 Local environ-
mental protection bureaux have been known to reduce discharge
fees for SOEs facing insolvency. 557 The fact that unprofitable en-
terprises benefit from lenient regulation reflects the continuing
presence of socialist practice and principles. Thus, as China shifts
to a market economy, tensions will arise between such socialist
redistributive policies and the need to promote an efficient allo-
cation of scarce resources. If China is to make strides in protect-
ing its environment, it must separate key social services from the
unprofitable enterprises. Such services must be provided through
another medium to ensure people still get them but that only
profitable and environmentally sound firms operate.5 58 Local
government is one possible alternate medium.55 9
V. FROM ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION TO
ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION
A. INSTRUMENTS FOR ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION
Industrialization and market transformation will continue to
be an indelible feature of East Asia's economic policy for some
time. But the region's long-term economic modernization will ul-
timately not be sustainable unless its economic policy is wedded
553. XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN
CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 145 (2000).
554. John G. Taylor & Qingshu Xie, Wuhan: Policies for the Management and
Improvement of a Polluted City, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE IMPACT ON
REGIONS, MIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 282, at 143.
555. See Alison W. Conner, To Get Rich is Precarious: Regulation of Private En-
terprise in the People's Republic of China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 1 (1991); Andrew Xuefeng
Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities
Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62 (1993).
556. Klee & Thomas, supra note 544.
557. MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 553, at 133-34.
558. Alford & Shen, supra note 288, at 413.
559. See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty
Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 402 (2000).
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to stronger environmental regulation. The challenge is to reform
environmental law and policy to take account of East Asian cir-
cumstances without accommodating them so completely as to
surrender all possibilities of improvement.
The developmental state has not disappeared from East
Asia, and there often persists a large gap between the professed
new market-oriented law and the traditional norms of central
planning and administrative regulation.5 60 This gap particularly
persists in the socialist regimes - China and Vietnam - where ad-
ministrative agencies threatened by the changes in market gov-
ernance have resisted reforms aimed at decreasing their power
over enterprises and the economy.5 61 Concomitantly, the incom-
plete transition to a market economy has fueled clientelism and
corporatism. Without the security of a well-functioning legal or-
der and mature markets, businesses have sought to forge closer
relationships with authorities who control access to capital, tech-
nology, raw materials and development approvals. 562 Conse-
quently, local authorities commonly interfere in the operation of
enterprises and in disputes with third parties in an effort to pro-
tect local businesses in which they have a stake.5 63
The problems of adapting environmental law to the transi-
tion from a planned economy to a capitalist, market-based econ-
omy are acute in China. Its still extant environmental legislation
dating from the 1980s or earlier assumes enterprises are owned
by the state. Some provisions of the Environmental Protection
Law of 1989 - such as those conferring responsibility for use of
polluting technologies 564 and for disabling pollution controls565
- can be interpreted as applying only to government work units
(danwei). Authorities seem to assume that national development
plans can shape the behaviour of economic actors who increas-
ingly respond to market signals - signals that may conflict with
those plans. The laws do not envisage the vast and complicated
array of corporate and other business entities that have prolifer-
ated since China's economic opening. An increasingly market-
based economy requires policy instruments that offer incentives
for businesses to improve their environmental performance.
560. WANG, supra note 195, at 32.
561. Peerenboom, supra note 210, at 57.
562. Id. at 55-56.
563. Id.
564. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohufa [Environmental Protec-
tion Law of the People's Republic of China], art. 34 (1989), available at http://www.
sepa.gov.cn/eic/649645345759821824/19891226/1022930.shtml (last visited Mar. 31,
2005).
565. Id. at art. 37.
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A model of "ecological modernization" reform could offer
major advantages to the more advanced economies of East Asia.
Drawing on their study of traditional Chinese values, Professors
Robert Weller and Peter Boll conclude that environmental poli-
cies will only succeed if they appeal to the profit and welfare of
those charged with implementing them - from officials to fac-
tory managers. Abstract appeals to the sanctity of "nature" are
unlikely to work at this stage, in their opinion.5 66 Although criti-
cized by some environmentalists as a compromise that alleviates
rather than solves the environmental crisis, the advantages of
ecological modernization would appear to outweigh its disadvan-
tages, especially for economies rapidly industrializing.5 67 Ecologi-
cal modernization doctrine promises a healthy synergy between
economic development and environmental protection when
economies and technologies are "modernized" to allow for more
efficient and less wasteful production. 568 Modernization can oc-
cur through corporate environmental management systems and
the application of advanced, clean technologies, encouraged
through policy instruments such as pollution taxes and corporate
environmental reporting obligations. The ecological moderniza-
tion model was the basis of Japan's successful response to air pol-
lution in the 1970s, and the cleanup of West Germany's industrial
and energy sectors after the acid rain-induced forest death in the
1980s. 569
But ecological modernization reforms are probably not suit-
able for all East Asian economies. Command and control regula-
tion is more suitable for countries setting up an environmental
regulatory apparatus in the first instance, a position in which
poorer nations in Indo-China presently find themselves. The
standards established by command regulations are clear and can
be relatively easier to monitor and enforce if resources and moti-
vation exist. Economic policy instruments such as environmental
taxes are more complex to design and implement - requiring,
for instance, the constant re-evaluation of the economic costs of
566. Robert P. Weller & Peter K. Bol, From Heaven-and-Earth to Nature: Chi-
nese Concepts of the Environment and their Influence on Policy Implementation, in
ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH, supra note 288, at 473, 496.
567. See Richard Welford & Peter Hills, Ecological Modernisation, Environmen-
tal Policy and Innovation: Priorities for the Asia-Pacific Region, 2 INT'L J. ENV'T &
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 324 (2003).
568. Christoff, supra note 411; HOLLIDAY ET AL., supra note 334, at 83-102.
569. See STEPHEN C. YOUNG & J. VAN DER STRAATEN, THE EMERGENCE OF
ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION: INTEGRATING THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECON-
OMY? (2001); OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN JAPAN (1977).
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particular resources and pollution that must be reflected in the
pricing of the economic incentives.570
Command and control regulation in much of East Asia is
gradually being supplemented by a mosaic of environmental gov-
ernance mechanisms, spanning market incentives, business self-
regulation, management system-based approaches, voluntary re-
porting schemes, and audit requirements designed to increase the
transparency and accountability of industry and regulators. Eco-
nomic instruments such as pollution charges, pricing policy, fa-
vourable terms of investment for environmental technology, and
market creation can yield significant environmental benefits. 571
Japan, with the most advanced environmental laws in the region,
continues to lead in research and experimentation with economic
instruments.572 Elsewhere in East Asia, one can find sporadic
ecological modernization measures, though nothing systematic.
Financial mechanisms to encourage investment in clean technol-
ogy are appearing. South Korea is promoting investment in clean
technologies though its Act Relating to Environmental Technol-
ogy Support and Development of 1994. 573 There is some evi-
dence of Korean companies embracing cleaner technologies. 574
Vietnam has been participating in various donor projects for
clean production demonstration, such as UNEP's "Strategies and
Mechanisms for Promoting Cleaner Production Investments." 575
The Singapore government is also advocating technological solu-
tions to its environmental problems, establishing the National
Energy Efficiency Committee in 2001 to forge programs to en-
courage more efficient use of energy by industries, homes, com-
mercial buildings and vehicles.576 The government budgeted
US$20 million for an Innovation for Environmental Sus-
tainability Fund to finance pioneering projects. 577 The Vietnam
570. Edward D. McCutcheon, Think Globally, (En)Act Locally: Promoting Ef-
fective National Environmental Regulatory Infrastructure in Developing Nations, 31
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 395, 445-46 (1998).
571. See OECD, INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY (1996).
572. The Japanese government established a Research Panel on Economic In-
struments such as Taxation and Charges in Environmental Policies, whose first re-
port - ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, UTILIZATION OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES - TAXES AND CHARGES (1996) - made general recom-
mendations to expand use of environmental taxes and other economic policy tools.
573. Lee & Adeel, supra note 155, at 144.
574. See J.S. Chung, General Environmental Policies and Clean Technology in the
Republic of Korea, 19(Jan./Mar.) INDUSTRY & ENV'T 43 (1996); Jean Aden et al.,
What is Driving the Pollution Abatement Expenditure Behaviour of Manufacturing
Plants in Korea? 27 WORLD DEV. 1203 (1999).
575. J.K Staniskis & Z. Stasiskiene, Promotion of Cleaner Production Invest-
ments: International Experience, 11(6) J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 619, 624 (2003).
576. Singapore Green Plan 2012, supra note 497, at v-vi.
577. Id. at viii.
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Ministry for the Environment is also creating a special environ-
mental fund, financed by revenues from environmental taxes and
fines, and contributions from international donors.5 78 This fund
will be used to subsidize training, education, and emergency envi-
ronmental measures. A similar financial mechanism was estab-
lished by Thailand's Enhancement and Conservation of National
Environmental Quality Act 1991.579 These financing schemes
work more effectively when complemented by mechanisms that
curtail funding to environmentally problematic enterprises.
Investment in clean technologies is also a high priority of
Chinese leaders, particularly given the legacy of a state enter-
prise sector lumbered with old, inefficient and wasteful technolo-
gies dating from the 1950s. However, there can be cultural
misunderstandings among SOE managers regarding what "clean
production" entails. One anecdote is that an SOE factory boss
believed it involved giving each worker a broom to clean up their
workspace.58 0 Various government policies have advocated
change, such as the 1993 Decision of the second National Work-
ing Conference on Industrial Pollution Prevention and Con-
trol,58 1 and the current Trans-Century Green Programme.582 In
1993, National Environmental Protection Agency established the
National Cleaner Production Center to facilitate cooperation in
the research, manufacture, trade and service of environmental
technologies.583
The most substantial Chinese initiative is the Clean Produc-
tion Promotion Law (CPPL) of 2002.584 It shifts China's environ-
mental regulatory focus from traditional end-of-pipe controls to
the products and processes from which pollution originates. The
CPPL requires enterprises to recycle some specified products
and packaging, and to report regularly on their pollution emis-
sions. It also advocates some preferential measures for those who
adopt the clean production model, such as preferential loans, tax
cuts or exemptions. Among the specific provisions, it is decreed
578. Circular No. 93/2003/TT-BTC guiding the implementation of the financial
management for Vietnam Environment Protection Fund (June 2003); see further
Bryant & Akers, supra note 294, at 169-70.
579. §§ 22-31, supra note 290.
580. Han Shi, Cleaner Production in China, in GREENING INDUSTRIALIZATION IN
ASIAN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 61, 68 (Arthur P.J. Mol & Joost C.L. Van Buuren
eds., 2003).
581. Id. at 63.
582. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF CHINA'S TRANS-CENTURY GREEN PLAN (1997), quoted in Tremayne & Waal,
supra note 413, at 312.
583. The Center collaborates through the China Association of Environmental
Protection Industry, available at http://www.cepi.com.cn.
584. World's First Clean Production Law to Be Publicized in China, ASIAINFO
DAILY CHINA NEWS, Sept. 10, 2001, available at LEXIS News Library.
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that, "[t]he State Council shall formulate fiscal and tax policies
conducive to the implementation of cleaner production. '585 Fur-
ther, there are provisions for the phasing-out of inefficient tech-
nologies; 586 mandatory eco-product labelling; 587 environmental
assessment of new construction projects to include the feasibility
of adoption of clean production methods and equipment;588
mandatory recycling of designated materials, 589 and compulsory
clean production audits for enterprises that violate pollution dis-
charge regulations.590 Products made from approved recyclable
materials are exempt from value-added tax.591 It is, however,
premature to assess the impact of the new CPPL. Complemen-
tary reforms to the energy sector, including energy commodity
pricing and removal of wasteful subsidies, will be critical to the
new law's long-term success. 592
Another sign of ecological modernization reform is environ-
mental taxation. Air pollution charges have been levied in South
Korea and China; and water effluent treatment charges exacted
in Thailand, Hong Kong and China; water consumption charges
exacted in virtually all countries. 593 Even Vietnam, with one of
the most elementary environmental law systems in East Asia, has
introduced regulations providing for the payment of environ-
mental protection fees by developers594 and a natural resources
use tax.595 The most widely used economic instrument in the re-
gion is wastewater charges, though they tend to have been lim-
ited to just a few big industries or large industrial estates.596 The
emission and resource charges are used primarily to raise reve-
585. Cleaner Production Promotion Law (approved on June 29, 2002), art. 7,
available at http://www.chinacp.org.cn/eng/cppolicystrategy/cp-law2002.html.
586. Id. at art. 12.
587. Id. at art. 13.
588. Id. at art. 18.
589. Id. at art. 27.
590. Id. at art. 28.
591. Id. at art. 35.
592. For some of these challenges, see Philip Andrews-Speed & Stephen Dow,
Reform of China's Electric Power Industry: Challenges Facing the Government, 28
ENERGY POL'Y 335 (2000).
593. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 172, at ch. 11; OECD, ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1993); see also Joon Keum Jung, The Korean Experience with Market-based Envi-
ronmental Policy Instruments, in PROCEEDINGS 6TH RUSSIAN-KOREAN INTERNA-
TIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 100 (2002).
594. Government Decree on Providing Guidance for the Implementation of the
Law on Environmental Protection (Oct. 18, 1994), arts. 34-36, available at http://
coombs.anu.edu.au/-vern/luat/english/Gov-175CP-env-impl.txt (last visted Apr. 1,
2005).
595. Ordinance on Natural Resources Tax 1993, available at http://coombs.anu.
edu.au/-vern/luat/english/Ord-nat-resource-tax.txt (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
596. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 172, at 12.
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nue, and the fees are usually not calibrated to reflect the margi-
nal cost of ecological damage. Also, their effect is often offset by
the continuation of environmentally-harmful subsidies in the en-
ergy and agricultural sectors. Tradeable emission permits have
hardly been introduced in the region.597 The potential of eco-
nomic instruments to improve environmental conditions in SEZs
has been demonstrated in the Philippines - there the Laguna
Lake Development Authority introduced two incentive fees for
water conservation and pollution abatement, which have both
been evaluated as having significantly helped improve environ-
mental conditions in the Laguna industrial estate.598
The most extensively studied environmental charge in East
Asia is China's pollution discharge levy. Introduced by the State
Council in the early 1980s after three years of experimentation,
China's discharge levy system formally requires that a fee be paid
by any enterprise whose effluent or emission exceeds the legal
standard. Charges are levied for water and air pollution, solid
waste, as well as noise. The scheme was arbitrarily implemented
until about 2000, when new methods of collecting the levy were
adopted, coupled with more recycling of levy revenue into pollu-
tion control projects. 599 But fundamental problems remain be-
cause the levy rate is usually much lower than the costs of
installing or operating pollution control equipment, and so pol-
luters have little incentive to minimize their discharges. 600 In fact,
enterprises typically find it cheaper to mothball existing pollu-
tion control mechanisms, which are more expensive to operate
than the discharge fees. In practice, the amount of levy paid by a
polluting factory ultimately depends on the result of its negotia-
tions with the local environmental protection bureau. 601 None-
theless, the potential for pollution taxes to help China's
environment is clear. A study of 260 enterprises in Beijing and
Tianjin with multiple water pollution sources found that an ap-
propriately set emission charge would reduce abatement costs
597. The Japanese government has gone the furthest in planning reforms for
tradeable pollution permits. OECD, IMPLEMENTING DOMESTIC TRADEABLE PER-
MITS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 74 (2002).
598. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCY, PLACE-BASED PUBLIC POL-
ICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DEVELOPING, MANAGING AND INNOVATING FOR SUS-
TAINABILITY ch. 2 (1999), available at http://apocalypse.usaep.org/policy/reportch2.
htm.
599. Jahiel, supra note 421, at 89, 91; see also Keith H. Florig, et al., China Strives
to Make the Polluter Pay: Are China's Market-based Incentives for Improved Envi-
ronmental Compliance Working? 29 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 268 (1995).
600. Jahiel, supra note 421, at 94; Theodore Panayotou, The Effectiveness and
Efficiency of Environmental Policy in China, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 288, at 431,
443.
601. Wang et al., supra note 538, at 248.
[Vol. 22:150
2004] IS EAST ASIA INDUSTRIALIZING TOO QUICKLY? 235
under the prevailing regulatory regime from US$47 million to
$33 million annually. 60 2
Another way that governments can facilitate ecological
modernization of their economy is by encouraging enterprises to
comply with best practice corporate environmental management
standards (EMSs), such as those embodied in the International
Standardization Organization (ISO) 14000 series.60 3 An EMS
provides a framework of standards and processes for corpora-
tions to improve their internal use of materials and energy, and
to provide a structure for companies to identify, appraise and
minimise their environmental risks. At a higher scale, the con-
cept of the "eco-industrial park" has been advanced by scholars
to extend a corporate EMS to a group of companies on an indus-
trial estate that cooperate to reduce environmental waste and im-
prove resource efficiency.604
Although developing counties were not well represented in
the negotiations of the drafting of the ISO 14000 series,605 the
developing world including East Asia is increasingly viewing ISO
14000 as a means to stimulate corporate environmental responsi-
bility and thereby achieve sustainable development. 60 6 Compa-
nies in East Asia are seeking certification for several reasons,
principally for reputation enhancement and environmental
materials and waste cost savings.607 Among further motivations,
export-oriented industries are seeking to avoid potential environ-
mentally-based trade barriers, and some large companies are re-
sponding to shareholder demands for corporate social
responsibility. 60 8 Some empirical research in East Asia shows
that ISO 14001 certified companies have a record of better com-
602. S. DASGUPTA, ET AL, WATER POLLUTION ABATEMENT BY CHINESE INDUS-
TRY: COST ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1996);
603. See David Monsma, Sustainable Development and the Global Economy:
New Systems in Environmental Management, 24 VT. L. REV. 1245, 1256 (2000);
Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards
Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation? 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 237 (2000).
604. See BRADEN R. ALLENBY, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY: POLICY FRAMEWORK
AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999); Suren Erkman, Industrial Ecology: An Historical
Approach, 5 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 1 (1997).
605. RIVA KRUT & HARRIS GLECKMAN, Iso 14001: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
FOR SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 41-45, 61 (1998).
606. Christine Mikulich, ISO 14000-14001, The Developing World's Perspective,
17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 117, 120 (2003).
607. See Gerald E. Fryxell & Agnes Szeto, The Influence of Motivations for Seek-
ing ISO 14001 Certification: An Empirical Study of ISO 14001 Certified Facilities in
Hong Kong, 65(3) J. ENVTL. MGmT. 223, 223 (2002).
608. Mikulich, supra note 606, at 147-48.
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pliance with government environmental regulations and stan-
dards than non ISO-certified companies. 60 9
But as some businesses may be reluctant to implement
EMSs, especially in the small business sector, where shareholder
and trade pressures are weaker or non-existent, governments are
looking for ways to promote more corporate participation in
EMSs. China adopted the ISO 14000 series as official state policy
on April 1, 1997.610 The China Accreditation Committee for En-
vironmental Management Systems Certification Bodies works to
encourage domestic enterprises to adopt the ISO 14001 standard
as a means of strengthening environmental enforcement in
China, and to conduct trial certifications of Chinese compa-
nies.611 The chief reason for adoption of ISO by the PRC is that
it would enable China to bolster its environmental regulatory re-
gime without sacrificing economic growth.612 Calkins suggests
that China only takes "environmental steps if it sees a capitalist
advantage" - thus, the economic benefits to be derived from
ISO 14000 participation were seen as the "greater marketability
of Chinese products, improved and streamlined raw material
consumption, reduced cost of waste management, reduced liabili-
ties. '613 So far, ISO certification among Chinese enterprises has
been slow, and has arisen mostly in the context of joint ventures
with Western companies operating in the SEZs. 614 Surveys of
Chinese firms suggest low levels of awareness and commitment
to environmental protection, and a preference to adopt discrete,
end-of-pipe technological solutions rather than holistic reor-
ganisation of management practices as demanded by EMSs.615
Elsewhere in East Asia, the Taiwanese government has fer-
vently promoted certification of corporate EMSs, and introduced
environmental reporting regulatory schemes into the Environ-
mental Protection Administration regulations.61 6 The govern-
ment offers financial assistance to firms wishing to invest in
measures to acquire ISO 14001 certification.617 The South Ko-
609. See, e.g., Dong-Myung Kwon et al., A Study of Compliance with Environ-
mental Regulations of ISO 14001 Certified Companies in Korea, 65 J. ENVTL. MGMT.
347 (2002).
610. ISO 14000 Series to Be Adopted April 1 as State Policy in China, 20 INT'L
ENvrTL. REP., CURRENT REP. (BNA) No. 5 at 198 (Mar. 5, 1997).
611. Mikulich, supra 606, at 145.
612. See Calkins, supra note 352, at 616.
613. Id.
614. Id. at 615, 636.
615. STEGER ET AL., supra note 552, at 22-23.
616. Kinne, supra note 157, at 93.
617. See Shen-yan Chiu & Yi-Zong Yang, Taiwan's Experiences in Promotion of
ISO 14000, Presentation at the World Bank Environmental Forum: Challenges and
Strategies for Environmental Management in Asia, Cheju Island, Korea, at 6, 8 (Feb.
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rean government is also encouraging ISO 14000 certification. In
1994, it initiated a pilot certification scheme. In 1995, the Korean
Standards Association established training activities jointly with
certification bodies from the United Kingdom.618 South Korea is
implementing ISO 14001 by requiring that companies adopt a
general EMS, an environmental assessment of their manufactur-
ing processes, and a plan for the improvement of environmental
management. 61 9 The South Korean Ministry of the Environment
reviews the applications, and companies deemed environmen-
tally friendly must report annually on their progress and meet
improvement plan indicators. In turn, these companies should
enjoy reduced compliance inspections.
While ISO standard compliance can be a useful adjunct to
the environmental regulatory process, it is certainly not in its cur-
rent form an adequate substitute. To be transformed into an ef-
fective EMS would require several additional elements, notably:
(i) requirements for measurable improvements in environmental
performance, rather than mere adoption of an environmental
management structure; (ii) environmental audits verified by a
third party; (iii) publication of audit findings; and (iv) public par-
ticipation mechanisms. 620 Other corporate EMSs that overcome
some of these deficits are available, such as the chemical indus-
try's Responsible Care program,62' and the European Union's
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). 622 The EMAS,
for example, seeks to promote continuous environmental per-
formance improvement in industrial activities or company level
operations, by committing certified entities to evaluate and im-
prove their environmental performance and provide relevant in-
formation to the public.623 There is already evidence of growing
interest in Responsible Care among East Asian companies.
624
8-10, 2001), available at: http:/www.inem.org/htdocs/iso/isotaiwan.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2005).
618. Environmental Management Standards Particularly the ISO 14000 Series:
Trade and Investment Impacts on Developing Countries Report by the UNCTD
Secretariat, UNCTAD, Agenda Item 3, at 15, U.N. Doc. TD/B/Com.1/EM.4/2
(1997).
619. Mikulich, supra note 606, at 147.
620. KRUT & GLECKMAN, supra note 605, at 95.
621. See Peter Simmons & Brian Wynne, Responsible Care: Trust, Credibility and
Environmental Management, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY: IN-
TERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH NEEDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 201
(Kurt Fischer & Johan Schot eds., 1993).
622. Supra note 348.
623. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1289
(1995).
624. Jean-Francois Tremblay, Responsible Care Gains Ground in Asia, 75
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 20 (June 23, 1997).
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The EMAS is being adopted by a number of European compa-
nies engaged in business in East Asia.625
B. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR EAST ASIA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL REFORMS
Increased cooperation and assistance from international do-
nors and lenders, and international environmental organizations,
are vital conduits for ecological modernizing reforms.626 Many
developing countries lack the financial resources, technical ex-
pertise, and management systems to devise and implement sus-
tainable development policies. In 1987, the World Commission
on Environment and Development appealed for more interna-
tional environmental cooperation, and requested that bilateral
and multilateral donors provide more assistance to both govern-
mental and non-governmental environmental institutions.627 This
clarion message has been reiterated many times.
Regional intergovernmental organizations in East Asia can
be an instrument for the modernization of environmental laws
and policies. An advantage of regional level collaboration is that
it may be easier for states to reach agreement on environmental
policy at the regional plane where there is less diversity of social
and economic characteristics between the participating parties
than would be found at a broader, global scale. Both the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 628 have formally incorpo-
rated environmental concerns into their agendas, although
neither has challenged the economic status quo.
A variety of intergovernmental statements and agreements
on environmental protection have been drafted by ASEAN.629
Plans of Action have also been published periodically, such as
625. See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION
(Howard J. Markman ed., 1997).
626. See especially Andreen, supra note 300.
627. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COM-
MON FUTURE 319-30 (1987).
628. See generally the website of ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org. ASEAN was
established in 1969 and, as of 2004, consists of ten members: Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and
Cambodia.
629. These include: the Manila Declaration on the ASEAN Environment 1981;
the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
1985; the Kuala Lumpur Accord on the Environment and Development 1990; the
Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development, the ASEAN Common
Stand on Environment and Development 1992; and the Bandar Seri Begawan Reso-
lution on Environment and Development 1994. Boer, supra note 159, at 1525. Inter-
governmental environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia is not so as extensively
institutionalised. See Kim Myungjin, Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia,
22 IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL 191 (2004).
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the ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment 1999-
2004,630 as well as specialist plans, such as the ASEAN Coopera-
tive Plan on Transboundary Pollution 1995.631 According to Pro-
fessor Ben Boer, "the effectiveness of such measures however
suffers from weakness in monitoring, assisting and ensuring state
compliance. This is because of the 'ASEAN way' and its prefer-
ence for non-interference in the domestic affairs of member
states; for non-binding plans, instead of treaties; and for central-
ized institutions with relatively little initiative and resources.
632
The only ASEAN treaty for environmental protection - the
ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources 1985 - has never come into effect owing to insuffi-
cient ratifications. 633 The APEC forum has had even less affec-
tion for environmental policy reform. 634 In March 1994, APEC
member governments adopted an Environmental Vision State-
ment and a Framework of Principles for integrating economic
and environment policy concerns. 635 Despite grand visions, opti-
mistic agendas, and some gains in normative standards and ca-
pacity-building, APEC's broader sustainable development
agenda has had "little to show in terms of implementation or im-
provements in environmental performance. '636 Like ASEAN, its
rhetoric of sustainability has failed to deliver, while its broad
agenda of financial and market liberalization might even have
accelerated natural resource degradation. There does, however,
appear to be a tentative, long-term political commitment to envi-
ronmental management across the region.
At a broader, global level, there are a miscellany of institu-
tions and treaties that incorporate mechanisms to enable devel-
oping countries to modernize their domestic laws to implement
treaty obligations. Various countries in East Asia are reforming
630. ASEAN, STRATEGIC PLAN OF ACTION ON THE ENVIRONMENT 1994-1998,
available at http://www.aseansec.org/8950.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
631. ASEAN, COOPERATION PLAN ON TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/8938.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
632. Boer, supra note 156, at 1527-28.
633. Text available at http://sunsite.nus.edu.sg/apcel/kltreaty.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2005). It is unclear why ASEAN members rejected their own regional
treaty, but it might be because their governments felt that they should not incur
obligations to protect their environment without tying such obligations to Western
financial and technical assistance, which could be secured through a global, rather
than a regional, environmental treaty.
634. See Lyuba Zarsky & Jason Hunter, Environmental Cooperation at APEC:
The First Five Years, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 323 (1997).
635. ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION [hereinafter APEC], http://www.
apecsec.org.sg/apec/apec-groups/other-apecgroups/sustainable-development.html
(last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
636. Jason Hunter, APEC: Promise or Peril in the Asia-Pacific, 2 ECOLOGI-
CAL ECON. BULL. 3 (1997), available at http://www.nautilus.org/archives/papers/
enviro/hunter_apec.html#II (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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their environmental laws in collaboration with international or-
ganizations. 637 For example, the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) has assisted scores of countries through its En-
vironmental Law and Institutions Programme Activity Centre in
Nairobi, and its UNEP Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
in Bangkok. Environmental law training programs have also
been funded by the Asian Development Bank and coordinated
by the National University of Singapore and the IUCN Commis-
sion on Environmental Law.638
Besides such support, the channelling of financial and tech-
nological assistance through treaties is vital to enhance the insti-
tutional capacity of Newly Industrialized Countries. Most East
Asian nations have ratified the major multilateral environmental
treaties, many of which provide the states parties with enhanced
access to environmental technologies and financial assistance. 639
For example, China's success in reducing ozone-depleting chemi-
cals owes principally to the financial and technological support it
received from joining the Montreal Protocol. 640 The Kyoto Pro-
toco1641 will likely play an even more influential role, mainly by
means of its dedicated funds64 2 to help developing countries
abate CO 2 emissions through technology transfer for energy effi-
ciency and by land use and waste management changes. 643 The
Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can
also support investments in non-fossil energy projects in develop-
ing countries. 644 China probably will become the largest recipient
of CDM projects, and its authorities have already given priority
637. Boer, supra note 156, at 1513-14.
638. Id.
639. See IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN GERMANY
AND CHINA (Zhengua Tao & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2001).
640. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550, available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/pdfs/Montreal-Proto-
col2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2005); see Jimin Zhao, The Multilateral Fund and
China's Compliance with the Montreal Protocol, 11 J. ENV'T & DEV. 331 (2002).
641. Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change [herein-
after Kyoto Protocol], Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/re-
source/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
642. Namely, the Special Climate Change Fund, Least Developed Countries
Fund and Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund. See Suraje Dessai, The Special Climate
Change Fund: Origins and Prioritisation Assessment, 3 CLIMATE POL'Y 295 (2003),
available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/-e120782/papers/sccf.pdf (last visited Apr. 17,
2005).
643. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE
BONN AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE (July 23, 2001), available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comn/environment/climat/pressbckgnd.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
644. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 641, art. 12(3)(b). The CDM allows industrial
countries to invest in projects in non-Annex I parties and to use the "certified emis-
sions reductions" that derive from the projects towards compliance with their Proto-
col commitments.
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to energy efficiency and renewable energy projects for CDM-
finance.645
China is estimated to be the world's second-largest emitter
of greenhouse gases (GHG), behind the United States. 646 Most
of China's GHG emissions come from burning coal, which is the
country's staple energy source. Significantly, it seems that
China's CO2 emissions decreased by 7.3 percent between 1996
and 2000 due to the implementation of new energy efficiency
technologies and the closure of obsolete SOE factories. 647 Al-
though the PRC did not accept a mandatory emissions target
when it ratified the Kyoto Protocol in August 2002, Chinese
agencies have been developing programs to reduce CO2 emis-
sions in collaboration with international partners under the CDM
program. The Chinese government has established a National
CDM Management Office to coordinate its participation in the
mechanism. 648 So far, Canada has been the most active govern-
ment to participate in CDM-related projects in China.649
Bilateral and multilateral aid and loans can also provide a
conduit for environmental assistance. Japan is the most generous
bilateral donor in the region, and a significant number of its aid
projects contain environmental improvement elements.650 The
European Union (EU) is emerging as a major donor in the re-
gion, and its environmental initiatives include the EU-China En-
vironmental Management Co-operation Programme (2001-
2005),651 and the EU-China Liaoning integrated Environmental
Programme (1999-2004).652 An increasing proportion of World
Bank and Asian Development Bank finance is also tied to sus-
tainable development practices. 653 Typically, loan agreements in-
clude environmental standards such as EIA of proposed
645. Kristian Tangen & Grild Heggelund, Will the Clean Development Mecha-
nism be Effectively Implemented in China? 3 CLIMATE POL'Y 303, 304 (2003).
646. See Deborah E. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol and China: Global Warming's
Sleeping Giant, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 404 (1999).
647. David G. Streets et al., Recent Reductions in China's Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions, 294 Sci. 1835, 1835 (2001).
648. For background, see Tauna Szymanski, The Clean Development Mechanism
in China, 29 CHINA Bus. REV. 26 (2002).
649. The collaboration has mostly occurred through the Canada-China Climate
Change Cooperation Project, at http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/english/source/ea/ea2002
121201.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
650. Tremayne & Waal, supra note 413.
651. See http://www.cestt.org.cn/emcp/index/eindex.jsp?id=0103000000 (last vis-
ited Apr. 17, 2005).
652. See http://www.eu-lnip.com/en/061.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
653. Lin Gan, World Bank Policies, Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduc-
tion, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE IMPACT ON REGIONS, MIGRATION AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 282, at 184, 193.
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projects. 654 The environmental effects of foreign investment can
be mitigated when project financing is linked to co-financing con-
sortia with multilateral development agencies operating under
usually stricter environmental management controls.655 In this
way, a limited stream of aid money could serve as an environ-
mental screen for a far larger pool of private capital. Co-financ-
ing arrangements are often sponsored through the World Bank
Group's International Finance Corporation 656 and the Multilat-
eral Investment Guarantee Agency. 65 7 All World Bank agencies
are bound by the mother bank's environmental and social
policies.658
At a strategic level, the World Bank also usually requires
each borrower to prepare a national environmental strategy.659
Professor Michael Rock argues that such requirements have "at-
tracted the attention of political and policy elites in East Asia
and created a political space for those in and out of government
who wanted to see more environmentally friendly pollution man-
agement policies. ' 660 No doubt, the international donor commu-
nity itself has to undergo further institutional reform if it is to be
a more positive driver of environmental change in East Asia.
There is a litany of environmentally reckless investments sup-
ported by the World Bank and its financial accomplices. 661 Apart
from adopting stronger environmental policies, international fin-
anciers must increase their environmental staffing, improve coor-
dination of assistance programs, and open up their operations to
greater public information and participation. 662
654. See ROBERT STEIN & BRIAN JOHNSON, BANKING ON THE BIOSPHERE? EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES OF NINE MULTILATERAL DEVELOP-
MENT AGENCIES (1979); THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK,
NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds.,
1998).
655. PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS FROM LATIN
AMERICA (Bradford S. Gentry ed., 1999); Zhongxiang Zhang & Aki Maruyama, To-
wards a Private-Public Synergy in Financing Climate Change Mitigation Projects, 29
ENERGY POL'Y 1363 (2001).
656. The website of the International Finance Corporation, http://www.ifc.org.
657. The website of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, http://www.
miga.org.
658. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK operational manual, operational policies, at
4.01 (Jan. 1999) (Environmental Assessment).
659. WORLD BANK, TAKING STOCK OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES
(1995), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/1999/09/14/000178830_98101912362529/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf
(last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
660. Rock, supra note 180, at 94.
661. Bruce M. Rich, The "Greening" of the Development Banks: Rhetoric and
Reality, 19 ECOLOGIST 44 (1989).
662. Sims, supra note 201, at 1236-37.
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VI. CLOSING REMARKS
East Asia is industrializing very quickly, causing environmental
policy to dangerously trail economic modernization. Its market
reforms clearly present threats to the environment but also, iron-
ically, some possible solutions. If the region is to avoid uneven
modernization, policy-makers must prioritize long-term environ-
mental health above short-term and possibly ephemeral eco-
nomic gains. Interestingly, while the SEZs pose momentous
environmental challenges, the zones do not appear to be suffer-
ing from pollution problems any worse than other parts of East
Asia. There have been some problems associated with inappro-
priate relations between local administrations and businesses in
the SEZs, but the environmental governance of SEZs appears, in
general, to be at least as competent as other parts of East Asia's
economies. Because the SEZs attract new industries often utiliz-
ing more advanced technologies and efficient production meth-
ods, those firms can often pose a lower pollution burden
compared to the old, industrial state-run enterprises. Foreign in-
vestment can certainly be a force that exacerbates environmental
problems in developing countries, but it can also offer some envi-
ronmental and social benefits, as the experience of China's SEZs
testifies. Because of their high profile and greater wealth, foreign
investors in SEZs are also likely to be subject to stricter environ-
mental regulation than local firms. So, the most pressing areas
for environmental law reform are not necessarily those in the
kernel of industrialization. The most serious environmental
problems posed by East Asia's SEZs tend to be more long-term
and indirect, notably their contribution to the development of a
Western-style consumer culture and an increase in greenhouse
gas emissions.
International environmental law and intergovernmental as-
sistance are necessary elements in the modernization of East
Asia's environmental regulations and policies. More use of eco-
nomic instruments and other ecological modernization reforms
will be vital to ensuring the sustainable economic transformation
of East Asia's SEZs. But while external forces can provide a cat-
alyst for some change, they alone will not secure a sustainable
future. The region's legal and political systems pose a range of
deep-rooted structural barriers to environmental reform. The
rule of (environmental) law has yet to become firmly established
in East Asia. A national constituency for law reform has to exist;
it can neither be manufactured nor led from outside. While rele-
vant laws, practices, and processes of law reform from other
countries can and should be assessed during the reform pro-
gramme, the output has to be seen to be national, dovetailing
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into the existing corpus of law and appropriate to local circum-
stances. East Asian governments' growing preference for mar-
ket-based governance would therefore appear to offer
opportunities for ecological modernization policy reforms.
Most capacity-building efforts to date have focused on core
national institutions but not on regional and local governments.
Among the various problems is the need to enhance the institu-
tional capacity of municipal authorities to be environmental reg-
ulators, and to change the incentive structure for taking
environmental protection action. The extent to which national
environmental policy goals are attained is strongly influenced by
the effectiveness of the local implementation apparatus. Central
governments should require all local administrations in the SEZs
to establish environmental protection bureaux of first-tier status
and equip them with adequate staff and resources. Some of the
revenue from SEZs should be earmarked specifically for these
bureaux. East Asian governments must also enhance institutional
mechanisms for cross-jurisdictional environmental cooperation
among local authorities.
Environmental law reform in the region must also be linked
to wider changes to promote democracy, respect for human
rights and good governance. Thus, opportunities for meaningful
citizen participation in decision-making should be enhanced and
the independence of the courts strengthened, which together can
thereby help counterbalance the problematic alliances between
local governments and local capital in some zones. The authors
of a study on Civil Society and the Future of Environmental Gov-
ernance in Asia argue that the "growth and effectiveness of
* [Asian] civil society - and the process of democratization that
nourish it - are likely to be the most significant force in the emer-
gence and implementation of [a new paradigm of ecologically
sustainable and equitable development in Asia]. '663 Their recom-
mended direction for Asian governments is to include a broad
array of stakeholders (both business and civil society) that can
potentially function as a "crucial driver for paradigm and policy
change. '664 The development of a vibrant civil society and
greater democratization is a crucial complement to the SEZ mar-
ket reforms. Increased political pluralism can enhance the influ-
ence of civil society, providing an important counter-weight to
the state and the market.
663. Lyuba Zarsky & Simon Tay, Abstract, Civil Society and the Future of Envi-
ronmental Governance in Asia (2000), available at http://www.nautilus.org/archives/
papers/enviro/zarsky-tay.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
664. Id.
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